THE
LIVING TEMPLE.

PART II.

CONTAINING
ANIMADVERSIONS ON SPINOSA,

AND

A FRENCH WRITER
PRETENDING TO CONFUTE HIM.

WITH

A RECAPITULATION OF THE FORMER PART,

AND AN ACCOUNT OF THE DESTITUTION AND RESTITUTION OF

GOD'S TEMPLE AMONG MEN.
A

PREFACE,

Shewing the inducement and general contents of this Second Part. The occasion of considering Spinoza, and a French writer who pretends to confute him. A specimen of the way and strength of the former's reasoning, as an introduction to a more distinct examination of such of his positions, as the design of this discourse was more directly concerned in.

It is not worth the while to trouble the reader with an account why the progress of this work (begun many years ago, in a former Part) hath been so long delayed; or why it is now resumed. There are cases wherein things too little for public notice, may be sufficient reasons to one's self: and such self-satisfaction is all that can be requisite, in a matter of no more importance than that circumstance only, of the time of sending abroad a discourse, of such a nature and subject, as that if it can be useful at any time, will be so at all times. The business of the present discourse, is religion; which is not the concern of an age only, or of this or that time, but of all times; and which, in respect of its grounds and basis, is eternal, and can never cease or vary. But if in its use and exercise it do at any time more visibly languish, by attempts against its foundations, an endeavour to establish them, if it be not altogether unfit to serve that purpose, will not be liable to be blamed as unreasonable. Every one will understand, that a design further to establish the grounds of religion, can have no other meaning, than only to represent their stability unshaken by any attempts upon them; that being all that is either possible in this case, or needful. Nothing more is possible: for if there be not already, in the nature of things, a sufficient foundation of religion, it is now too late; for their course and order cannot begin again. Nor is any thing, besides such a representation, needful: for have the adventures of daring wits (as they are fond of being thought) altered the nature of things? Or hath their mere breath thrown the world off from its ancient basis, and new-moulded the universe, so as to make things be after the way of their own hearts? Or have they prevailed upon themselves, firmly to believe things are as they would wish?

One would be ashamed to be of that sort of creature, called Man, and count it an unsufferable reproach to be long unresolved, Whether there
ought to be such a thing in the world as religion, yea, or no. What ever came on it, or whatsoever I did or did not besides, I would drive this business to an issue; I would never endure to be long in suspense about so weighty and important a question. But if I inclined to the negative, I would rest in nothing short of the plainest demonstration: for I am to dispute against mankind; and eternity hangs upon it. If I misjudge, I run counter to the common sentiments of all the world, and I am lost for ever. The opposers of it have nothing but inclination to oppose to it, with a bold jest now and then. But if I consider the unrebutted demonstrations brought for it, with the consequences, religion is the last thing in all the world upon which I would adventure to break a jest. And I would ask such as have attempted to argue against it, Have their strongest arguments conquered their fear? Have they no suspicion left, that the other side of the question may prove true? They have done all they can, by often repeating their faint despairing wishes, and the mutterings of their hearts, "No God! no God!" to make themselves believe there is none; when yet the restless tossings to and fro of their uneasy minds; their tasking and torturing that little residue of wit and common sense, which their riot hath left them, (the excess of which latter, as well shews as causes the defect of the former,) to try every new method and scheme of atheism they hear of, implies their distrust of all; and their suspicion, that do what they can, things will still be as they were, that is, most adverse and unfavourable to that way of living, which however at a venture, they had before resolved on. Therefore, they find it necessary to continue their contrivances, how more effectually to disburden themselves of any obligation to be religious; and hope, at least, some or other great wit may reach further than their own; and that either by some new model of thoughts, or by not thinking, it may be possible at length to argue or wink the Deity into nothing, and all religion out of the world.

And we are really to do the age that right, as to acknowledge, the genius of it aims at more consistency and agreement with itself, and more cleverly to reconcile notions with common practice, than heretofore. Men seem to be grown weary of the old dull way of practising all manner of lewdnesses, and pretending to repent of them; to sin, and say they are sorry for it. The running this long-beaten circular tract of doing and repenting the same things, looks ridiculously, and they begin to be ashamed of it. A less interrupted and more progressive course in their licentious ways, looks braver; and they count it more plausible to disbelieve this world to have any ruler at all, than to suppose it to have such a one as they can cheat and mock with so easy and ridiculous a repentance, or reconcile to their wickedness, only by calling themselves wicked, while they still mean to continue so. And perhaps of any other repentance they have not heard much; or if they have, they count it a more heroical, or feel it an easier thing to laugh away the fear of any future account or punishment, than to endure the severities of a serious repentance, and a regular life. Nor can they, however, think the tortures of any hell so little tolerable as those of a sober and serious life upon earth. And for their happening to prove everlasting, they think they may run the hazard of that. For as they can make a sufficient shift to secure themselves from the latter sort of torments, so they believe the champions of their cause have taken sufficient care to secure them from the former.
As religion hath its gospel and evangelists, so hath atheism and irreligion too. There are tidings of peace sent to such as shall repent and turn to God: and there have been those appointed, whose business it should be to publish and expound them to the world. This also is the method for carrying on the design of irreligion. Doctrines are invented to make men fearless, and believe they need no repentance. And some have taken the part to assert and defend such doctrines, to evangelize the world, and cry "peace, peace," to men, upon these horrid terms. And these undertake for the common herd, encourage them to indulge themselves all manner of liberty, while they watch for them, and guard the coasts: and no faith was ever more implicit or resigned, than the infidelity and disbelief of the more unthinking sort of these men. They reckon it is not every one's part to think. It is enough for the most to be boldly wicked, and credit their common cause, by an open contempt of God and religion. The other warrant them safe, and confidently tell them they may securely disbelieve all that ever hath been said, to make a religious regular life be thought necessary; as only invented frauds of sour and ill-natured men, that envy to mankind the felicity whereof their nature hath made them capable, and which their own odd preternatural humour makes them neglect and censure.

And for these defenders of the atheistical cause, it being their part and province to cut off the aids of reason from religion, to make it seem an irrational and a ridiculous thing, and to warrant and justify the disuse and contempt of it, and as it were, to cover the siege, wherewith the common rout have begirt the temple of God; they have had less leisure themselves, to debauch and wallow in more grossly sensual impieties. Herewith the thinking part did less agree: and they might perhaps count it a greater thing to make debauchees than to be such, and reckon it was glory enough to them to head and lead on the numerous throng, and pleasure enough to see them they had so thoroughly disciplined to the service, throw dirt and squibs at the sacred pile, the dwelling of God among men on earth, and cry, "Down with it even to the ground." Nor for this sort of men, whose business was only to be done by noise and clamour, or by jest and laughter, we could think them no more fit to be discoursed with than a whirlwind, or an ignis fatuus. But for such as have assumed to themselves the confidence to pretend to reason, it was not fit they should have cause to think themselves neglected. Considering, therefore, that if the existence of a Deity were fully proved, (that is, such as must be the fit object of religion, or of the honour of a temple,) all the little cavils against it must signify nothing, (because the same thing cannot be both true and false,) we have in the former part of this discourse, endeavoured to assert so much in an argumentative way. And therefore first laid down such a notion of God, as even atheists themselves, while they deny him to exist, cannot but grant to be the true notion of the thing they deny; namely, summarily, that he can be no other than a being absolutely perfect. And thereupon next proceeded to evince the existence of such a being. And whereas this might have been attempted in another method, as was noted Part 1. Ch. 1. by concluding the existence of such a being first from the idea of it, which (as a fundamental perfection) involves existence; yea, and necessity of existence, most appaently in it. Because that was clamoured at as sophistical and captious,
A PREFACE.

(though very firm unslliding steps might, with caution, be taken in that way,* yet we rather chose the other as plainer, more upon the square, more easily intelligible and convictive, and less liable to exception in any kind; that is, rather to begin at the bottom, and rise from necessity of existence, to absolute perfection, than to begin at the top, and prove downward, from absolute perfection, necessity of existence.

Now, if it do appear from what hath been said concerning the nature of necessary, self-existing being, that it cannot but be absolutely perfect, even as it is such, since nothing is more evident than that some being or other doth exist necessarily, or of itself, our point is gained without more ado: that is, we have an object of religion, or one to whom a temple duly belongs. We thereupon used some endeavour to make that good, and secure that more compendious way to our end; as may be seen in the former Part. Which was endeavoured as it was a nearer and more expeditious course; not that the main cause of religion did depend upon the immediate and self-evident reciprocal connexion of the terms, necessary existence, and absolute perfection, as we shall see hereafter in the following discourse: but because there are other hypotheses, that proceed either upon the denial of any necessary being that is absolutely perfect, or upon the assertion of some necessary being that is not absolutely perfect; it hence appears requisite, to undertake the examination of what is said to either of these purposes, and to shew with how little pretence a necessary most perfect being is denied, or any such imperfect necessary being, is either asserted or imagined.

We shall therefore in this Second Part, First, take into consideration what is (with equal absurdity and impiety) asserted by one author, of the identity of all substance, of the impossibility of one substance being produced by another, and consequently of one necessary self-existing being, pretended with gross self-repugnancy, to be endued with infinite perfections, but really represented the common receptacle of all imaginable imperfection and confusion.—Next, what is asserted by another in avowed opposition to him, of a necessary self-existent being, that is at the same time said to be essentially imperfect.—Then we shall recapitulate what had been discoursed in the former Part, for proof of such a necessarily existent and absolutely perfect being, as is there asserted.—Thence we shall proceed to shew how reasonably scripture testimony is to be relied upon, in reference to some things concerning God, and the religion of his temple, which either are not so clearly demonstrable, or not at all discoverable the rational way.—And shall lastly shew how it hath come to pass, if God be such as he hath been represented, so capable of a temple with man, so apt and inclined to inhabit such a one, that he should ever not do so; or how such a temple should ever cease, or be uninhabited and desolate, that the known way of its restitution may be the more regardable and marvellous in our eyes.

The authors against whom we are to be concerned, are Benedictus Spinoza, a Jew, and an anonymous French writer, who pretends to confute him. And the better to prepare our way, we shall go on to preface something concerning the former, namely, Spinoza, whose scheme, (as it is laid down in his

* As by the excellent Dr. Cudworth, in his Intellectual System, we find it done.
Posthumous Ethicks,) though with great pretence of devotion, it acknowledges a Deity, yet so confounds this his fictitious Deity with every substantial being in the world besides, that upon the whole it appears altogether inconsistent with any rational exercise or sentiment of religion at all. And indeed, the mere pointing with the finger at the most discernible and absurd weakness of some of his principal supports, might be sufficient to overturn his whole fabric; though perhaps he thought the fraudulent artifice of contriving it geometrically must confound all the world, and make men think it not liable to be attacked in any part.

But whether it can, or no, we shall make some present trial; and for a previous essay, (to shew that he is not invulnerable, and that his scales do not more closely cohere, than those of his brother-leviathan,) do but compare his definition of an attribute. * "That which the understanding perceives of substance; as constituting the essence thereof" with his fifth Proposition, "There cannot be two, or more substances of the same nature, or attribute," which is as much as to say that two substances cannot be one and the same substance. For the attribute of any substance (saith he) constitutes its essence; whereas the essence therefore of one thing, cannot be the essence of another thing, if such an attribute be the essence of one substance, it cannot be the essence of another substance. A rare discovery! and which needed mathematical demonstration! Well, and what now? Nothing it is true can be plainer, if by the same attribute or nature, he means numerically the same; it only signifies one thing is not another thing. But if he mean there cannot be two things or substances, of the same special or general nature, he hath his whole business yet to do, which how he does, we shall see in time.

But now compare herewith his definition of what he thinks fit to dignify with the sacred name of God, † "By God (saith he) I understand a being absolutely infinite; that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, every one whereof expresses an infinite essence." And behold the admirable agreement! how amicably his definition of an attribute, and that mentioned proposition, accord with this definition (as he calls it) of God! There cannot be two substances, he saith, that have the same attribute, that is, the same essence. But now it seems the same substance may have infinite attributes, that is, infinite essences! O yes, very conveniently: for, he tells you that two attributes really distinct, we cannot conclude do constitute two divers substances. ‡ And why do they not? Because it belongs to the nature of substance, that each of its attributes be conceived by itself, &c. Let us consider his assertion, and his reason for it. He determines, you see, two really distinct attributes do not constitute two divers substances. You must not here take any other men's notion of an attribute, according to which, there may be accidental attributes, that, we are sure, would not infer diversity of substances for their subjects; or, there may be also essential ones, that only flow from the essence of the thing to which they belong; so, too, nobody doubts one thing may have many properties. But we must take his own notion of an attribute, according where to it constitutes, or (which is all one) is, that very essence. Now will not such attributes as these, being really distinct, make di-

* Ethic. Part 1. Def. 4. † Definit. 6. ‡ Schol. in Prop. 10.
vers substances? Surely what things are essentially diverse, must be concluded to be most diverse. But these attributes are by himself supposed to be really distinct, and to constitute (which is to be) the essence of the substance. And how is that one thing, or one substance, which hath many essences? If the essence of a thing be that, by which it is what it is, surely the plurality of essences must make a plurality of things.

But it may be said, Cannot one thing be compounded of two or more things essentially diverse, as the soul and body of a man; whence therefore, the same thing, namely, a man, will have two essences? This is true, but impertinent. For the very notion of composition signifies these are two things united, not identified, that are capable of being again separated; and that the third thing, which results from them both united, contains them still distinct from one another, not the same.

But it may be said, though these attributes are acknowledged and asserted to be distinct from one another, they are yet found in one and the same substance common to them all. And this no more ought to be reckoned repugnant to common reason, than the philosophy heretofore in credit, which taught that the vast diversity of forms throughout the universe, which were counted so many distinct essences, do yet all reside in the same first matter, as the common receptacle of them all.

Nor yet doth this salve the business, were that philosophy ever so sure and sacred. For you must consider he asserts an attribute is that which constitutes the essence of the substance in which it is. But that philosophy never taught the forms lodged in the same common matter were its essence, though they were supposed to essentiate the *composita*, which resulted from their union therewith. Yea, it did teach they were so little the essence of that common matter, that they might be expelled out of it, and succeeded by new ones, and yet the matter which received them still remain the same. But that an attribute should be supposed to be the essence of the substance to which it belongs; and that another superadded attribute, which is also the essence of substance, should not make another substance essentially distinct, is an assertion as repugnant to common sense, as two and two make not four. But that which completes the jest, (though a tremendous one upon so awful a subject,) is, that this author should so gravely tell the world, they who are not of his sentiment, being ignorant of the causes of things, confound all things; imagine trees and men speaking alike, confound the divine nature with the human, &c. * Who would imagine this to be the complaining voice of one so industriously labouring to mingle heaven and earth! and to make God, and men, and beasts, and stones, and trees, all one and the same individual substance!

And now let us consider the reason of that assertion of his; why two attributes really distinct, do not constitute two beings, or two distinct substances; because, saith he, it is of the nature of substance that each of its attributes be conceived by itself, &c. A marvellous reason! Divers attributes, each whereof, as before, constitutes the essence of substance, do not make divers substances; because those attributes may be conceived apart from each other, and are not produced by one another. It was too plain to need a proof, (as was observed before,) that there cannot

* Schol. 2. in Prop. 8. Part 1.  † Schol. in Prop. 10.
be two substances of one attribute, or of one essence, (as his notion of an attribute is,) that is, two are not one. But that two attributes or essences of substance, cannot make two substances, because they are diverse, is very surprisingly strange. This was (as Cicero upon as good an occasion speaks) not to consider but cast lots what to say. And it deserves observation too, how well this assertion, "That two distinct attributes do not constitute two distinct substances," agrees with that,* "Two substances having diverse attributes, have nothing common between them." This must certainly suppose the diversity of attributes to make the greatest diversity of substances imaginable; when they admit not there should be anything (not the least thing?) common between them! And yet they make not distinct substances!

But this was only to make way for what was to follow, the overthrow of the creation. A thing he was so over intent upon, that in the heat of his zeal and haste, he makes all fly asunder before him, and overturns even his own batteries as fast as he raises them; says and unsays, does and undone, at all adventures. Here two substances are supposed having diverse attributes, that is, diverse essences, to have therefore nothing common between them; and yet presently after, though two, or ever so many diverse attributes, give unto substance two, or ever so many diverse essences, yet they shall not be so much as two, but one only. For to the query put by himself, By what sign one may discern the diversity of substances? he roundly answers, (Schol. in Prop. 10.) The following propositions would shew there was no other substance but one, and that one infinite, and therefore how substances were to be diversified would be inquired in vain. Indeed, it would be in vain, if knowing them to have diverse essences, we must not yet call them different substances. But how the following propositions do shew there can be no more than one substance, we shall see in time. We shall for the present take leave of him, until we meet him again in the following discourse.

* Prop. 2
Wherein is shewn, I. The destructiveness of Spinoza’s scheme and design to religion and the temple of God. II. The repugnancy of his doctrine to this assertion—That whatsoever exists necessarily and of itself, is absolutely perfect; which is therefore further weighed. III. His vain attempt to prove what he designs: also his second proposition considered. IV. His definition of a substance defective; and proves not his purpose. V. His third, fourth, fifth, and sixth propositions considered. VI. His fourth axiom examined. VII. His seventh and eighth propositions; his eighth Scholia. VIII. His inconsistency with himself, and with reason and religion. IX. The manuductio ad pantosophiam—A guide to all kinds of wisdom. X. Concluding remarks.

HITHERTO we have discoursed only of the Owner of this temple, and shewn to whom it rightfully belongs; namely, That there is one only necessary, self-existing, and most absolutely-perfect Being, the glorious and ever-blessed God—who is capable of our converse, and inclined thereto; whom we are to conceive as justly claiming a temple with us, and ready, upon our willing surrender, to erect in us, or repair such a one, make it habitable, to inhabit and replenish it with his holy and most delectable presence, and converse with us therein suitably to himself and us; that is, to his own excellency and fulness, and to our indigency and wretchedness. And now the order of discourse would lead us to behold the sacred structure rising, and view the surprising methods by which it is brought about, that any such thing should have place in such a world as this. But we must yield to stay, and be detained a little by some things of greater importance than merely the more even shape and order of a discourse; that is, looking back upon what hath been much insisted on in the
former Part—That some being or other doth exist necessarily
and of itself, which is of absolute or universal perfection—
and taking notice of the opposite sentiments of some hereto;
because the whole design of evincing an object of religion
would manifestly be much served hereby, we could not but
reckon it of great importance to consider what is said against
it. We have observed in the Preface a two-fold opposite hy-
thesis, which therefore, before we go further in the discourse
of this temple of God, require to be discussed.

I. The first is that of Spinosa, which he hath more ex-
pressly stated, and undertaken with great pomp and boast to
demonstrate, in his Posthumous Ethicks; which we shall
therefore so far consider, as doth concern our present design.
He there, as hath been noted in the Preface, asserts all "sub-
stance to be self-existent, and to be infinite; that one substance
is improducible by another; that there is but one, and this one
he calls God, &c." Now this horrid scheme of his, though he and
his followers would cheat the world with names, and with a spe-
cious shew of piety, is as directly levelled against all religion,
as any the most avowed atheism: for, as to religion, it is all one
whether we make nothing to be God, or every thing; whether we
allow or no God to be worshipped, or leave none to worship him.
His portentous attempt to identify and deify all substance, at-
tended with that strange pair of attributes, extension and
thought, (and an infinite number of others besides,) hath a
manifest design to throw religion out of the world that way.

II. And it most directly opposes the notion of a self-existent
Being, which is absolutely perfect: for such a being must be
a substance, if it be any thing; and he allows no substance but
one, and therefore none to be perfect, unless all be so. And
since we are sure some is imperfect, it will be consequent there
is none absolutely perfect; for that the same should be imper-
fected, and absolutely perfect, is impossible. Besides, that he
makes it no way possible to one substance to produce another,
and what is so impotent must be very imperfect: yea, and
whatsoever is not omnipotent, is evidently not absolutely per-
fected. We are therefore cast upon reconsidering this proposition
—Whatsoever being exists necessarily and of itself, is absolutely
perfect. It is true that if any being be evinced to exist necessarily
and of itself, which is absolutely perfect, this gives us an ob-
ject of religion, and throws Spinosa's farrago, his confused
heap and jumble of self-existent being, into nothing. But
if we carry the universal proposition as it is laid down, though
that will oblige us afterwards as well to confute his French confuter, as him; it carries the cause of religion with much the greater clearness, and with evident, unexceptionable self-consistency. For indeed that being cannot be understood to be absolutely perfect, which doth not eminently comprehend the entire fulness of all being in itself; as that must be a heap of imperfection, an everlasting chaos, an impossible, self-repugnant medley, that should be pretended to contain all the varieties, the diversifications, compositions, and mixtures of things in itself formally. And for the universal proposition: the matter itself requires not an immediate, self-evident, reciprocal connexion of the terms—necessarily self-existent, and absolutely perfect.—It is enough that it however be brought about by gradual steps, in a way that at length cannot fail; and I conceive hath been in the method that was followed in the former Part.

For, to bring the business now within as narrow a compass as is possible: nothing is more evident than that some being exists necessarily, or of itself; otherwise nothing at all could now exist. Again, for the same reason, there is some necessary or self-existent being that is the cause of whatsoever being exists not of itself; otherwise, nothing of that kind could ever come into being. Now that necessary being, which is the cause of all other being, will most manifestly appear to be absolutely perfect. For, if it be universally causative of all other being, it must both have been the actual cause of all being that doth actually exist, and can only be the possible cause of all that is possible to exist. Now so universal a cause can be no other than an absolutely or universally perfect being. For it could be the cause of nothing, which it did not virtually or formally comprehend in itself. And that being which comprehends in itself all perfection, both actual and possible, must be absolutely or universally perfect. And such a being, as hath also further more particularly been made apparent, must be an intelligent and a designing agent, or cause; because, upon the whole universe of produced beings, there are most manifest characters of design, in the passive sense; that is, of their having been designed to serve ends to which they have so direct and constant an aptitude; so that the attempt to make it be believed they were forced or fell into that posture of subserviency to such and such ends, by any pretended necessity upon their principal cause or causes, or by mere casualty, looks like the most ludicrous trifling to any man of sense. For among produced be-
ings there are found to be many, that are themselves actively designing, and that do understandingly intend and pursue ends; and consequently that they themselves must partake of an intelligent, spiritual nature, since mere matter is most manifestly incapable of thought or design. And also, by the most evident consequence, that their productive cause, (namely, the necessary, self-existing being, whereto all other things owe themselves,) must be a mind or spirit, inasmuch as to suppose any effect to have any thing more of excellency in it than the cause from whence it proceeded, is to suppose all that excellency to be effected without a cause, or to have arisen of itself out of nothing. See former Part, Chap. III. Sect. VII.

Page 144.

Therefore if it did not immediately appear that necessary being, as such, is absolutely perfect being; yet, by this series of discourse, it appears that the main cause of religion is still safe; inasmuch as that necessary being which is the cause of all things else, is however evinced to be an absolutely perfect Being, and particularly a necessary self-existent Mind or Spirit, which is therefore a most apparently fit and most deserving object of religion, or of the honour of a temple; which is the sum of what we were concerned for. Nor did we need to be solicitous, but that the unity or onliness of the necessary Being, would afterwards be made appear, as also we think it was. For since the whole universe of produced being must arise out of that which was necessary self-existent Being, it must therefore comprehend all being in itself, its own formally, and eminently all other; that is, what was its own, being formally its own, must be eminently also all being else, contained in all possible simplicity, within the productive power of its own. This Being therefore containing in itself all that exists necessarily, with the power of producing all the rest, which together make up all being, can primarily be but one, inasmuch as there can be but one all. Upon the whole therefore, our general proposition is sufficiently evident, and out of question—That whatever exists necessarily, and of itself, is absolutely perfect. Nor is it at all incongruous that this matter should be thus argued out, by such a train and deduction of consequences, drawn from effects, that come under our present notice; for how come we to know that there is any self-existing Being at all, but that we find there is somewhat in being that is subject to continual mutation, and which therefore exists not necessarily, (for whatsoever is what it is necessarily, can never
change, or be other than what it is,) but must be caused by that which is necessary and self-existent. Nothing could be more reasonable or more certain than the deduction from what appears of excellency and perfection in such being as is caused; of the correspondent, and far-transcendent excellency and perfection of its cause. But yet, after all this, if one set himself attentively to consider, there must appear so near a connexion between the very things themselves, self-existence, and absolute perfection, that it can be no easy matter to conceive them separately.

Self-existence! Into how profound an abyss is a man cast at the thought of it! How doth it overwhelm and swallow up his mind and whole soul! With what satisfaction and delight must he see himself comprehended, of what he finds he can never comprehend! For contemplating the self-existent Being, he finds it eternally, necessarily, never-not existing! He can have no thought of the self-existing Being, as such, (Des Cartes,) but as always existing, as having existed always, as always certain to exist. Inquiring into the spring and source of this Being's existence, Whence is it that it doth exist? His own notion of a self-existing Being, which is not arbitrarily taken up, but which the reason of things hath imposed upon him, gives him his answer; and it can be no other, in that it is a self-existent Being, it hath it of itself, that it doth exist. It is an eternal, everlasting, spring and fountain of perpetually-existent being to itself. What a glorious excellency of being is this! What can this mean, but the greatest remoteness from nothing that is possible: that is, the most absolute fulness and plenitude of all being and perfection? And whereas all caused being, as such, is, to every man's understanding, confined within certain limits: what can the uncaused self-existent Being be, but most unlimited, infinite, all-comprehending, and most absolutely perfect? Nothing therefore can be more evident, than that the self-existent Being must be the absolutely perfect Being.

And again, if you simply convert the terms, and let this be the proposition,—That the absolutely-perfect Being is the self-existent Being—it is most obvious to every one, that the very notion of an absolutely-perfect Being carries necessity of existence, or self-existence, in it; which the notion of nothing else doth. And indeed one great Master (Dr. More) of this argument for the existence of God, hath himself told me, "That though when he had puzzled divers atheists with it they had been wont to quarrel at it, as sophistical and falla-
cious, he could never meet with any that could detect the sophism, or tell where any fallacy in it lay; and that, upon the whole, he relied upon it as most solid and firm. And I doubt not but it may be managed with that advantage as to be very clearly concluding; yet, because I reckoned the way I have taken more clear, I chose it rather. But finding that so near cognation and reciprocal connexion between the terms both ways, I reckoned this short representation hereof; annexed to the larger course of evincing the same thing, might add no unuseful strength to it; and doubt not to conclude, upon the whole, that—whatever Being exists necessarily, and of itself, is absolutely perfect—and can, therefore, be no other than an intelligent Being; that is, an infinite, eternal Mind, and so a most fit, and the only fit deserving object of religion, or of the honour of a temple.

III. But now, be all this ever so plain, it will, by some, be thought all false, if they find any man to have contrivance enough to devise some contrary scheme of things, and confidence enough to pretend to prove it; until that proof be detected of weakness and vanity, which must first be our further business with Spinosa. And not intending to examine particularly the several parts and junctures of his model, inasmuch as I find his whole design is lost, if he fail of evincing these things,—That it belongs to all substance, as such, to exist of itself, and be infinite.—And, (which will be sufficiently consequent hereupon,) That substance is but one, and that it is impossible for one substance to produce another. I shall only attend to what he more directly says to this effect, and shall particularly apply myself to consider such of his propositions as more immediately respect this his main design: for they will bring us back to the definitions and axioms, or other parts of his discourse, whereon those are grounded, and even into all the darker and more pernicious recesses of his labyrinth; so as every thing of importance to the mentioned purpose will be drawn under our consideration, as this thread shall lead us.

His first proposition we let pass; "That a substance is, in order of nature, before its affections;" having nothing applicable to his purpose in it, which we shall not otherwise meet with.

His second, "That two substances, having divers attributes, have nothing common between them;" or, which must be all one, do agree in nothing, I conceive it will be no great presumption to deny. And since he is pleased herein to be
divided from himself, it is a civility to his later and wiser self to do so, who will afterwards have substance, having a multitude of distinct attributes, that is, essences, (Schol. in Prop. 10.) and which therefore cannot but be manifold, to have every thing common. So little hath he common with himself.

And it will increase the obligation upon him, to deliver him from the entanglement of his demonstration, as he calls it, of this proposition; as I hope we shall also of the other too, for no doubt they are both false. Of this proposition his demonstration is fetched from his third definition, namely, of a substance, "That which is in itself, and conceived by itself; that is, whose conception needs the conception of nothing else, whereby it ought to be formed;" so is his definition defined over and over.

IV. We are here to inquire:—Into his definition of a substance: and, Whether it sufficiently prove his proposition.

First, For his definition of a substance. He himself tells us, (Schol. in Prop. 8.) "A definition ought to express nothing but the simple nature of the thing defined;" and we may as well expect it distinctly to express that. Both this definition express the simple nature of a substance, "That which is in itself," when it is left to divination what is meant by is, whether essence, or existence, or subsistence? And when we are to be at as random a guess, what is intended by being in itself? Whether being only contained, or being also sustained in, and by, or of itself? And supposing this latter to be meant, whether that self-subsistence exclude dependence only on another, as a subject, which we acknowledge true of all substance; or dependence as on an efficient, which if he will have to be taken for true of all, he was in reason to expect it should be so taken from his effectual proof, not from the reverence of his authority only: for what he adds, "And that is conceived by itself; and whose conception needs not the conception of any other thing by which it ought to be formed;"—would he have us believe this to be true, when afterward his tenth proposition is, "That every attribute of substance ought to be conceived by itself?" Whereupon then so many attributes, so many substances, it being the nature of a substance to be conceived by itself. But passing from his notion of a substance, let us consider,

Secondly, How it proves his proposition, that "Two substances, having different attributes, have nothing common between them." According to him, every attribute of substance
is to be conceived by itself; and yet have one and the same
substance common to them all: therefore the distinct concep-
tion of things is, even with him, no reason why they should
have nothing common between them. But as to the thing it-
self, he must have somewhat more enforcing than his defini-
tion of a substance, to prove that two (or many) individual sub-
stances may not have the same special nature common to them,
and yet be conceived by themselves; having different individual
natures or attributes, or different special natures, having the
same general nature. Yea, and an equal dependence on the
same common cause, which is a less ingredient in the concep-
tion of a thing, than the general or special nature is. And I
doubt not, we shall find he hath not disproved, but that there
is somewhat, in a true sense, common to them and their cause,
that is of a conception much more vastly different from them
both.

V. Whereupon, it is necessary to take distinct notice of
his third proposition, "What things have nothing common
between them, of them the one cannot be the cause of the
other." In which nothing is to be peculiarly animadverted
on, besides the contradiction in the very terms wherein it is
proposed, What things have nothing common between them.
How can they be things, and have nothing common between
them? If they be things, they have sure the general notion
of things common to them; there can therefore be no such
things, that have nothing common. And let this be supposed
to have been absurdly set down on purpose; yet now, for his
demonstration hereof, it rests upon a palpable falsehood—that
causes and effects must be mutually understood by one another;
as we shall see more hereafter.

His fourth proposition we let pass; what it hath regardable
in it, being as fitly to be considered under the fifth; "There
cannot be two or more substances, in the whole universe, of
the same nature or attribute;" unto which, besides what hath
been said already, we need only here to add, that (whereas
he hath told us, by the attribute of a substance, he means the
essence of it) if he here speak of the same numerical essence or
attribute, it is ridiculously true; and is no more than if he
had said, One thing is but one thing. If he speak of the same
special or general attribute or essence, it is as absurdly false;
and for the proof of it, in the latter sense his demonstration
signifies nothing. There may be more than one (as a stone, a
tree, an animal) that agree in the same general attribute of
corporeity, and are diversified by their special attributes; and
CHAP. I. THE LIVING TEMPLE.

there may be many of the same special attribute, (namely, of rationality,) as John, Peter, Thomas, &c. that are distinguished by their individual ones. He might as well prove, by the same method, the identity of his *modi*, as of substances; as that there can be but one individual triangle in all the world, of one attribute or property, as but one substance. Let (for instance) one at Paris, another at Vienna, a third at Rome, a fourth at London, describe each an equilateral triangle of the same dimensions, or in a thousand places besides; each one of these do only make one and the same numerical triangle, because they have each the same attribute. But how are the attributes of these several triangles the same? What! the same numerically? Then indeed they are all the same numerical triangle; for one and the same numerical essence makes but one and the same numerical thing. But who that is in his right wits would say so? And if it be only said they have all attributes of one and the same kind, what then is consequent, but that they are all triangles of one kind? Which who in his right wits will deny? And if the attribute of a substance be that which constitutes its essence, the attribute of any thing else is that which constitutes its essence. See then how far Spinoza hath advanced with his demonstration of the identity of substance! If he prove not all substance to be numerically the same, he hath done nothing to his purpose. And it is now obvious to every eye how effectually he hath done that.

Whence also it is further equally evident, that his demonstration dwindles into nothing; and gives no support to his sixth proposition, which contains the malignity of his whole design, namely, "That one substance cannot be produced by another substance," which rests (as you see) partly upon the fifth, "That there cannot be two substances of the same attribute," which in his sense is, as hath been shewn, most absurdly false, and the attempt of proving it as absurd; partly upon his second, "That two substances, of different attributes, have nothing common between them," which might be said of whatsoever else, as truly as of substances; but which is also most evidently untrue; and partly, upon his third, "That such things as have nothing common between them, the one of them cannot be the cause of the other," which depends upon two false suppositions,—"That there can be two things, which have nothing common between them;" which, as hath been noted, contradicts itself, and needs not be further stood upon. And—"That whatsoever things are cause and
effect, the one to the other, must be mutually understood by one another,” which we shall here more distinctly consider, it being also his second demonstration of the corollary of this his sixth proposition, (which nothing but a disposition to trifle, or having nothing to say, could have made him mention, as a corollary from this proposition, it being in effect but a repetition of the same thing,) namely, “That if one substance can be produced by another, (agent, or substance, which you please,) the knowledge of it must depend upon the knowledge of its cause, (by the fourth axiom,) and thereupon (by definition third) it should not be a substance.”

VI. We are here to examine this his fourth axiom, “That the knowledge of an effect depends upon the knowledge of its cause, and doth involve it.” An effect may be considered two ways; absolutely, as it is in itself, or relatively, as it is the effect of an efficient cause. It cannot, it is true, be understood to be the effect of such an efficient, but the knowledge that this was its efficient, is involved therein: for it is the same thing; and so much may be known, without knowing any thing of the nature of either the efficient or effect. But this signifies nothing to his purpose. He must therefore mean, that the knowledge of an effect absolutely considered, and in its own nature, depends upon and involves the knowledge of the nature of its efficient. Surely, the nature of a thing may be competently known by its true definition. But is the efficient cause, wont to be universally put into definitions? He tells us himself (Scholium second upon proposition eighth) “A true definition contains, or expresses, nothing, besides the mere nature of the thing defined.” And let any man that thinks it worth it, be at the pains to examine his own definitions in the several parts of this ethico-geometrical tract, and see whether he always puts the efficient cause into every definition. And (no doubt) he thought himself to define accurately. If all other men, who have so generally reckoned the efficient and end, external causes, and only matter and form internal, and ingredient into the nature of things, and therefore only fit to be put into definitions, were thought by him mistaken and out in their reckoning, it was however neither modest nor wise, to lay down for an axiom, a thing so contrary to the common sentiment of mankind; and, without the least attempt to prove it, go about to demonstrate by it, in so portentous a cause; and lay the whole weight of his horrid cause upon it; expecting all the world should be awed into an assent, by the authority of his bare word; and not presume to disbelieve or doubt it, only because he is pleased to stamp the
magisterial name of an axiom upon it. If therefore any man assume the boldness to deny his axiom, what is become of his demonstration? And whereas it is commonly apprehended, that definitions are not of individual things, but of special kinds, and is acknowledged by himself, (Prop. 24.)—"That the essence of things produced by God, involves not existence, and the production of a thing is nothing else but the putting it into actual existence;" why may not the abstract essence, or nature of things, be well enough conceived and defined, without involving the conception of their productive cause? And this enough shews, also, That this definition of a substance proves not, that one substance cannot be produced by another: namely, "That which can be conceived by itself," for so it may, without involving the conception of that which produces it; and so be a substance sufficiently according to his definition. Though there can be no inconvenience in admitting, that things understood apart, by themselves, may be afterwards further and more clearly understood, by considering and comparing them in the habitudes and references which they bear as causes and effects (or otherwise) to one another.

VII. And now is his seventh proposition, "That it belongs to the nature of substance to exist." Which is so great a pillar, left itself without support; and being understood of substance as such, as his terms and design require it to be, it is manifestly impious, communicating the most fundamental attribute of the Deity, to all substance. And it is as little befriended by reason, as it be-friends religion; for it rests upon nothing but the foregoing baffled proposition: and this definition, (5.) of that which is its own cause; which is, "That whose essence involves existence, or which cannot be conceived otherwise than as existing;" whereas, it is sufficiently plain, we have a conception clear enough of the general nature of a substance as such, abstracted from existence, or non-existence, conceiving it only to be such, as if it exist, doth subsist in and by itself, that is, without having a subject to support it; though it may be such as to have needed a productive, and continually to need a sustaining efficient cause. Nor is there less clearness in this abstract conception of a substance, than there is in that of a modus, or accident, which we may conceive in an equal abstraction, from actual existence, or non-existence; understanding it to be such, as that if it exist, it doth inexist, or exist only in another. And now is our way sufficiently prepared to the consideration of his eighth
proposition; "That all substance is necessarily infinite." And how is it demonstrated? Why, by his fifth proposition,—
"That there can be but one substance, of one and the same attribute,"—which hath been sufficiently unravelled and exposed, so as not to be left capable of signifying any thing here, as the reader will see by looking back to what hath been said upon it. And now it must quite sink; its next reliance failing it, namely, the foregoing seventh proposition,—"That it belongs to it, to exist necessarily." I grant the consequence to be good, and reckon it a truth of great evidence and concernment, "That whatsoever exists necessarily, is infinite." I heartily congratulate Spinosa's acknowledgment of so very clear and important an assertion; and do hope, as in the foregoing discourse I have made some, to make further good use of it. But for what he assumes, that all "substance necessarily exists;" you see it rests upon nothing, and so consequently doth what he would conclude from it, that all substance is infinite. And his further proof of it avails as little, namely, that it cannot be finite; because (by his second definition) if it be so, it must be limited by something of the same nature, &c. Which would be absurd by proposition fifth,—
"That there cannot be two substances of the same attribute:" for that there be two, of the same individual attribute, to bound one another is unnecessary (as well as impossible) and absurdly supposed for this purpose. For if there were two of the same individual nature and attribute, they would not bound one another, but run into one; inasmuch as having but one attribute, they should, according to him, have but one and the same essence: and so be most entirely one, and that there cannot be two, or many times two, of the same special or general nature, is unproved; and the contrary most evident, as may be seen, in what hath been said upon that fifth proposition.

No man needs wish an easier task, than it would be to shew the falsehood or impertinency of his Scholia upon this proposition, and of his following discourse, to the purpose above mentioned. But I reckon it unnecessary, his principal supports being (I will not say overthrown, but) discovered to be none at all. I shall therefore follow his footsteps no further, only take notice of some few things that have a more direct aspect upon his main design, and make all the haste I can to take leave of him, that I may be at liberty to pursue my own. What is in his first Scholium follows, he says, only upon his seventh proposition, which itself follows upon nothing; and therefore, I further regard it not. His second
Scholium would have his seventh proposition pass for a common notion; and so it will, when he hath inspired all mankind with his sentiments. But why must it do so? Because substance is that which is in itself, and is conceived by itself. Now compare that with his tenth proposition,—"Every attribute of substance ought to be conceived by itself." There the definition of substance, is given to every attribute of substance; therefore, every attribute of substance is a substance, since the definition of substance (def. 3.) to which he refers us in the demonstration of that proposition, agrees to it; therefore, so many attributes, so many substances. What can be plainer? We have then his one substance multiplied into an infinite number of substances. By his sixth definition, we shall see his own confession of this consequence, by and by.

And whereas in this Scholium he would make us believe, that modifications, men may conceive as not existing, but substances they cannot. Let the reason of this assigned difference be considered: "That by substance they must understand that which is in itself; and is conceived by itself, its knowledge not needing the knowledge of another thing. But by modifications they are to understand that which is in another, and whose conception is formed by the conception of that thing in which they are: wherefore, we can have true ideas of not-existing modifications, inasmuch as though they may not actually exist, otherwise than in the understanding, yet their essence is so comprehended in another, that they may be conceived by the same. But the truth of substances is not otherwise without the understanding, than in themselves, because they are conceived by themselves, &c." Which reason is evidently no reason. For with the same clearness, where-with I conceive a substance, whencesoever it exists, as existing in itself; I conceive a modification, whencesoever it exists, as existing in another. If therefore, any thing existing in another, be as truly existing, as existing in itself, the existence of a substance is no more necessary, than the existence of a modification. And if we can have true ideas of not-existing modifications, we may have as true, of not-existing substances: especially since (according to him) we cannot conceive of substance, without conceiving in it some or other modification. For he tells us, "The essence of modifications is so comprehended in another, that they may be conceived by the same." Now, what means he by the essence of modifications being comprehended in another? By that other, he must mean substance: for modifications do modify substances, or nothing;
and if the essences of modifications be contained in substances, they must (according to him) be contained in the essence of substances.

For there is, saith he, nothing in nature, besides substances and their affections or modifications (demonstration of proposition fourth, and definition fifth). Therefore, since nothing can be conceived in substance, antecedent to these modifications, besides its own naked essence, they must be contained immediately, in the very essence of substance, or in substance itself; wherefore, if all substance be necessarily existent, they must be necessarily inexistant. And if the essence of substance contains the inexisting modi, the essence of the modi doth equally contain their inexistence in substance. Whereupon, by consequence also, the essence of these modifications, doth as much involve existence (since no one can affirm inexistence to be existence) as the essence of substance doth, in direct contradiction to proposition twenty-fourth, which expressly (and most truly) says, "The essence of things produced by God" (which he, as untruly, intends of these modifications alone) "do not involve existence."

And now for his notanda in this Scholium by which he would conclude, that there is no other than this one infinite substance in being, p. 31. It is true indeed, that the definition of a thing (which we have before said is of specific natures, not of individuals) expresses not any certain number of existing individuals (be it man, or triangle, or what else you please) nor any at all. For surely the definition of man, or triangle, would be the same, if every individual of each, should be abolished and cease. But that, if any do exist, some cause must be assignable why they exist, and why so many only. What is to be inferred from this? That the reason being the same, as to every substance whose essence involves not existence in it, (which that the essence of every substance doth, or of substance as such, he hath not proved, nor ever can,) when any such substance is found to exist, the cause of its existence, not being in its own nature, must be external. And therefore, so many only do exist, because a free agent, able to produce them, (for the very substance of created beings itself, owes not its production to a merely natural, undesigning, or to any subordinate agent only,) was pleased to produce so many, and no more. And so hath this unhappy author himself, with great pains and sweat, reasoned out for us the very thing we assert.

But that it may be further seen, how incurious a writer this
man of demonstration is, and how fatally, while he is designing the overthrow of religion, he overthrows his own design, I shall not let pass what he says, in demonstrating his twelfth proposition,—"That no attribute of substance can be truly conceived, from which it may follow, that substance can be divided." How he proves it by proposition eighth, and after by the sixth, I shall not regard, until I see those propositions better proved. But that which I at present remark, is his argument from proposition fifth,—"That if substance could be divided, each part must consist of a different attribute; and so of one substance many might be constituted." A fair confession, that many attributes will constitute many substances. And himself acknowledges many attributes of substance, (definition sixth, and proposition eleventh.) And therefore, though he here call this an absurdity, it is an absurdity which he hath inevitably now fastened upon himself, having here allowed, plainly, the consequence (as was above promised to be shewn) that if there be diversity of attributes, they will constitute a diversity of substances, which it was before impossible to him to disallow, having defined an attribute (as was formerly noted) to be (def. 4.) that which constitutes the essence of substance. Therefore, his whole cause is here fairly given away; for his one substance is now scattered into many, and the pretended impossibility of the creation of any substantial being, quite vanished into thin and empty air. The many inconsistencies to be noted also in his annexed letters, with several parts of his discourse, it is not my business particularly to reflect on. It is enough, to my purpose, to have shewn that he comes short of his.

VIII. Upon the whole, little more seems needful for the refutation of this his horrid doctrine of the unity, self-existence, and infinity of all substance, than only to oppose Spinoza to Spinoza. Nor have I ever met with a discourse so equally inconsistent with all principles of reason and religion, and with itself. And so frequently doth he overthrow his own ill design, in this very discourse, that it is altogether unnecessary to insist on the inconsistencies of this, with his demonstrations of Des Cartes's principles, written divers years before. Against which, every one that hath compared, knows these his later sentiments to import so manifest hostility, that I may well spare that vain and useless labour, it being sufficient only to note the more principal, in the margin.*

* As his asserting God to be a most simple being, and that his attributes do only differ, ratione. Whereas now, he makes his attributes as

VOL. I. 20
His following propositions (and among them those most surprising ones, the sixteenth and twenty-eighth) tend to evince the onliness of substance, and the absolute necessity of all actions; but upon grounds so plainly already discovered to be vain and false, that we need follow him no further. Nor is it necessary to disprove his hypothesis, or charge it with the many absurdities that belong to it, they are so horrid and notorious, that to any one who is not in love with absurdity for itself, it will abundantly suffice to have shewn he hath not proved it.

IX. I cannot but, in the mean time, take some notice of the genius, which seems to have inspired both him, and his devotees. A fraudulent pretence to religion, while they conspire against it. Whereof many instances might be given; as the prefixing that text of holy Scripture to so impure a volume, on the title page, 1 John 4. 13. "By this we know that we dwell in God, and God dwelleth in us, because he hath given us of his Spirit." That the preface to his posthumous works is filled up with quotations out of the Bible; which it is their whole design to make signify nothing. The divine authority whereof, an anonymous defender of his, in that part of his work which he entitles, Specimen artis ratiocinandi, naturalis & artificialis ad pantosophiae principia manuducens—A specimen of the art of reasoning, natural and artificial, conducting to the principles of all kinds of wisdom—undertakes to demonstrate (because, as he says, all religion depends upon the word of God) by an argument, which, he says, he can glory, that after many years meditation, the divine grace favouring him, he hath found out, by which he tells us, (p. 211, &c.) he is able (to do what, that he knows, no man hath ever done before him) to demonstrate naturally the truth of the sacred Scripture, that is, That it is the word of God. An argument, he says, able to convince the most pertinacious Pagan, &c. And it is taken from the idea of God, compared with that divine saying, Exod. 3. 14. "I am that I am." Whereupon, what he says, will to any one who attentively reads shew his design, namely, at once to expose religion, and hide himself. And so doth his collusion sufficiently appear in divers, as extension and thought, and says, they ought to be conceived as really distinct. Scholia in Proposition tenth. There he asserts all things to be created by God, here, nothing. There he makes corporeal substance divisible; here, all substance indivisible, &c. And yet in this work (vide Scholia in proposition nineteenth) refers us to the former, as if, where the one destroys the other, both were firm.
making the soul philosophically mortal, and Christianly immortal, p. 70, &c. But if the Philosopher perish for ever, what will become of the Christian?

This author also finds great fault with the instances usually given to exemplify the common definition of substance, That is, a being subsisting by itself, or in itself, (Manuduct, p. 11, 12.) because he thought them not agreeable enough to his master Spinosa's notion of the unity and identity of all substances, and consequently of the improducibility of any. And he fancies them to contradict themselves, that while they call the sun, the moon, the earth, this or that tree, or stone, substances, they yet admit them to be produced by another. For how can it be, saith he, that they should be in, or by themselves, and yet depend on another, as on a subject, or as an efficient cause? He is very angry, and says they by it do but crucify and mock their readers, only because it crosses and disappoints his and his master's impious purpose of deifying every substance. And therefore, to serve that purpose as he fancies the better, he would more aptly model all things and reduce them to two distinct kinds only, namely, Of things that may be conceived primarily and in themselves, without involving the conception of another: and again, of things that we conceive not primarily and in themselves, but secondarily and by another, whose conception is involved in their conception. But all the while, what is there in this, more than what is common and acknowledged on all hands? as the sense of the trivial distich he takes the pains to recite,

Summus Aristoteles, &c.

But when all this is granted, what is he nearer his mark? Of that former sort, still some are from another; and one other only of and from itself. But then (says he) how are those former conceived in and by themselves? Well enough, say I: for they are to be conceived, as they are to be defined; but the definition of a thing is to express only its own nature and essence (as Spinosa himself says Seiolum second, in proposition eighth) considered apart by itself, into which (as hath been said) the efficient cause, which is extrinsical to it, enters not; and without considering whether it exist or exist not. Because definitions are of special kinds, or common natures, that exist not as such; not of existing individuals, except the one, only selfsubsisting, original Being, of whose essence existence is; which Spinosa himself acknowledges, and makes his twentieth proposition; as on the other hand
The essence of things produced by God involves not existence” is his twenty-fourth.

X. But that the substance of things, whose essence involves existence, and whose essence involves it not, should be one and the same, exceeds all wonder! One would think, so vastly different essences of substance should at least make different substances; and that when Spinosa hath told us so expressly, that an “attribute of substance constitutes the essence of substance; and that all the attributes of substance are distinctly conceived; the conception of the one, not involving the conception of another;” and so do most really differ from each other, and make so many essences therefore, of substance really distinct, (though he once thought otherwise of the divine attributes, that they did only differ from each other ratione, and that God was a most simple Being, which he also takes pains to prove, R. D. Cartes. Princip. Philos. Append. part. 2d. Cap. 5. p. 117, 118.) one would surely hereupon think, that so vastly different attributes, as necessary existence, and contingent, should constitute the most different substances imaginable. For what is an attribute? Id quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejus essentiam constituens—That which the understanding perceives concerning a substance as constituting its essence. (Definition fourth.) Now the essence of some substance the understanding most clearly perceives as involving existence in it. Existence therefore constitutes the essence of such substance, and is therefore an attribute of it. Some other essence it as clearly perceives, that involves not existence. Now this sort of essence is the attribute of somewhat. And of what is it the attribute? Why, he hath told us, “An attribute is what the understanding perceives of substance as constituting its essence;” therefore, some substance hath such an essence as involves not existence.

Now let it hereupon be considered (albeit that I affect not to give high titles to any reasonings of mine) whether this amount not to a demonstration against the hypothesis of Spinosa, and the rest of his way, that all substance is self-existent; and that, even upon their own principles and concessions, so frequently acknowledging the world to be produced, and not self-existent, that even the substance of it is produced also; which they deny, namely, (Manuduct. p. 107.) That whose essence this unnamed author says, includes not existence, either hath some substance belonging to its essence, or it hath not. If not, it may exist without substance; and then unto what is it an attribute, or what doth it modify? If yea, there is then
some substance, and particularly that of this world, in whose essence, existence is not included; and that by consequence, the substance of this world is produced. But if any make a difficulty of it to understand, how all being and perfection should be included in the Divine Being, and not be very God; so much is already said to this in the former Part of this discourse, (namely, Chap. 4. Sect. III, &c.) that as I shall not here repeat what hath been said, so I think it unnecessary to say more.

And it is what Spinosa himself had once such sobriety of mind as to apprehend, when (Princip. R. D. Cart. Philosoph. more Geometr. demonstrat. Append, Part I. Cap. 2.) he says thus of God, or of increate substance, that God doth eminently contain that which is found formally in created things, that is, God hath that in his own nature, in which all created things are contained in a more eminent manner; and that there is some attribute in God, wherein all the perfections, even of matter, are after a more excellent manner themselves contained. Having before told us, (Princip. Part I. Axiom. 8.) That by eminently, he understood when a cause did contain all the reality of its effect more perfectly, than the effect itself; by formally, when it contained it in equal perfection. And so he might have told himself of somewhat sufficiently common (though not univocally) to the substance of the Divine Nature, and that of creatures; whereon to found the causality of the former, in reference to the latter, as effected thereby. But as he grew older, his understanding either became less clear, or was more perverted by ill design.

CHAP. II.

I. Animadversions upon a French writer, nameless. II. His pretence to confute Spinosa: and the opinion of the world’s being made of independent self-existing matter; chosen by him and asserted against two other opinions. III. The opinion of matters being created out of nothing, and charged (falsely) by him with novelty. IV. Moses, and the author to the Hebrews misalleged, vindicated. V. Self-originate, independent matter disproved: asserted by this author with evident self-contradiction; and without necessity.

BUT having here done with him and that sort of men, I shall now briefly consider the forementioned author’s
way of confuting him. The conceit, that there must be such a thing as necessary self-subsisting matter, hath I confess seemed to be favoured by some or other name among the Ethnics of that value, as to have given some countenance to a better cause: besides some others, who with greater incongruity, and more injury to it, have professed the Christian name. It hath been of late exposed, and asserted more expressly, by this French gentleman, who hath not thought fit to dignify it with his name, doubting perhaps whether the acquainting the world with it, might not more discredit his cause, than his cause (in this part of it) could better the reputation of his name. However it be, though my inquiry and credible information hath not left me ignorant, I shall not give him occasion to think himself uneivilly treated, by divulging what he seems willing should be a secret. For though it was not intrusted to me as such, I shall be loath to disoblige him by that, whereby that I know I can oblige nobody else. It is enough that his book may be known by its title, L'Impie conteneu. It is professedly written against the atheism of Spinoso. And when I first look'd into it, I could not refrain thinking of Plato's repartee to Diogenes, when the latter undertook to reprehend the other's pride, that he did it with greater pride. Although I think not the application is to be made in the strictest terms. For I will neither be so indulgent to Spinoza, as to reckon that any man's atheism can be greater than his; nor so severe to this his adversary, as positively to conclude he designed the service of any atheism at all. But I think him at least, unwarily and without any necessity, to have quitted one of the principal supports of the doctrine of a Deity; and that he hath undertaken the confutation of atheism, upon a ground that leads to atheism.

II. He thinks, it seems, Spinoza not otherwise confutable, than upon the hypothesis of eternal, independent matter, which he thus explains in his preface, it being the second of the three distinct hypotheses whereof he there gives an account.

The second,* he says, is theirs who assert two beings or two substances increate, eternal, independent, as to their simple existence, though very differently; the former whereof is God, the infinitely perfect Being, Almighty, the Principle of all perfection; and the second, matter, a being essentially imperfect, without power, without life, without knowledge; but

* La seconde est celle de ceux qui, &c. Avertissement.
capable nevertheless of all these perfections, by impression from God, and his operations upon it. This he pretends to have been the hypothesis of the ancient philosophers and divines (after he had acknowledged the former hypothesis—"That the world, and the matter of it, were drawn out of nothing by the infinite power of the first and supreme Being, which itself alone was eternal and independent,"—was the hypothesis of the greater part of Christian divines, and philosophers.) And this second, he says, is the hypothesis which he shall follow, rejecting the first, but now mentioned; and in opposition to the third, which makes the world and its production to be nothing else than an emanation of the Divine Substance, whereby a part of itself is formed into a world. And this, he says, was the opinion of the ancient Gnostics and Priscillianists, and is for the most part of the Cabbalists, of the new Adamites or the illuminated, and of an infinite number of Asiatic and Indian philosophers.

III. To qualify the ill savour of that second opinion which he follows, he would have us believe it to be the more creditable, than the (rejected) first, which he says is a new thing in the world, and that it was not born until some ages after Christ; which is gratis dictum—spoken without proof. And whereas he tells us, he takes notice, that Tertullian was the first that maintained it against a Christian philosopher, who defended the eternal existence of matter; he had only reason to take notice, That the philosopher he mentions, was the first, that calling himself a Christian, had the confidence to assert an opinion so repugnant to Christianity and to all religion, and who therefore first gave so considerable an occasion to one who was a Christian indeed, to confute it. Nor was Hermogenes a much more creditable name with the orthodox, ancient Christians, than those wherewith he graces the third opinion, besides the other ill company which might be assigned it, if that were a convictive way of fighting, by names.

IV. And for what he adds, That Moses was, he dares say, of his opinion; because he only gives such an account of the creation, as that it was made of an unformed pre-existent matter; and the apostle Paul to the Hebrews, saying, God drew these visible things out of those that were not visible. He shows indeed, more daringness than solid judgment, in venturing to say the one or the other upon so slender ground. As if every thing were false, which Moses and Paul did not say. But it appears rather from his way of quoting, (who, it is like,
did not much concern himself to turn over the leaves of the Bible, that he might be sure to quote right,) that God did create that unformed matter, as he calls it. For it is expressly said, God created heaven, and earth, and that this earth (not matter) was without form, and void, Gen. 1. 1, 2. And if this unformed earth and matter be, as with him it seems, all one, then the unformed matter is said to have been created. For God is said to have created that unformed earth; which must indeed exist unformed, previously to its being brought into form; but not prior to all creation. And the same thing must be understood of the unformed heaven too, though Moses's design was to give us a more distinct account of what was nearer us, and wherein we were more concerned. And indeed, it seems most agreeable to the letter of the text, and to the following history, so to understand those words: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," namely, That in the beginning, he created that, which afterwards became heaven and earth, that is, unformed matter. For heaven and earth as now they are, or as they were in their formed state, were not created in a moment, in the very beginning; but in several successive days, as the following history shews. And so much Tertullian aptly enough intimates to that Pseudo-christian Hermogenes, Terrae nomen redigit in materiam, &c.—The name of earth he reduces into matter, &c. Nor is Heb. 11. 3. capable of being tortured into any sense more favourable to his gross fancy, which (as the Greek text, if any will consult it, shews) doth not say, The things that are seen were made of things not appearing, but were not made of things appearing: As to what he adds touching the word crere, &c. I let it pass, not liking to contend about words often promiscuously used.

V. But shall apply myself to the consideration of the thing in question, and shew how inconsistently this author asserts independent matter, both with the truth and with himself; and also how unnecessarily he doth it, and that the defence of the common cause against Spinoza, did no way oblige him to it.

First, How inconsistently he asserts it, 1. With the truth of the thing; for,

(1.) Whatsoever exists independently and necessarily, is infinite. And herein I must do Spinoza that right, as to acknowledge he hath, in asserting it, done right to truth; though the grounds upon which he asserts it, are most perniciously false. But I conceive it is capable of being clearly proved (and hath been proved, Part 1st.) otherwise, namely, that ne-
cessary, self-originate Being, is the root and fountain of all being, whether actual or possible: since there is nothing actually brought into being, which is not actually from it, and nothing possible, but whose possibility depends upon it. And that which virtually comprehends all being, actual and possible, cannot but be infinite. For without the compass of such all-comprehending Being, there is nothing to bound it. And what is bounded by nothing, is unbounded or infinite. Whereupon also, matter plainly appears not to be of itself. For if it were, for the same reason it must be infinite and all-comprehending. But nothing were more apparently contradictions and self-repugnant, than the assertion of two all-comprehending beings; and if there be but one, that matter is not that one. But that it must be a necessary, self-originate, intelligent Being, which is the root of all being, I conceive already sufficiently proved in the former part of this discourse. Wherein it is also shewn, that finite created beings, arising from that infinite self-originate one, limit it not, nor do detract any thing from its infinity, but concur to evidence its infinity rather; inasmuch as they could never have been, had they not been before contained within the productive power of that incresce self-originate being. It is, by the way, to be noted that the notion of infinity we now intend, doth not merely import unconfinedness to this or that certain space, (though it include that too,) for that, alone, were a very maimed, defective notion of infinity. But we understand by it the absolute all-comprehending profundity and plentitude of essence and perfection. Whereupon, it signifies nothing to the preserving entire the infinity of the self-originate, intelligent Being, only to suppose it such, as that it can permeate all the space that can be taken up by another (supposed) self-originate being. For still, since its essence were of itself, it were not virtually contained in the other. Which therefore would evince that other not to be in the true sense infinite. Whereupon we

(2.) Prove the impossibility of independent, self-originate matter, from the known, agreed notion of God, namely, That he is a Being absolutely perfect, or comprehensive of all perfection. Even they that deny his existence, confess (though to the contradiction of themselves) this to be the notion of the thing they deny. Now, though this assessor of independent matter acknowledges it a being essentially imperfect, he can only mean by that, less perfect; not that it hath, simply, no perfection at all. It is idle trifling, to brangle about words. Perfection hath been wont to go for an attribute of being. He
calls it a being; it must therefore have some perfection, some goodness, be of some value. Is it not better than nothing? Then, that perfection must be eminently contained in God; otherwise, how is he a Being comprehensive of all perfection? The imperfections of matter belong not to him; nor of any thing else. For imperfection is nothing: nor do the perfections of any creature belong to him formally, or in the same special kind, but eminently, and in a higher and more noble kind. And so, to have all being and perfection, either for his own, or within his productive power, cannot, without contradiction, be denied of him, who is confessed to be God. And again, to be able to create, is surely a perfection. Omnipotency, more a perfection than partial impotency. Wherefore to assert matter could not be created by God, is to assert an impotent, imperfect God. Or (since God can be conceived under no other notion than of a Being absolutely perfect) to assert none at all.

(2.) This supposition not only denies to God all perfection, but it ascribes to matter, which he himself confesses the meanest sort of being, (as shortly it will be fitter to take further notice,) the high excellency of self-subsistence, the first and most fundamental of all divine perfections.

(4.) If matter be, as such, an independent, self-originate thing, then every part or particle of matter must be so. And then, let such matter be supposed to fill up infinite space, we shall have an infinite number of independent entities, co-existing for ever; for a finite number cannot replenish infinite space: or let it be supposed (more agreeably to the pretended sentiments of this author) confined within the limits of the formed universe; and how unreasonably is such a thing as independent matter, supposed to be of itself, limited to one spot of immense space! For let the universe be supposed finite, though ever so vast, it must yet be conceived but as a minute spot, to the infinite unbounded vacuity that lies without it; and which yet he seems to acknowledge replenished with the Divine Being. Now let a man set himself to consider, and try how easy it will be to his thoughts to conceive one little portion of boundless space, taken up with a mean being, next to nothing, that is of itself there, and cannot but be there, and nowhere else, imposed upon the infinitely perfect Being; the all-wise and almighty God, who fills up all space unavoidably and from all eternity, so that he could not, if he thought it a cumber, disencumber or rid himself of it; and rather seemed of necessity, than of choice, to have made a
world of it, as not knowing else what to do with it; with which imagination also the youth of the world so ill agrees, for why then was it so lately made?

(5.) But it further seems very evident, and more fully evidential of the absurdity of this conceit, that if there were such matter, the world could never have been made of it. For how great alterations must such rude, undigested, unformed matter have undergone, in forming of such a world as this? But what greater inconsistency can we imagine, than that what exists necessarily, or of itself, should be alterable? What is of itself what it is, must be eternally and without change what it is. So absurd, as well as profane, it will be to ascribe to dull and senseless matter, or to any thing else, so peculiar and appropriate an attribute and name as that of the Deity, I am that I am. For, hereupon, such matter were not only supposed vainly and to no purpose, being never possible to be the matter of the world, but destructively, and against the very purpose that should be served by it. For such matter being supposed to occupy the space of the formed world, must exclude thence any other matter of which it could be formed; and make it, consequently, impossible there should ever have been any such world as this, where the supposition itself makes it be. This see discoursed more at large, Part 1, Ch. 2.

(6.) And whereas his great reason for such self originate, independent matter, namely, the imagined impossibility of creation, or that any thing can be produced out of nothing, (which so far as is needful, we partly have, and further shall consider, in its proper place,) doth as much oppose the creation of any spiritual being, as material. If all that hath been said in the former Part of this discourse, and by many authors besides, do sufficiently prove there are such spiritual or immaterial beings that are created, or are not of themselves; and that, of the property of thought, which is found belonging to them, matter is not capable, (which I shall think to have been done until I see the contrary evinced,) we must judge him very absurdly to have asserted such self originate, independent matter. And as he hath asserted it very inconsistently with the truth of the thing; so

2. It will appear he hath done it as little consistently with himself. For

(1.) He acknowledges God to be L'etre infiniment parfait, tout puissant, & le principe de toute perfection—a Being infinitely perfect, almighty, and the principle of all
perfection. Now how is he infinitely perfect, if his being include not all perfection? How is he almighty, if he cannot create? How is he the fountain or principle of all perfection, if the perfection of matter (which, as hath been said, though he make it essentially imperfect, must have some perfection belonging to it, since it is not mere nothing) be not eminently comprehended in his being?

Besides that here acknowledging God to be omnipotent, and having denied the necessary, eternal, independent matter, which he imagines to be infinite, but limited and confined to the created universe only; I would hereupon demand of him, Cannot the blessed God, if he please, create many worlds? If he say, No, then how is he omnipotent?—If Ye, of what matter must they be made? Not of his (imagined) necessary, independent matter, for of that really none could: but according to him the present universe is made: it is already taken up, and pre-engaged therein, and it is limited thereto. Therefore the matter is yet to be created, of which the other worlds are to be made; and it can be so, otherwise no more worlds can be made: and thereupon the great God is, not without blasphemy, said to have gone to the utmost of his power, to have done in this kind all that he can. And this must be said, by this author, in express contradiction to the truth of the thing, to the most common and agreed idea or notion of the Divine Being; and now, most apparently, to himself. And therefore his high rant against Spinoza, p. 47, 48, (in this point more orthodox than himself,) That he confounds in his philosophy being and perfection, Pretendant que, ce qui est, & ne renferme aucune negation d'etre, est une perfection, &c.—Pretending that whatsoever is, and includes not in its notion any negation of being, is a perfection, &c. is vain, and as much without cause, as what he afterwards says about it is without sense. For he adds, That for his part he finds nothing more false or extravagant; and why so? Because then pain and sorrow must be reckoned among perfections, and such real perfections as are worthy of God, or a Being infinitely perfect. And upon this, he triumphs over such men, as supplanters of the Deity, instead of defenders of so great a Being, and as having lost their senses and their reason, &c. But if he had not lost his own, and abandoned himself to that fury and rage of insolence which he there imputes to his opposers, he might have been capable of so much calm and sober consideration, as to have bethought himself, that among creatures, a sense of pain, real grief and sorrow, correspond-
ent to their present, true causes, import more perfection, than stupidity, insensibleness, and apathy; and if so, though pain and grief cannot formally agree to the most perfect being of God, to whom their causes cannot agree, that the life and perciplency do eminently agree to him, by which he can apprehend an injury, though not a real hurt, (which he can therefore only not apprehend, not because the perceptive principle is wanting, but the object.) and by the power of imparting whereof, he is able to make a creature capable of pain and grief, where the objects shall (as they may deservedly) occur, and meet the perceptive principle; and that the power of making such a creature, is a greater perfection than an impotency of doing it. Which perfection, therefore, he could not, consistently with himself, deny to God, having acknowledged him a Being infinitely perfect, or comprehensive of all perfection.

(2.) Nor doth he assert necessary increate matter, consistently with his own reasonings for the possibility of a vacuum, (p. 110.) where he takes it for granted, that God can anecantir une petite partie de la matiere, &c.—annihilate some small particle of matter, one stone, for example, or one grain of sand. Which how ridiculously is it supposed, by one who supposes such matter necessarily self-existent! For who sees not that necessity of existence, and impossibility of non-existence, do infer one another, or signify rather the same thing. Therefore, no man, except Spinoza, could be at once more daring and more unhappy than this author. And as it hath thus appeared, that he hath asserted such self-originate, independent matter, very inconsistently both with the truth of the thing and with himself; so,

Secondly, It will also appear he hath done it very unnecessarily; and particularly, without that necessity which he pretends of answering Spinoza. For there is no necessity of it so much as pretended, upon any account besides that of the common maxim, that nothing can come out of nothing; the sense whereof must first be inquired before it can be understood, how far it will serve his purpose, or infer the necessity of independent matter. The sense of it must either be this—That a being could never arise out of no-being, of itself, without a pre-existent, creative cause; which is most evidently true, but as evidently not to his purpose: or this—That what once was not, could never be produced into being by a pre-existent, omnipotent Cause; which were to his purpose, but
is evidently, and by apparent self-contradiction, untrue.* And what can make it have so much as the least semblance of truth? Either the authority of the maxim, or some plausible reason. For its authority: though that which he claims to it of the ancient philosophers were little considerable, if ever so truly claimed, we have no ground to think it otherwise claimed than most untruly. Its authority, as he represents it, depends upon a worse authority. He is so modest as to expect it to be believed, upon his bare word, that this was the opinion of all the ancient philosophers before Christ’s time; while yet he thinks not fit to tell us his name. But if their reasonings from it be considered, that generations are out of matter, and corruptions are into matter, we have no cause to apprehend they understood it otherwise than that natural agents did neither create nor annihilate any thing. Besides that, there is positive ground enough to conclude, that the more instructed and wiser Pagans, long before Christ’s time, did believe all things to have sprang from one intelligent, self-subsisting original, matter itself not being excepted. As, with the Egyptians, the inscription of the temple at Sais shews, “I am all that is, or was, or shall be, &c.” and with the Grecians, their worshipping God, under the name of Pan: which could mean no other thing, than that they thought the Deity to comprehend eminently or virtually all being besides, in its creative or productive power. And we have reason to think that Pagan philosophers since Christ, such as Hierocles, Jamblichus, Porphyry, Plotinus, &c. who (as others have observed) were manifestly of this sentiment, understood the minds of the more ancient philosophers as well as this French gentleman; nor do they pretend to contradict them herein.

And for the reason of the thing itself, he hath not the least appearance of any on his part, but that, because the finite power of a creature cannot bring a thing out of nothing, therefore omnipotency cannot; which is so far from concluding for him, that (as hath been intimated) it manifestly contradicts itself, and concludes the contrary. For how is that omnipotency, which cannot do every thing that implies not a contradiction? And how is that a contradiction, that what once was not, should afterwards come to be? there being no objective impossibility or intrinsic repugnancy in the thing itself to exist,

* Of this see at large Dr. Cudworth’s Intellectual System.
but that it were truly *ens possible*—*a possible agent*; (and we are out of doubt concerning matter for instance, or whatsoever else we are sure doth exist, that it could exist;) and supposing also that there be a sufficient, causative power, to make it exist, or produce it into being: and what cause can be more sufficient than an omnipotent one, such as our author confesses God to be? Nor doth he deny that there are intelligent spirits, that were not of themselves; only he would have us think them but finer matter, impressed with intellectual power. But what akin is a mind to matter, except his own? And supposing a mind or intellect be stamped upon matter, it is then but added to it, not drawn out of it, as if matter had before contained it. And even thus, since mind or intellect is not nothing, (unless he will say himself differs by nothing from unthinking clay;) we have something out of nothing. And who can think it more impossible to Omnipotency, to create matter, than a mind?

But if he reckon thought, or intellect, is contained in matter, or included in the notion of it, then matter, as such, must be intelligent, and consequently all matter; and this will be absurdity enough, to give him as good a title to the privilege of not being reasoned against, as, from his magisterial way of writing, we may count Spinosa thought himself to have. Nor indeed will it leave any man so much as a conjecture at the reason why he should pretend to differ from him. For who can imagine, why his matter, endued with the attributes of extension and thought, might not do as well as Spinosa's substance?

Or if he think matter, as such, to have only seminal reason or intellect in it, antecedently to his supposed divine impress upon it, how will that agree with his making it *essentiellement imperfect*—*essentially imperfect*? (Preface.) Or what means his added *capable neanmoins*, its being *nevertheless capable* of all such perfections by the impression of God upon it? Is that capacity something, or nothing? Or what sense is it to make it capable of having those perfections, which it is essential to it not to have?

And surely, as he will attribute to matter more perfection than he intended, so he will attribute less to God. For he will, at this rate, attribute no more to him, than hath been generally ascribed to ordinary natural agents; that is, to produce into actual being, out of matter, that whereto there was in it some seminal disposition before.
And here, indeed, is the source of his error, his reducing infinite power to the measures of finite; an insolent presuming to circumscribe Omnipotency, and making that simply impossible even to Almightyness itself, which is only so to created agents. And to this purpose, I find some reasonings in Sextus Empiricus, who tells us how the sceptics attempt to prove (besides their disputing against the other three sorts of causation) that ἄονον — an incorporeal thing, cannot be ἁίνη ὀφνας — the cause of any thing corporeal; arguing (and slightly enough) from the common methods of subordinate agents, to the operations of the supreme Cause. Nor is it apprehensible, how one can find a medium; or while they make matter independent, how not to make God dependent.

And when the author we are concerned with took a friendly notice of Hermogenes' consent with him upon this subject, he might as well have been at the pains to consider somewhat of what Tertullian wrote against him, that hereby, in some respect, God is made inferior and subject to matter, when without it he could not have made a world. Materie superior inventur, quae illi copiam operandi subministravit, & Deus subjectus materie videtur, cujus substantia eguit; nemo non subjicitur ei cujus eget, &c.—Every one is subject to what he stands in need of. Tertull. contra Hermog.
CHAP. III.

I. The reason of what next follows. II. Directions to readers not wont to inquire into the grounds of their religion. III. A summary and plainer proposal unto such, of what hath been said in the former Part, concerning God’s existence and conversableness with men. IV. The reasonableness (so much being already evinced) of alleging, and relying upon the testimony of the holy Scriptures: First, The expressness of that testimony concerning the unity of the Godhead, the trinity therein. Secondly, The absolute perfection of the Divine Nature. Thirdly, The infiniteness of God’s knowledge, power, goodness, and presence. Fourthly, His propensions towards men, and aptness (supposing there were no obstruction) to human converse: matters of doubt herein resolved.

I. AND having thus far established and vindicated so principal a ground-work in this important cause,—That what is necessarily, or of itself, is an absolutely perfect Being, distinct from all things else; and a proper Object of religion, or whereto a temple, and all the worship thereof, duly belong—I shall now only suffer myself to be a little further diverted from my intended course, apprehending that their case is also to be considered, who have been less accustomed to this course, of reasoning out to themselves the principles of their religion: unto whom therefore what hath been hitherto attempted may seem, if not obscure in its parts, yet so tiresome in the whole, as not to meet with patience enough to trace the design that hath been driven on, to its issue and period; it being very incident to unexercised and less-attentive readers, to lose their thread, and forget the scope of a discourse, and so still have the truth to seek even in the midst of it. And if what hath been hitherto said, prove unsatisfying to any, that justice must be done to the cause itself and to them, as to avow that it must rather proceed either from this infirmity in the reader, or from the unskilfulness of the writer to propound things happily and to advantage; than either from the invidence of the things themselves, or from want of capacity, even in an ordinary understanding. Nor doth any undertaking seem more feasible, or less to be despaired
of, than plainly and satisfyingly to evince, to an unprejudiced understanding that shall attend, these first foundations of religion and a temple, namely, That God is; and—That he is conversable with men, or is such as is capable and apt to receive worship from them, and impart blessedness to them. We shall therefore so far interrupt the current of this discourse, as to endeavour this, by giving a brief and plain sum of the more principal things that have been said to this purpose already.

II. But to prepare for it, must desire you that have not been, as yet, wont to employ your minds this way, to observe the following directions.

First, That you would not give place to discouragement, nor think too meanly of the understanding whereby God hath distinguished you from the inferior creatures. There is that mind and spirit in man, which doth compass many things of far greater difficulty than it is here to be employed about; though it can be exercised about nothing of so great consequence. That apprehensive power that can take in the orderly frame of such notions as are requisite to the exact skill of numbering or of measuring things, of navigation, of trade, of managing the common affairs of human life; that can lay down to itself such prudent maxims and rules whereby the inconveniences may in great part be avoided which are incident to common conversation, and the advantages gained which may serve one's own private and secular interests; that understanding which can do all this, would far more easily comprehend as much as is needful to the certain knowledge of God's existence, and that he is such as we ought to worship, and may enjoy, if it apply itself hereto. Do not so despair as not to make an attempt; you know not the strength of your own mind until you have tried it.

Secondly, That you indulge not, or do not suffer yourselves to be insensibly seized by a mean and sordid sloth. Set your thoughts awork with vigorous diligence. Give not out before you have well begun. Resolve, since you have a thinking power about you, you will use it to this most necessary purpose; and hold your thoughts to it. See that your minds do not presently tire and flag; that you be rationally peremptory, and soberly obstinate, in this pursuit: yield not to be diverted. Disdain, having minds that can reach up to the great Original and Author of all things, that they should be confined to this dirty earth, or only to things low and mean.

Thirdly, Look on things that are rationally evident to your
understandings, as equally certain with what you see with your eyes. Are you not as sure that two and two make four (which judgment is the act of your mind) as that this thing which you look upon is black or white, or of this or that shape or figure? Do not so debase your own understandings, as to think nothing certain that comes under their judgment. It is true, they are apt enough to be deceived in many things, and so is your sense too; but if your sense could make you certain of nothing, what would become of justice and government among men? Who could take an oath before a magistrate? What would become of the common actions and affairs of life? How could you eat or drink, or buy or sell, if you could not certainly distinguish one thing from another? Some things are so plain as that you can be in no doubt about them, as that this is bread, not a stone; that a horse, not a sheep; otherwise all the world must stand still, and all commerce and action cease. And if there were not some things sure to your minds, that you may certainly say, in some plain cases at least, this is true and that false, this right and that wrong, you would be at as great a loss. Otherwise, you might be apt to think a part of a thing greater than the whole, or that the same man might be at London and at Rome at the same time; and you might be as ready to kill your own father as to do him reverence, or to commit robbery upon your rich neighbour as relieve the poor, and judge the one as good an action as the other.

Fourthly, As any particular thing is offered to you, for the purpose we are here aiming at, consider it well by itself; before you go further; and think thus, Is this plain and certain, yea or no? If at the first sight you think it not so, observe diligently what is brought for the proof of it, and see whether now it be not manifestly certain; and when you once find it is, fix it in your mind as a certainty; say, Thus far I am sure. Let not your thoughts run back to this as a doubtful thing any more, or unravel their own work; but make use of it as a certainty, to your further purpose.

III. Being thus prepared, take this brief account of what hath before been discoursed more at large.

First, As to this first and great principle,—That there is a God. Be but patient of being led by the hand a few easy steps in a way that is in some part sufficiently beaten, or at least that is sufficiently plain, and it is to be hoped you will soon see that matter put out of all doubt. Let this then be your first step:
1. That somewhat or other there is, that hath been from all eternity necessarily and of itself, without dependence upon any thing else. If this be not at the first view evident to you, or if it seem too large a step, we will divide it into parts; and consider well what is said for the proof of it, by these degrees.

(1.) Somewhat or other must ever have been: for otherwise, how could any thing come to be at all? Do you think it was possible, if ever there was nothing at all in being, of one sort or other, that any thing should have come into being? No surely, for which way should it be? It could not be made by another, there being no other to make it; and it could not make itself, itself being as yet nothing. But sure you can easily apprehend, that to make a thing be, is to do something; and as easily, that what is nothing, can do nothing. Therefore, when your own eyes tell you that something now is, you may be as sure, as of what you see with your eyes, that somewhat or other hath ever been. Say with yourself, 

Some what now is, therefore somewhat hath ever been. If you discern not the clearness of this consequence, take the opposite to it: Nothing now is, therefore nothing will ever be; it is as broad as long.

(2.) You may next proceed thus, that something or other hath been of itself; that is, without depending upon any thing else, or being beholden to any other thing for its being. Now here pause a while, and consider what is said to make this plain to you. Either you must acknowledge something hath ever been of itself; or you must say that all things that are, or ever have been, were from another, without any exception. But mark now, if you say that all things that are, or ever have been, without excepting any, were from another, you contradict yourself; for besides all things that are, or ever have been, without excepting any, there is not another from whom they could be. Therefore it is impossible that all things without exception should have been from another; whence then it is plain that something must have been of itself, without depending for its being upon any thing else: for it will come to the same contradiction, if you say all things depend upon some other; since there is nothing beyond all things: therefore, to say that all things depend, is to say they depend on nothing, that is, they do not depend. And to say they have all depended on one another for their being, or made one another, is altogether as absurd; for it will make the whole compass or circle of all being to depend upon nothing, or come
at length to this, that some one made itself, or even (which is more gross) made its own maker; unless you will rest in some one that made all the other, and was itself not made by any of them. If you do not apprehend this yourself, desire any one that hath a better understanding to explain it to you, and you will soon see the matter intended by it to be as evident as your heart can wish. And so this will be out of question with you—That somewhat was of itself; which added to what was proved before, comes to this—That somewhat was ever of itself. And both these thus conjoined, plainly appear from what hath been said. For we have seen that nothing could possibly make itself, (which would absurdly imply, that before, it both was and was not,) and therefore, whatsoever was of itself, must ever have been, or never had beginning of being. So much then, I suppose, you take to be most certain, that something hath ever been of itself. Whereupon you may further add,

(3.) That what was ever of itself, was necessarily. I hope you understand what is meant by being necessarily, that is, being so as that it could not possibly but be. You may perceive that some things are so as that it was possible they might not have been, as a house, a town, a garment, or whatsoever was made by such makers as might have chosen whether they would have made it, or no. Yea, or whatsoever is any way made to be, having before not been; for what once was not, it is manifest it was then possible for it not to be. But to be necessarily, is to be so as that it could never possibly but have been; that is, that which is necessarily, is somewhat of so excellent a nature, as that it could never be out of being. Now what was ever of itself, it was in this sense necessarily; namely, so as that the excellency of its nature was such, as could never permit that it should not be; whence the name I AM agrees peculiarly and always thereunto. Nothing can otherwise be of itself, (not by making itself, which you have seen is impossible,) but by an everlasting possession of that excellency of being, which excludes all possibility of not being. It depends upon no one's choice or power, whether that which is of itself shall be or not be.

(4.) What hath thus ever been necessarily, still is, and will ever be; which is plain upon the same ground. What could never but be, can never but be; for its nature is such, as where to not to be is impossible. Otherwise, if its nature had not been such, there being nothing else by which it should be made, it could never have been. Wherefore thus far you
have firm footing in this first step; no part of the ground which it measures shakes under you. You may say you are sure of this—That somewhat there now is, that hath been from all eternity, necessarily and of itself, without dependence upon any thing else, and that can never cease to be.—Set this down therefore for a certainty, and then add to it,

2. That whatsoever is not necessarily and of itself, is from and by that which is necessarily and of itself, as the first Author and Cause thereof. This is so certain, that nothing needs to be said for the proof of it more than hath been said already, so that you do but understand the meaning of it; which you cannot but do, if you consider that all things that are, or ever were, must be of these two sorts, namely, what was of itself, and what was not of itself, but from another: therefore, what is not of the first sort, must be of the second; that is, what was not of itself, must be from another; and then, what other must it be from? Surely from what was of itself, as its first and chief cause, whatsoever inferior or secondary causes it may have had besides, that were before it, caused by that first. So that you now have plainly before you, and in view, some or other eternal, necessary Being, not only to be considered as it is in itself, but as the original and root of all besides. Then go forward a little, and further add,

3. Neither this visible world, nor any thing of it, is necessarily, or of itself, without depending upon any thing else; and was therefore created and made by some more excellent Being that was so, and is quite distinct and diverse from it. That this may be made evident to you, consider,

(I.) That whatsoever is changeable or imperfect, and capable of becoming more perfect, is not necessarily, and of itself, without dependence upon any thing else. For what is of itself necessarily, and without dependence on any other, must have whatsoever belongs to it, all at once; for from whence should any addition or change happen any way to it? Not from any other, for it no more depends on another for addition, than it is liable to diminution by another, being what it is, necessarily, or from itself: for nothing can impart or add what it hath not; and what it hath was in it before, and was in it necessarily, and therefore unalterably, and without possibility of any change. Now you know this visible world is continually changing, and in an imperfect state; and we may add, that there is somewhat invisible, of whose present being we are certain, that was not of itself, and that did not make this world. For instance, we
are certain of the present being of our own mind and spirit, which we cannot see with our eyes, but by self-reflection we are sure we have somewhat in us that can think. Nor is there any thing that comes under our immediate, certain observation, more excellent than man himself, especially his mind and soul. And do you not yourself know, and find how changeable, indigent, and imperfect that is? Therefore you may be sure it is not of itself, nor the maker of this visible world. If all the men in the world should join all their wit and power together, which way would they go to work to make such a world as this? Yea, or even to make one single pile of grass, or grain of sand? Which way can you devise then, they should make the sun or stars, or such an earth as this? It is plain, then, that all this world had a maker, distinct from itself.

(2.) Whatsoever being is of itself, is more excellent than what is not of itself. This you cannot but assent to at the first sight: for besides that you must needs acknowledge it better to live of one's self, than to be beholden to another, you must also know that whatever being is not of itself, hath no excellency in it, but what was in that being that was of itself before; and therefore it had in it all the excellency that is in such things as proceeded from it, (unabated because in it necessarily,) together with the proper excellency of its own being, whereas the other sort of beings have but their own derived excellency only. Wherefore this also is most evident, that this world had a maker distinct from and more excellent than itself, that changes not, and whereto that name most properly agrees, I AM THAT I AM. Being sure of this, you may proceed, and conclude,

4. That the things which are manifestly not of themselves, but created and made, do plainly shew that the maker of them doth excel in power, wisdom, and goodness. The greatness of his works shews his mighty power; the nature, exactness, and order of them, his admirable wisdom; and his own self-sufficiency, and independency on the things made, shew his rich and vast goodness in making them, as you may see more at large in Part I. Now therefore, if you have attended, you cannot but find that you are sure and at a plain certainty concerning these four things:—That somewhat was ever, and is necessarily;—that what was not so, did arise from that which was;—that this world being not so, did therefore spring from that eternal, necessary, self-subsisting Being;—and that this Being hath those particular excellencies, whereof there
are the manifest appearances and footstrokes in the works that are made by him, (namely, especially power, wisdom, and goodness,) in himself. And thus the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead; so that they who see them not are without excuse. Rom. I. 20. If you be sure that any thing is, you may be sure something was ever of itself: if you be sure any thing that was not of itself hath appearances of power, wisdom, and goodness in the frame of it, you may be sure that that Being which was of itself is the powerful, wise, and good Creator and Maker of it. It is to be hoped, then, you are at a certainty,—That God is.

Secondly, And now as to the second principle, that hath been insisted on also in the former Part,—That this God is conversable with men. You cannot surely doubt, but that he that made you, and gave you all that any way belongs to your being, can apply himself to you, or any of his creatures, in a way suitable to the natures which he hath put into you and them; nor that he is ready to converse with you, in a way suitable to the nature he hath given you, if you be such towards him, and so apply yourself to him, as you ought. For it is not a greater thing to do so, nor more exceeding or going beyond the reach of his power, wisdom, and goodness, as you cannot but see, than to have given being to you, and all things.

But now if what is further discoursed in that former Part, concerning the oneness of the Divine Being, and the infiniteness thereof, or concerning any other perfections there particularly asserted unto it, seem not so plain to you as is requisite to guide and facilitate your applications to him; what hath been more plainly said in this, is however sufficient, as more primarily fundamental and requisite to that further knowledge of his nature and will towards you, which in another way is to be had and sought after.

A cloud and darkness are now drawn over the world of mankind; and though it be still very easily discernible that God is, it is yet more difficult to attain to so distinct apprehensions what he is, as are necessary to our conversing with him. Against this difficulty, he hath afforded a gracious relief; that is, he hath provided there should be a more express discovery of him extant among men, than can be collected by their making observations upon this world. The case was such with man, (grown now so great a stranger to God,) as to re-
quire a written revelation of his nature and will; and we have
it in those scriptures which bear with us the name of the word
of God. It were indeed very unseasonable and absurd, to
urge their authority in the inquiry, whether there be a God
or no? For what authority have they more than other writings,
but as they are God's word? Therefore to expect or give
assent to them as such, while yet it remains an undecided con-
troversy, whether there be any such one, or no, for whose
sake the assent should be given, were to expose our religion,
not to prove it. These holy writings were not intended, by
their affirmation of it, to inform us of God's existence, which
they suppose, and do not prove, as a thing we may otherwise
be certain of; but to teach us our duty towards him, and
what our expectations may be from him; and do therefore
give us a true representation and discovery of his nature, (so
far as it was needful for us preparatively first to know it,) and
then next, of the present state of things between him and us,
that we might be directed how to apply ourselves to him suit-
ably to both the one and the other. It is true, that we can
never know that there is a God, without knowing somewhat
of his nature, or what a one he is. We cannot so much as
inquire whether he be or no, but we must have some notion
in our minds of the thing we inquire about; and so much as
is necessary to this purpose, may be plainly gathered in the
way we have gone hitherto. For if we understand the dif-
ference between something and nothing, between being and no
being, and find that something is, or that there is some being;
and again, if we understand the difference between a thing's
being of itself, and being of or from another, and find the
former must be the original of the latter, we cannot but un-
derstand ourselves, when we say there is an Original Being.
And having some understanding what is meant by power,
wisdom, and goodness; withal finding that not only the
effects of these, but these very things themselves, are in the
world, we cannot but be sure (because these things come
not of nothing) that the Original Being is powerful, wise,
and good. And now when we have thus found out an Ori-
ginal Being, that is of wisdom, power, and goodness sufficient
to be the Author of such a world as this, we at once know
both what God is, (sufficiently to distinguish him from all things
else,) and are at a certainty that he is.

When we perceive that he hath given to all breath and
being and all things; we have sought, and even felt and found
him out, and found that he is not far from any one of us,
since in him we live and move and have our being; that he is every where present, in this his creation, as the great Sustainer and the Life of the universe: and forasmuch especially as we are his offspring, (as even the light of a Heathens poet could reach to discover,) even we, who are a sort of intelligent, designing, active beings, that therefore the Godhead is not like silver, or gold, &c. but of a nature more nearly resembling that of our own souls, and the higher excellencies of the best of his creatures, although eminently containing in himself also all the real perfections, virtues, and powers of all the rest: when we understand so much of God, (as we may by the light of our own reason,) we understand enough to give a foundation to religion, and to let us see he ought to have a temple, and worship: and another sort of temple than is made by men’s hands, other worship than can be performed by the hands of men; as is there clearly argued, and inferred by the apostle, upon those plain grounds. Now when we are arrived thus far, it is reasonable to make use of the further help which we may observe the great, and wise, and good God to have most condescendingly, most aptly, and most mercifully afforded us, for our more distinct understanding of his nature, and our own state; and how we are to behave ourselves towards him thereupon.

IV. Taking notice therefore that there is a written revelation of him extant in the world, that bears his name, and gives itself out to be from him; if now we look into it, observe the import and design of it, compare it with what we before knew of his nature and our own: consider what is most obvious to an easy self-reflection in our own state and case, and how exactly this written revelation agrees and corresponds to those our former notices: taking in withal the many considerations that concur besides, to evidence to us the divine original and authority thereof: we cannot but have much rational inducement and obligation to receive, with all reverence and gratitude, this revelation, as from God; and to rely upon it, as a sure and sacred light sent down from heaven, to direct us in all our concerns. God-ward. For finding our own great need of such an additional light, and apprehending it sufficiently agreeable to the divine goodness to afford it, and expecting it to be such, in its scope and design, as we find it is: if we further consider it must have had some author, and perceiving it not easy, with any plausible pretence, to affix it to any other than God himself: if we consider that it was impossible it could be invented by men, without some design
of self-advantage, either in this world or in the other; and how absurd any such expectation must be, either from men here, (the contents thereof being so repugnant to the common inclinations of men, as to oblige those that owned them to the severest sufferings on that account,) or from God hereafter, who could not be expected to reward forgery, falsehood, and the usurpation of his name! If again, we further observe the positive attestations whereby he hath challenged and owned it as his own, and wherein the divine power hath borne witness to the divine truth contained in it; if the matters of fact on which all depends appear not less certain than that there were men and nations in the world, that we have not seen, and before we were born: if we see it not only improbable, but even next to impossible, that the records of those miraculous attestations should have been forged, and nations imposed upon thereby; and amongst them, many of the wisest of men in those very times when the things recorded were alleged to have been done, and in a matter wherein their eternal hope was concerned; * we shall upon the whole see cause to judge, That as it were most absurd to suppose such a revelation given by God, and no sufficient rational evidence withal given that it is from him, (without which it cannot serve its end, and so would signify nothing,) so that there is nothing wanting, in divine estimate itself, to make up such a sufficient, rational evidence; nor in our own, unless we would suppose it necessary that every man should have a Bible reached him down by an immediate hand from heaven, or make some other supposition as fond and vain as that; or that we count not that sufficient evidence, which ought to satisfy our reason, if it do not gratify our fancy and curiosity too. It is not fit, here, to say more of the divine original of those holy writings, nor needful; so much being written already, † with so great clearness, on that subject, by many. That therefore being out of question what you cannot reason out yourselves, or apprehend from the reasonings of others, concerning God's nature tending to represent him worthy of a temple with you, and capable of receiving and rewarding your sincere and spiritual worship, fetch out from that divine volume; for you may be sure, though you can-

* If we take notice that in some parts of this Vol. there are very ancient predictions, of the strangest and most unlikely events, that we see exactly fulfilled in the other parts.

not search him out unto perfection, he perfectly understands himself, and is certainly such, as he there tells you he is: and he there reveals himself to be such, as to whom the temple and worship we here intend, cannot be doubted (as he hath ordered things) to be both due and grateful. Whatever might be otherwise matter of doubt, is by his express-discovery of himself, taken away.

If it were still a doubt, after all that hath been formerly said for the reasoning out of these things, whether the Deity be one only, or manifold; whether the world had but one, or had not many makers; and so, whether there be no danger of misapplying our religion, or of mistaking the object of our worship. This word plainly tells us,

*First*, That there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things. 1 Cor. 8. 6. That he is God, and there is none else. Isa. 45. 21, 22. And that however there be thrice that bear witness in heaven, and the stamp of whose name is, in our baptism, distinctly and solemnly put upon us; Mat. 28. 1 John 5. yet (as in many other instances, that may be in some respect three, which in some other respect is but one) without the unnecessary, punctual declaration, how these are three, and how but one, it expressly tells us, *these three are one.*

And if it be yet a doubt with us (in which the reasonings of some may be too short to determine and resolve them) whether this one God be so absolutely and every way perfect as to be sufficient for us all; whether he can understand all our concerns, relieve us in all our necessities, hear our prayers, satisfy our desires, receive our acknowledgments and thanksgivings, and take notice with what love and sincerity they are tendered unto him; or, if he can do for us according to our necessities, and reasonable desires; whether we have any ground to believe that he will; this word of his plainly assures us,

*Secondly*, That he is God all-sufficient; Gen. 17. 1. that he hath all fulness in him. It often represents him to us, under the name of the Lord God Almighty: tells us that he can do every thing, and that he doth whatsoever it pleaseth him. It tells us his understanding is infinite, and particularly assures us that he searches the hearts of men, and tries their reins; that they cannot think a thought, or speak a word, but he understands them afar off, and knows them altogether: that his eyes are upon all the ways of men; that he knows all things, and therefore knows if they love him.
And that we may be the more fully put out of doubt how easy it is to him to do so, we are assured,

Thirdly, That he is everywhere present, that he fills heaven and earth, that the heaven, and heaven of heavens, cannot contain him; that there is no going from his Spirit, or flying from his presence; that if one go up to heaven, he is there; lie down in hell, he is there; go to the uttermost part of the sea, yet there his hand shall lead, and his right hand hold them.

Fourthly, And that all doubt may vanish, concerning his will and gracious inclination, how expressly doth he make himself known by this name? namely, That he is the Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, &c. Exod. 34. 7. And by the same blessed and inspired penman of a part of these holy writings, (the beloved disciple, who lay in the bosom of his only-begotten Son; who also is in the bosom of the Father, and hath declared him,) we are not only told that God is Light, whereby the knowledge, purity, simplicity, and glory of the Divine Being are represented, but also, once and again, that God is Love, that we might understand him as a Being not of more glorious excellency in himself, than of gracious propensions towards his creatures. And lest it should be thought our meanness should exempt us, and put us beneath his regard, we are told, He taketh care for sparrows, he heareth the ravens when they cry; and generally, that the eyes of all wait upon him, and he gives them their meat in season, Ps. 145. (which even the brute creatures are emphatically said to seek of God) and that he opens his hand, and satisfies the desire of every living thing. Ps. 104. And besides what he hath so expressly testified concerning his own nature, his favourable inclinations towards men might sufficiently be collected from that very nature which he hath given to man, considered in comparison and reference to his own: that he made him in his own image; and that he being the Father of spirits, hath placed a spirit in man, so agreeable to his own spiritual nature; and by his own inspiration given him that understanding, that the mind begotten corresponds, by its most natural frame and constitution, to the mind that begot, the ἡ̣σιτος πατερικάς, (as it was anciently called,) his own Eternal Mind: and that if its own original be remembered, it turns itself towards him, seeks his acquaintance by an instinct he hath himself implanted in it, and cannot rest until he have such a temple erected in it, wherein both he and
it may cohabit together. By all this, his aptness to that converse with men, which is imported in the notion of a temple, doth so far appear, that at least it is evident such converse cannot fail to ensue, supposing that there were nothing in the way that might be a present obstruction thereto. And it will more appear, when we have considered (since there is somewhat that obstructs this converse) what he hath done to remove the obstruction, and how he hath provided that the intercourse may be restored, and his temple be resettled with men, upon everlasting foundations.

CHAP. IV.

I. That there is an obstruction to this intercourse. II. The method of the following discourse. First, Man's apostasy from God, and the vitiated state of his nature; 1. Not only represented in the sacred Scriptures, but also, 2. Acknowledged and lamented by Pagans:—in some respects very mistakenly; wherein perhaps some of them not justly understood:—This not the primitive state of man; therefore not to be imputed to the Author of nature. Secondly, The temple of God hereby made waste and desolate, and become, 1. Unfit for the divine presence, being, (1.) Unsuitable, and, (2.) Disaffected. 2. Hereupon forsaken, and most justly. Thirdly, The new foundation and platform of his present temple laid in Immanuel.

BUT so far it is, that there should want probability of a very inward commerce between God and man, that we have reason to think it rather strange, considering his nature and our own, it should not have been continual; and that his unbounded and self-communicative fulness was not by him always afforded, and always imbibed and drawn in by so capable and indigent a creature. One would wonder what should have discontinued this intercourse! What can be so apt to give and flow out, as fulness? What should be so apt to receive and take in, as want and emptiness? Such a commerce then as can be supposed between one* that is rich and full, and them that are poor and necessitous, one would think should have never failed. So a fabulous dream may be significant, and not uninstructive, touching the reason and way

* Porus and Penia.
of commerce between God and creature. We are therefore put upon a new inquiry, and need no longer spend ourselves in anxious thoughts, Can there be any converse between God and men? That we may rather say, How can it not be? or, How strange is it there is not more! that he hath not a temple in every human breast, replenished with his vital presence! that there are nothing but ruins and desolation to be found, where one would expect a fabric worthy of God, and an indwelling Deity! This must therefore be the sad subject of our thoughts a while, What hath rendered the blessed God so much a stranger on earth, and occasioned him in so great part to forsake his terrestrial dwelling? Whence we shall have the advantage (seeing how just cause there was, on his part, for this deplorable distance) to adore the grace that returns him to us, and inclined him to take that strange course, which we find he did, to repair his forlorn temple, and fill this desolate, forsaken world with the joyful sound of those glad tidings, "The tabernacle of God is with men." We shall find he is no further a stranger in this world, than as we have made and continued him so: no further a home-dweller in it, than as by an admirable contrivance of wisdom and love, which will be the eternal wonder of the other world, he hath made way for himself: whereby his propensions towards men, prevailing against so great an obstruction, do even now appear at once both evident and marvellous, and ought to be not only the matter of our belief, but admiration.

II. Wherefore our discourse must here proceed by these steps, to shew—That mankind hath universally revolted, and been in a state of apostasy from God; that hereby the temple of God in man hath been generally made waste and desolate; and that he hath laid both the new foundations and the platform of his present temple in Immanuel, God with us, his own incarnate Son, who rebuilds, beautifies, furnishes, inhabits it, and orders all the concerns of it.

First, Mankind hath universally revolted, and been in a state of apostasy from God. This we do little need to labour in—every man's own reflection upon the vitiated powers of his own soul, would soon, as to himself, put the matter out of doubt; whence each one's testimony concerning his own case, would amount to a universal testimony. No man that takes a view of his own dark and blinded mind, his slow and dull apprehension, his uncertain staggering judgment, roving conjectures, feeble and mistaken reasonings about matters that concern him most; ill inclinations, propension to what is un-
lawful to him, and destructive, aversion to his truest interest and best good, irresolution, drowsy sloth, exorbitant and ravenous appetites and desires, impotent and self-vexing passions—
can think human nature, in him, is in its primitive integrity, and so pure as when it first issued from its high and most pure original. By such reflection, every man may perceive his own ill case, in these and many more such respects; and by observing the complaints of the most serious, and such as have seemed most to study themselves, collect it is generally so with others also.

1. They that have read the sacred volume, cannot be ignorant that all flesh have corrupted their way; (Gen. 6;) that the great God, looking down from heaven upon the children of men, to see if there were any that did understand, that did seek God, (Ps. 14. 2;) hath only the unpleasing prospect before his eyes even of a universal depravation and defection; that every one of them is gone back; they are altogether become filthy, there is none that doeth good, no not one; that all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God; (Rom. 3. 10—23.) that this world lieth in wickedness: (1 John 5. 19.) and that this was not the first state of man, but that he is degenerated into it from a former and better state: that "God made him upright," but that he is become otherwise, by his own "many inventions:" (Eccl. 7. 29.) that by trying conclusions to better a state already truly good, he brought himself into this woeful plight; and by aiming at somewhat above, sunk so far beneath himself into that gulf of impurity and misery, that is now become to him as his own element and natural state.

2. Yea and the matter hath that evidence, that even many of them who, for aught we know, never conversed with those sacred records, have no less clearly discovered the sense of the present evil state of man, than their ignorance of the original of that evil, though some of them carefully acquit God of it. Max. Tyr. Diss. 25. We find their complaints* of the malignity of ignorance surrounding all the earth, and that corrupts the soul shut up in the body: that, as a garment and web, inwraps the minds of men, that they cannot look to him whose pleasure it is to be known, and who is not to be heard with ears, nor seen with eyes, or expressed by words. That till it be rent in pieces, they have upon them † the bond of cor-

† της χαλκίας καλίας.
ruption, the dark coverture, the living death, the sensible carcass, a moving sepulchre, which they carry about with them.

We find complaints, that *by bonds and chains our mind is held, from our infancy: of certain "mean and debasing passions, that do fasten and even nail the soul to the body:" of † much greater evils, and more grievous, than the most painful bodily diseases, gouts, stranguries, dysenteries, and myriads of the like; namely, all manner of sins, wickednesses, transgressions, ungodlinesses, which we have to lament as the maladies or disaffections of our soul.

Of certain § old or inveterate spots, that are by all means to be washed and purged out: that there are certain ¶ principles of viciousness, as pleasures, griefs, lusts, fears, enkindled from the body, but mixed with the soul, and that absurdly bear rule over it.

And the naturalness of these is more than intimated, while they are said to be || rather from parents and our first elements than ourselves: or, ¶ rather to be imputed, as is elsewhere said, to those that plant, than those that are planted.

Whence also, **vice is said to be involuntary: (being rooted in our natures:) that whosoever are vicious, become so, from such things as do even prevent our choice. And that †† all men do more evil than good, beginning even from their very childhood.

And (as another expresses it) we offend from certain †† involuntary passions, in which the pravity of the soul is made to consist: or §§ that we here partake a certain mundane nature, which, he says, is mixed of mind and necessity.

* ἰγμαῖν καὶ συνίστων τὸν καθεχομένων, ἵνα βεβαιῶ, ὅπερ. Iamb. de vit. Pythag.
† πειρὰ τὸ σῶμα τελεσκίδες, στερισθευμομένι, φεύγωτιδε, ξοδάγχαι, σεργυγοίζω, δοῦσθείς, &c. πειρὰ δὲ τὸν ψυχὴν σωλῶ μαίζων καὶ χαλεπώσης. ἀνθρώπω, κακὰ, παρισμοῖα, κατισδήματα. Idem.
‡ —ίγκατεσκεφθομένων κυλίδες, p. 256, Hippar. Pythag.
¶ ἀληθῶν μὲν τὸς φανερών ἀνί, τῶν φιλομονίων μᾶλλον. Idem Timaeus.
** κακὰ, δὲ αὐτοκαλω ταῖς γενήσις. Ibid.
§§ μεγαλύνν γὰρ ὅτι ὦ τὸ κόσμῳ φύσις ἐκ τῆς γένους, ἢ αὐταγγει. Idem p. 77.

VOL. I. 28
And even from hence that * virtue is voluntary; vice is, by another, concluded to be involuntary. "For," says that author, "who can willingly, in the most lovely and most noble part of himself, choose that which is the greatest of all evils?" esteeming vicious inclination the most repugnant thing to liberty, (as it is indeed in the moral sense,) and the greatest slavery. Whereupon, another inquiring, since God doth nothing but what is good, whence evils should come, resolves that whatsoever is good is from heaven, but † all evil from our self-natural vileness. And another speaks of an evil adhering to our being, and not only acquired, but ‡ even connatural to us; yea, and this evil is said to be the very death of the soul. The sadness of the common case of man in this respect, hath been therefore emblematically represented by § a potion of error and ignorance, presented to every one at their first coming into the world, and whereof it is said all do drink, more or less; a woman called Imposture, accompanied by other harlots, Opinion, Lust, Pleasure, &c. seizing and leading away every one. And hence are || bitter complaints and accusations poured forth even against nature itself, as being a mere force and war, and having nothing pure or sincere in it, but having its course amidst many unrighteous passions; yea, and its rise and first production are lamented, as founded in unrighteousness. The discontentful resentments whereof have made some not spare to censure our very make and frame, the uniting ¶ of an immortal thing to a mortal in the composition of man, as a kind of distortion of nature, that the thing produced, should be made to delight in having parts so unnaturally pulled and drawn together.

So that some of the ethnick philosophers have been so far from denying a corruption and deprivation of nature in man, that they have overstrained the matter, and thought vicious inclination more deeply natural than indeed it is; and so

* τῷ οἴ τῷ ἀσθένει ἐκόσιον ἐκεῖνον ἔστιν τῷ τῷ κακίαν ἀκόσιον ἑώρακαί, &c.
   Alcinous Cap. 30.
† εἰς ᾿Αὐθίνην μοῦ Ἐννήσιας, Max. Tyr. Dissert. 29.
‡ τῷ στηρίχκοσμῳ τῷ θεῷ ἵμων κακίαν. Hiero. in Carm. Pythag.
§ τῶν ἀντιπροσωπευόμενον οὐ τοῦ βίου τολμάς, τοις σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ οἱ μὲν σωλήνα, οἱ δὲ στήλον. Tab. Cebetis.
¶ Empedocles and Heraclitus are represented as (πολλάκις ἄδουκλην καὶ ἀντιπροσώπ̣ευς τὸν φύσιν ὧν ἄναγκην καὶ πόλεμον ὑπὸ, ἀμυνόμενος τοὺς μὴν σωλήνως ἐκείσας) often bewailing and reproaching human nature, as being a principle of force and hostility, and having nothing pure or sincere.
taxed and blamed nature, in the case of man, as to be too liable to implied reflections even on the blessed Author of nature himself. Wherefore the known principles of the sect of the Stoics* do too plainly tend, who give in so vast a catalogue of the diseases and distempers of the mind of man: taking every thing into the account that hath the least of perturbation in it, without excepting so much as mercy itself, or pity towards them that suffer unjustly; and yet seem to subject all things to fate and natural necessity, whereby all these evils in the mind of man would be rejected upon the holy God, as their original Cause. Whence therefore some that were more sober have made it their business to vindicate God from so horrid an imputation; and one of much note

* D. Laert. L. 7. But perhaps they have been somewhat misunderstood by their prejudiced opposers, or some unwary expressions of theirs been stretched beyond what was meant. For though they reckon ἀλάσχος (compassion) among the distempers of the mind; yet so afterwards they do ἀλάσχομαι (the want of compassion) too. Whence it is probable they intended to place ἀλάσχος (compassion) among the evils of man's nature no otherwise than as it should include undue perturbation in it, or as it might urge those who are more apt to be passionate upon such occasions, than just and wise, to the doing of unfit or unseasonable things for the afflicted person's relief; than which nothing is more suppressable: which occasioned that famous general Agesilaus, when his sick friend importuned him with tears, to stop the (then necessary) march of his army for his sake, (looking sadly back upon him,) to say, ὑς χελετόν ἔβλεβεν εὔτερον, (How hard is it to be pitiful and wise!) Plutar. Apophtheg. Lacon. And that afterwards making ἀλάσχομαι vicious too, their meaning was, that a calm and sedate will or propension to relieve persons in distress was the virtue, both the other the opposite vices. Which seems more likely than Menagius's way of salving the ἀμφοτερις, by supposing ἀλάσχομαι here to have been miswritten for ἀλάσχοις, by some very assuming transcribers, that were willing rather to express their own mind than their author's. Observ. in Locum.

† And though in what follows they are sharply taxed, as laying all the evils of the world (moral as well as other) upon God and nature. This seems to have proceeded from some lavish speeches of Chrysippus, that justly fell under the representation of Plutarch's severer and more sound judgment. Yet surely they did suppose another, and purer state of nature, out of which man was lapsed; otherwise, how come they, when they assign the common notion of vicious perturbation or passion, to call it an irrational and [παραφυτικόν] preternatural motion? What nature is that, which it is supposed to swerve from? Besides that, they constantly call these diseases of the soul, therefore they understood them not to be its very nature: for then what were the diseased subject? Nor could it agree with that known dogma of theirs, that virtue is ᾠδικῶς τριθήμορος, a thing to be taught, if they should suppose vice in that sense natural. And indeed, that Plutarch entitles that book he hath against them,
animadverts upon the mistakes of such as seemed so to charge him, sharply blaming them for such an intimation; but more sharply (perplexing others in his own dubious twilight) for the excuse they give of it, namely, That God doth what they attribute to him in this matter, for the punishment of wicked men: * alleging it were a grievous matter that God should will and revenge the same thing, that wickedness should both be, and be punished, according to the mind of God. † Some do, with great reverence of the divine majesty, confess the rise of all this evil to be from man himself, namely, even that sort of evil which is called by the name of wickedness, is said to be from an innate principle, which the arbitrary power of a man's own soul hatcheth and fosters, and the fault is his who admits it; but God is faultless: ‡ that God did place the soul over a terrene body, as a charioteer over a chariot, which it might govern or neglect, &c. §

So another says, ‖ that whatsoever things come into this world from God, are good; but evils proceed from a certain ancient nature, &c. By which what could he mean, but the hereditary pravity which hath in a long series descended from depraved progenitors, so as no longer to be a new thing; but of a forgotten original, and from of old reigning in the world?

They of this famous sect, the Platonists, seem often to attribute vicious inclination to the soul's being united with the body; (as supposing it to have existed pure and sinless before;)
yet even they appear also not to have thought it impossible a human soul should sometime have been in an earthly body without sin. For their renowned leader discourses at large of a former incorrupt state of man in the body, (a golden age, as others also call it,) and of a defection or apostasy from it; which state, though his Egyptian tradition misinformed him about the continuance of it, he excellently describes (as also man's declining from it,) telling us, that "then God familiarly conversed with men, taking care of them, as a shepherd of his flock: that he was chiefly intent upon the ducrure and government of their minds; that (as he afterward says in another part of that unfinished discourse) while *the godlike nature continued in sufficient vigour with them, they were obedient to laws, and behaved themselves friendly towards that † divine thing that was akin to them. Then they possessed thoughts that were true, and altogether great; using meekness and prudence in reference to their own conditions and one another: that they disregarded all things in comparison of virtue. They easily bore a prosperous condition, esteeming all outward things little. They were not intoxicated or drunken with sensual delights; but sober and quick-sighted, and all things increased upon them through their mutual love and virtue. But they growing at length into a too great esteem and love of terrene things—‡and that participation which they had of God decaying (whereas all was well while the Divine Nature remained with them) and being variously intermingled with § much deadly evil, and a kind of human custom or course of living;" as elsewhere he so expresses sinful corruption, "prevailing among them, and they not able to bear a prosperous condition, came to shame, and to ruin with it; having lost the loveliest of their most precious things." Agreeably whereto, another, discoursing of the nature and original of evil, places it in our being plunged and sunk into matter and corporeity: and commenting upon a noted passage of his master, (in Theadet.) namely, "That our recovery must be by a speedy flight to God," &c. says, that ||this flight is not to depart from the earth, but that we become, even while we are on earth, righteous, and holy, and wise.

Therefore also have we with this sort of men, so frequent discourses of the purgative virtues, which suppose a lapse

* ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ φύσις ἅθως ἔτηκεν. † σιγεῖ τὸ συγγενὲς θεῖον.  
‡ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ μοιρα.  § πολλὴ τῷ θνητῷ.  
into great impurities; yet not so inseparable from our natures, 
but that by divine help (which they also sometimes speak of as necessary) a cure and redress may be wrought.

Nor, if we consider, can it be so much as imaginable to us, that the present state of man is his primitive state, or that he is now such as he was at first made. For neither is it conceivable, the blessed God should have made a creature with an aversion to the only important ends, whereof it is naturally capable: nor particularly, that he created man with a disaffection to himself; or that ever he at first designed a being of so high excellency as the spirit of man, to drudge so meanly, and be so basely servile to terrene inclinations; or, that since there are manifestly powers in him of a superior and inferior sort and order, the manner should have been, by original institution, framed to command; and the more noble and excellent, only to obey and serve: as now, every one that observes may see the common case with man is. And how far he is swerved from what he was, is easily conjecturable, by comparing him with the measures which shew what he should be. For it cannot be conceived for what end laws were ever given him, if, at least, we allow them not the measures of his primitive capacity, or deny him ever to have been in a possibility to obey. Could they be intended for his government, if conformity to them were against or above his nature? or were they only for his condemnation? or for that, if he was never capable of obeying them? How inconsistent were it with the goodness of the blessed God, that the condemnation of his creatures should be the first design of his giving them laws; and with his justice, to make his laws the rule of punishment, to whom they could never be the rule of obedience and duty; or with his wisdom, to frame a system and body of laws, that should never serve for either purpose, and so be upon the whole useful for nothing? The common reason of mankind teacheth us, to estimate the wisdom and equity of law-givers, by the suitableness of their constitutions to the genius and temper of the people for whom they are made; and we commonly reckon nothing can more slur and expose government, than the imposing of constitutions most probably impracticable, and which are never likely to obtain. How much more incongruous must it be esteemed to enjoin such as never possibly could! Prudent legislators, and studious of the common good, would be shy to impose upon men under their power, laws against their genius and common usages, neither alterable easily, nor to any
advantage. Much more absurd were it, with great solemnity and weighty sanctions to enact statutes for brute creatures! And wherein were it more to purpose to prescribe unto men strict rules of piety and virtue, than to beasts or trees, if the former had not been capable of observing them as the latter were not? We insist not on the written precepts in the sacred volume, (where we have also the history of man's creation and fall,) but let the law be considered which is written in men's hearts; the νόμος διαθήκης, the τάξις ἰονομος, or the lex nata (in the ethnick language) * which the eternal lawgiving mind hath created in our souls. And how evidently doth that law convince, that we neither are, nor do what we should? How gross and numerous deformities do we daily behold by that shattered and broken glass? How many things which we disapprove, or certainly would, if we discussed the matter with ourselves? How frequent buffetings are many, when they reflect, constrained to suffer at their own hands; even wherein (not having another law) they are only "a law to themselves," and have only their own thoughts, either their excusers, or accusers? And what doth that signify, but a lapse and recess from their original state? the broken imperfect memorials whereof, are a standing testimony against their present course; their notions of right and wrong, comely and uncomely, demonstrating against their vicious inclinations and ways. For would they ever reprove themselves for what was not possible to be otherwise? Or was man created a mere piece of self-contradiction; or with a nature made up of repugnancies, and perpetually at war with itself? This I should do, but that which is clean contrary I have a mind to. Were these ever like to be impressions, both, signed upon him by the same hand? Nothing is plainer therefore, than that he is corrupted from his primitive integrity, and become a depraved and a degenerate thing.

Secondly, We go on then, in the next place, to shew,—That by this degeneracy, the temple of the living God among men, became waste and desolate: namely, both uninhabitable or unfit for his blessed presence; and—thereupon, deserted and forsaken of it. And (because in breaches and disagreements man hath the first hand and part) we shall therefore treat, 1. Of the unfitness of man, in his state of apostasy, to entertain the divine presence, or be any longer God's temple;

and, 2. Of the blessed God's absenting himself, and estrangemen from him hereupon.

1. That the spirit of man, by his having apostatized, became unfit to answer the purposes of a temple, will too plainly appear, by considering the nature of that apostasy; which, what was it but a severing himself from God; a recess and separation? Not in respect of place, (which was impossible,) but the temper of his mind and spirit: or not by a local removal, but by unsuitableness and disaffection, departing in heart from the living God. It is true indeed, that by this his revolt, he became indisposed to all other converse which belonged to him as a creature intelligent and virtuous, but chiefly to divine: the blessed God being the chief term of this defection and revolt.

For man, by his original rectitude, was principally determined towards God; and by the same due bent and frame of spirit by which he stood rightly postured towards him, he was in a right disposition to every thing besides wherewith he had any concern. And adhering to him as his centre and prime object, he kept his due order towards all other things: whence by forcing and relaxing the bonds that held him united to God, and by changing his posture towards him, he came to stand right no way. Turning to him the back, and not the face, all things are inverted to him. He is now become most directly opposite to God, and unduly disposed towards other things only by means of that opposition. As then he is unfit for every other good use, so most of all for that of a temple; and that upon both the above-mentioned accounts, as being first unsuitable to the blessed God, and then thereupon disaffected.

(I.) Man was become most unsuitable to him; the divine image (which where should it be but in his temple) being now defaced and torn down. We speak not now of the natural image of God in man, or the representation the soul of man hath of its Maker in the spiritual, intelligent, vital, and immortal nature thereof, which image we know cannot be lost; but its resemblance of him in the excellencies which appear to be lost, and which were his duty, a debitum inesse, and could not be lost but by his own great default. And those are both such as wherein the soul of man did imitate and resemble God, as knowledge, purity, justice, benignity, &c. and such as wherein though it could not imitate him, yet was to bear itself correspondently towards him; as he being the absolute Sovereign, to be subject to him, obey and serve him: and he being the all-sufficient Good, to trust in
him, depend upon him, know, love, and delight in him, unite with him, and expect blessedness only in and from him. How unlike and disagreeable to God in all these respects is apostate man! That whereas the notion given us of God, is, that he is Light, and with him is no darkness at all; (1 John 1.) it is said of such as have been involved in the common apostasy, in reference to that their former state, “Ye were darkness;” as if that were the fittest and truest account that could be given of this revolted creature: not that he is in darkness, or there is much darkness in him, but, “He is darkness.” He and darkness may define one another—That is he; and he is that. A dismal horrid cloud hath inwrapped his soul, that resists and yields not easily to the most piercing beams, excludes light, wheresoever it would insinuate itself. This hath made the soul of man a most unmeet receptacle for the divine presence, and more like a dungeon than a temple. And as he is now sunk into carnality, and a low, abject, earthly spirit, how unfit is he for divine converse! How unapt to savour the things of God! How unlike the Father of Spirits! And whereas he was of a middle nature, partaking somewhat of the angelical, somewhat of the animal life, how is he swallowed up of the latter, and become like the beasts that perish; as the horse and mule without understanding, as the dog and swine both for fierceness and impurity; as the one is both apt to bite and devour, and return to his own vomit, and the other both to rend such as stand in his way, and wallow in the mire. We might add the sundry other Scripture resemblances of wolves, bears, lions, serpents, adders, vipers, &c. whereby many brutes seem to meet in one man; and to have made a collection, and contributed their worst qualities, and all the venom of their natures, to the making up of one mischievous composition in him. So that instead of a temple, he is a cage of every unclean and hurtful thing: he is, in short, of a reprobatc mind, full of all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness, envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity, &c. How repugnant, in all respects, to the holy, pure, benign, merciful nature of God! How remote from the imitation of his Maker, wherein he hath offered himself as his most imitable pattern! And wherein he is not imitable, but requires a proportionable and correspondent deportment or conformity: as by trust to his all-sufficiency, by subjection to his sovereign power and government. How dismal is the case, and how horrid the effects of the apostasy in these regards! How preposterous and perverse are his dispositions
and the course he hath run! For wherein it was permitted to him to imitate and affect likeness to a Deity; where he was put under no restraints, and his highest aspirings had been not only innocent, but most worthy of praise, (as to imitate God in wisdom, righteousness, sincerity, goodness, purity, &c.) here nothing would please but utmost dissimilitude, and to be as unlike God as he could devise. But in those things that were within the inclosure, and appropriate most peculiarly to the Godhead; to be the first and the last, the Alpha and Omega; the only one on whom all must depend, and to whom all must be subject and obey: these sacred regalia, the highest rights and flowers of the eternal crown, these are thought fine things, and beheld with a libidinous devouring eye, caught at by a profane sacrilegious hand. Nothing would satisfy but to be Godlike in this most disallowed and impossible sense. Man, when he hath reduced himself to the lowest pitch of wileness, misery and penury, now will be self-sufficient; and when he is become the most abject slave to ignominious lusts and passions, now he will be supreme: that is, having made himself viler than the meanest creature, and worse than nothing, he will be a God, even his own, a God to himself. Having severed and cut himself off from God, he will supply the room, and live only within himself; be to himself what God was, and should ever be. He now moves wholly in his own sphere, disjoined from that of the whole world, and is his own centre. All he does is from himself, and for himself. Thus is the true image of God torn down from his own temple, and that alienated, and become the temple of a false God, dedicate to that abominable idol, self.

(2.) Whence it comes to pass, that man is most disaffected to God, and full of enmity. So Scripture testifies concerning the carnal mind, Rom. 8. 8. And what it had before represented (ch. 2.) full of all malignity, it afterwards speaks of as directing it (most horrid to think!) against this blessed object; "Haters of God, despiteful, &c." Nor is any thing more natural; for, in part, the contrariety of their nature to his, more immediately begets this enmity, which always rises out of dissimilitude; and partly it is fomented and increased to a great degree, by a secret consciousness of that dissimilitude, and the misgivings of their own guilty fears thereupon: which must tell them, whencesoever they have so much communication with themselves, that they are unlike, and cannot but be unpleasing to him: and this infers some kind of dread; whence (as hath been commonly observed) the passage is short and easy
unto hatred. And though the more positive workings of this enmity do not (perhaps with the most) so ordinarily discover themselves; and they do not see or suspect that they hate him, while they are not urged to self-reflection; and when they are, hardly admit a conviction that they do: yet the matter carries its own evidence with it, and would soon be put beyond a question, if men were willing to understand the truth of their own case. For whence else do they so slowly entertain the knowledge of God, when the whole earth is full of his glory? When so manifest prints and footsteps of his wisdom, power, and goodness, do offer themselves to view in every creature, whence can it be, but that they like not to retain him in their knowledge? Rom. 1. And that their very hearts say to him, Depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of thy ways? Job 21. Why is so bright a light not observed, but that it shines amidst a malignant darkness, that, resisting, comprehends it not? Why are the thoughts of God so unpleasant to men and unfrequent, that when one would suppose no thoughts should be so obvious, none so welcome, yet it is become the character of an unrenewed man to forget God, (Ps. 9.) or not to have him in all his thoughts? Ps. 10. Why do men decline his acquaintance, live voluntary strangers to him all their days, and as without him in the world? Ephes. 2. Why are men so averse to trust him, and turn to him, even upon so mighty assurances? What makes them shy to take his word, but rather count him a liar, though they know it inconsistent with his nature; and can form no notion of God, without including this conception therein, that he cannot lie; when as yet they can ordinarily trust one another, though there be so much colour to say, "All men are liars?" Why do they resist his authority, against which they cannot dispute, and disobey his commands, unto which they cannot devise to frame an exception? What, but the spirit of enmity, can make them regret so easy a yoke, reject so light a burden, shun and fly off from so peaceful and pleasant paths: yea, and take ways that so manifestly take hold of hell, and lead down to the chambers of death, rather choosing to perish than obey? Is not this the very height of enmity? What further proof would we seek of a disaffected and implacable heart? Yet to all this, we may cast in that fearful addition, their saying in their heart, No God; (Ps. 14.) as if they should say, O that there were none! This is enmity, not only to the highest pitch of wickedness, (to wish their common Parent extinct, the
Author of their being,) but even unto madness itself. For in the
forgettable heat of this transport, it is not thought on that they wish
the most absolute impossibility, and that, if it were possible, they
wish, with his, the extinction of their own, and of all being; and
that the sense of their hearts, put into words, would amount to no
less than a direful and most horrid execration and curse upon God,
and the whole creation of God at once! as if by the blasphemy
of their poisonous breath, they would wither all nature, blast
the whole universe of being, and make it fade, languish, and
drop into nothing. This is to set their mouth against heaven
and earth, themselves, and all things at once, as if they
thought their feeble breath should overpower the omnipotent
word, shake and shiver the adamantine pillars of heaven and
earth, and the almighty fiat be defeated by their nay; striking
at the root of all! So fitly is it said, The fool hath in his
heart muttered thus! Nor are there few such fools: but this
is plainly given us as the common character of apostate man,
the whole revolted race: of whom it is said, in very general
terms, “They all are gone back, there is none that doeth good.”
This is their sense, one and all; that is, comparatively; and
the true state of the case being laid before them, it is more their
temper and sense to say no God, than to repent, and turn to
him. What mad enmity is this! Nor can we devise into what
else to resolve it.

This enmity, indeed, more plainly shews itself where the
Divine Glory (especially that of his grace, and good-will
towards men, a thing not less evident, than strange!) more
brightly shines: yet there are so manifest appearances of it
every where, and he hath so little left himself “without wit-
ess” unto any, that the universal strangeness of men towards
him apparently owes itself more to enmity than ignorance;
and even where there is much darkness, there is more ill-will.
For their ignorance, by which they are alienated from the life
of God, is called blindness of heart; that is, voluntary, affect-
ed blindness, Eph. 4. 18. It can be imputed to nothing else,
that they who have God so near to every one of them, who live,
and move, and have their being in him, do not yet seek after
him, and labour to feel and find him out; that is, that they
can miss of God so nigh at hand, when they have even palpable
demonstrations of his nearness, and kind propensions towards
them. Now this being the case, whatever this degenerate
vile creature might serve for else, he was plainly most unfit
for the use of a temple, or to be the dwelling-place of God.
2. Nor can it now be a wonder that the divine presence should be hereupon withdrawn; that the blessed God absents himself, and is become a stranger to this his once beloved mansion. We shall here take notice how apparent it is—That he hath done so, and—That he was most highly justifiable herein.

(1.) That God hath withdrawn himself, and left this his temple desolate, we have many sad and plain proofs before us. The stately ruins are visible to every eye, that bear in their front (yet extant) this doleful inscription—"Here God once dwelt." Enough appears of the admirable frame and structure of the soul of man, to shew the divine presence did sometime reside in it; more than enough of vicious deformity, to proclaim he is now retired and gone. The lamps are extinct, the altar overturned; the light and love are now vanished, which did the one shine with so heavenly brightness, the other burn with so pious fervour; the golden candlestick is displaced, and thrown away as a useless thing, to make room for the throne of the prince of darkness; the sacred incense, which sent rolling up in clouds its rich perfumes, is exchanged for a poisonous, hellish vapour, and here is, "instead of a sweet savour, a stench." The comely order of this house is turned all into confusion; "the beauties of holiness" into noisome impurities; the "house of prayer into a den of thieves," and that of the worst and most horrid kind: for every lust is a thief, and every theft sacrilege: continual rapine and robbery are committed upon holy things. The noble powers which were designed and dedicated to divine contemplation and delight, are alienated to the service of the most despicable idols, and employed unto vilest intuitions and embraces; to behold and admire lying vanities, to indulge and cherish lust and wickedness. What! have not the enemies done wickedly in the sanctuary? How have they broken down the carved work thereof, and that too with axes and hammers, the noise whereof was not to be heard in building, much less in the demolishing this sacred frame! Look upon the fragments of that curious sculpture which once adorned the palace of that great king; the relics of common notions; the lively prints of some undefaced truth; the fair ideas of things; the yet legible precepts that relate to practice. Behold! with what accuracy the broken pieces show these to have been engraved by the finger of God, and how they now lie torn and scattered, one in this dark corner, another in that, buried in heaps of dirt and rubbish! There is not now a system, an entire table of coherent truths to be found, or a frame of holiness, but some
shivered parcels. And if any, with great toil and labour, apply themselves to draw out here one piece, and there another, and set them together, they serve rather to shew how exquisite the divine workmanship was in the original composition, than for present use to the excellent purposes for which the whole was first designed. Some pieces agree, and own one another; but how soon are our inquiries and endeavours non-plussed and superseded! How many attempts have been made, since that fearful fall and ruin of this fabric, to compose again the truths of so many several kinds into their distinct orders, and make up frames of science, or useful knowledge; and after so many ages, nothing is finished in any one kind! Sometimes truths are misplaced, and what belongs to one kind, is transferred to another, where it will not fitly match: sometimes falsehood inserted, which shatters or disturbs the whole frame. And what is with much fruitless pains done by one hand, is dashed in pieces by another; and it is the work of a following age to sweep away the fine-spun cobwebs of a former. And those truths which are of greatest use, though not most out of sight, are least regarded: their tendency and design are overlooked; or they are so loosen'd and torn off, that they cannot be wrought in, so as to take hold of the soul, but hover as faint ineffectual notions, that signify nothing. Its very fundamental powers are shaken and disjointed, and their order towards one another confounded and broken: so that what is judged considerable is not considered, what is recommended as eligible and lovely is not loved and chosen. Yea, the truth which is after godliness is not so much disbelieved, as hated, held in unrighteousness; and shines as too feeble a light in that malignant darkness which comprehends it not. You come, amidst all this confusion, as into the ruined palace of some great prince, in which you see here the fragments of a noble pillar, there the shattered pieces of some curious imagery, and all lying neglected and useless among heaps of dirt. He that invites you to take a view of the soul of man, gives you but such another prospect, and doth but say to you,—"Behold the desolation;" all things rude and waste. So that should there be any pretence to the divine presence, it might be said, If God be here, why is it thus? The faded glory, the darkness, the disorder, the impurity, the decayed state in all respects of this temple, too plainly shew the great Inhabitant is gone.

(2.) And what was so manifest a sign of God's absence, was also a most righteous cause: for who have committed these
great wastes, and made this temple uninhabitable, but men themselves? And what could be more injurious to the holy God, than to invade and profane his temple? Or for what could we suppose him to shew more jealousy and concern? Whoever were a God, one would expect he should plead for himself, when men have cast down his altar. No words can express the greatness of the indignity! For do but take the following state of the case, thus: Man was his own creature, raised out of nothing by his mighty and most arbitrary hand; it was in his power and choice, whether ever he should have being, any, or none, another, or this, of so noble an order and kind. The designation was most apt, of so excellent a creature to this office and use, to be immediately sacred to himself, and his own converse; his temple and habitation, the mansion and residence of his presence and indwelling glory! There was nothing whereto he was herein designed, whereof his nature was not capable. His soul was after the required manner, receptive of a Deity; its powers were competent to their appointed work and employment; it could entertain God by knowledge and contemplation of his glorious excellencies, by reverence and love, by adoration and praise. This was the highest kind of dignity whereto created nature could be raised, the most honourable state. How high and quick an advance! This moment, nothing, the next, a being capable and full of God!

It was a most delectable and pleasant state, to be separated to the entertainment of the divine presence; that as soon as man could first open his eyes, and behold the light and glory of this new-made world, the great Lord and Author of it should present himself, and say, "Thou shalt be mine." How grateful a welcome into being! "Thee, above all my works, which thou beholdest, I choose out for myself. Thine employment shall be no laborious, painful drudgery; unless it can be painful to receive the large communications of immense goodness, light, life, and love, that shall, of their own accord, be perpetually flowing in upon thee! Whate’er thou espiest besides, that is even most excellent and pleasant to thy sense, is yet inferior to thee, and insufficient for thy satisfaction and highest delight, and but the faint shadow of that substantial fulness, which I myself will be unto thee."

There was, in all this, the freest and most condescending vouchsafement; no necessity could urge the self-sufficient God to affect union and familiarity with its own creature. Man’s alienation of himself from God, was as entirely volun-
tary, nothing could force him to it; he could have no inducement, which it was not easy to resist; heaven and earth could not afford the matter of a regardable temptation, to withdraw him from what did so infinitely excel. But how mean things have become the tempting and prevailing objects! the momentary relishes of a merely sensual delight, that might have been had innocent and pure, without breaking the enclosure. Ravenous appetite, lust after forbidden pleasure, is impatient of restraint: reason, that should have restrained it, resigns its office, falls into a treacherous combination with usurping sense, chooses rather to obey than rule, to rebel than obey; for not to rule, being thereto enjoined by the supreme Ruler, was to rebel. The empire of rebellious appetite was reckoned more tolerable than God's: thus are his authority affronted and his goodness despised both at once. He is rejected both as ruler and benefactor, with equal disrespect to his majesty and grace, to his governing and his heart-delighting presence. And how ignominious, hereupon, is the rejection, when so vile things are chosen and preferred! The tyranny of lust, before his holy, reasonable, orderly government; the pleasures of sin, rather than those of the divine presence: this being the practical, decisive judgment given in the case, that these are better. It is better to be the meanest drudge and slave than his servant, and to feed upon husks or ashes than his pure and most satisfying communications. And what he chose to be, he is; that is, with the indignity done to God, he hath joined the vilest debasement of himself. For hence also, how loathsome a creature is he now become! How perverted in all his powers! How full of darkness, confusion, impurity, malignity, and venom! How universally and horridly deformed! And hereof an estimate may be made, from his unaptness to self-reflection; which how notorious is it! What doth he not rather choose to do with his thoughts, than turn them inward? And how unfit is he for divine converse, that cannot endure his own; or to associate with God, that is become too foul a creature to have any satisfying converse with himself? Now what could be expected to ensue upon all this, but that he should be forsaken of God; that the blessed presence be withdrawn, that had been so despitely slighted, to return no more? No more, until at least a recompense should be made him for the wrong done, and a capacity be recovered for his future converse: namely, until both his honour should be repaired, and his temple; until he might again honourably return, and be fitly received. But who
could have thought in what way these things should ever be brought to pass? that is, neither could his departure but be expected, nor his return but be above all expectation. To depart was what became him; a thing, as the case was, most God-like, or worthy of God, and what he owed to himself. It was meet so great a Majesty, having been so condescendingly gracious, should not be also cheap, or appear unapprehensive of being neglected and set at nought. It became him, as the self-sufficient Being, to let it be seen he designed not man his temple for want of a house; that having of old inhabited his own eternity, and having now the heavens for his throne, the earth his footstool, he could dwell alone, or where he pleased else, in all his great creation; and did not need, where he was not desired. That of the Cynic was thought a brave saying, when his malecontented servant turned fugitive, and left him—"It were an unworthy thing Manes should think he can live without Diogenes, and that Diogenes cannot without Manes." (Senec. de Tranquill.) How much better would it suit with the real self-fulness of a Deity, where nothing of this kind can look like an empty, hollow boast! It was becoming of his pure and glorious holiness, not to dwell amidst impurities, or let it be thought he was a God that took pleasure in wickedness; and most suitable to his equal justice to let them who said to him, "Depart from us," feel they spake that word against their own life and soul; and that what was their rash and wilful choice, is their heaviest doom and punishment. It was only strange, that when he left his temple he did not consume it; and that not leaving it without being basely expelled, he hath thought of returning without being invited back again. Yea, and that whatsoever was necessary thereto, is designed by his own so strange contrivance, and done at his own so dear expense: his only-begotten Son most freely consenting with him, and in sundry capacities sustaining the weight and burthen of this great undertaking. This leads us to the third thing proposed, which will be considered in the following chapter.
CHAP. V.

I. The restitution of this temple undertaken by the Immanuel. II. The subject of the preceding chapter continued, wherein is shewn, Thirdly, That the blessed God hath laid the platform and foundations of his present temple in Immanuel; which was first more darkly prefigured, and afterwards more clearly revealed: he was himself to be the platform, the foundation, and the founder of it; and in order hereto must also be a sacrifice. III. The subject more particularly considered, wherein is shewn the sufficiency and the necessity of this constitution of Immanuel, for this purpose. First, Its sufficiency; in which it is proved, I. That we have enough in him, whereupon God might express himself willing to rebuild and return to his former temple. This founded on his sacrifice: objections to his sacrifice answered. 2. That man be made willing to render it back to him, and admit the operation of his fashioning hand. To effect this purpose, it is shewn, (1.) That on account of his sacrifice, he hath the power of giving the Holy Spirit. (2.) That the unwillingness of man is to be overcome by the power and spirit of Immanuel, as hereafter to be more fully shewn: but working (suitably to an intelligent subject) in a rational way. (3.) In this there is a great accommodativeness in the constitution of Immanuel, as demonstrating, [1.] Divine love. [2.] Divine holiness: and those, (1.) In the possibility of attaining them. (2.) In their own native loveliness. Secondly, The necessity of this constitution of Immanuel for this purpose.

I. AND indeed, what was to be designed and done, did every way call for so great an undertaker.—The indignity offered to the majesty of the most high God, in his so ignominious expulsion from his own temple, was to be recompensed:—and the ruin must be repaired which had fallen his temple itself. In reference to both these performances, it was determined that Immanuel, that is, his own Son, his substantial Image, the Brightness of his glory, the eternal Word, should become incarnate; and being so, should under take several parts, and in distinct capacities, and be at once a single Temple himself, and that this temple should be also a sacrifice, and thereby give rise to a manifold temple conformed to that original one, of each whereof, in the virtue of that sacrifice, he was himself to be the glorious Pattern, the firm Foundation, the magnificent Founder, and the most curious Architect and Former, by his own various and most peculiar influence.
chap. v. the living temple.

331

This hath been the result of the divine counsel, and the Lord's own doing, most justly marvellous in our eyes.

II. This leads us to the last thing proposed in the method in the preceding chapter: and to consider,

Thirdly, That the blessed God hath laid the platform and the foundations of his temple, as it was to be restored and set up again among men, in and by that great Immanuel, his own Son made flesh. It is to be considered that (as hath been shewn) the world had a long time lain deluged with wickedness, sunk in sensuality, and a deep oblivion of God: his memorial was even lost among men, and nothing less thought of than a temple in the true design and meaning of it; the notices of God, and any inclination to religion that remained, (too deeply infixed into the mind and nature of men to be quite extinct,) were yet so faint and weak, carnal and terrestrial propensions so strong, that the vital religion which was the proper business of a living temple, could have no place. It was not so only in the Pagan world from which God had further withdrawn himself, but even with that select people to whom he vouchsafed more peculiar manifestations and symbols of his mind and presence.

They had a figurative temple by his own appointment, erected in much glory among them, that might have instructed them, and by degrees the rest of the world, if they would have understood its true meaning and signification, that God was yet willing to dwell with men on earth, and that it should be a "house of prayer for all nations," who ought, upon those glorious appearances of God among that people, to have gradually proselyted themselves unto them. It prefigured what he intended, namely, in his appointed season, by his own Son to descend and inhabit, make and constitute him a much more glorious temple than could be built of wood or stone, or by the hands of men: that in after time "Shiloh should come, unto whom the gathering of the people should be," and by whom he would reconcile and re-collect the apostate world back again to himself. But all this was an unintelligible mystery on all hands; entered not into the minds of men of either sort, but much less into their hearts; and the Jews did much more affect to paganize, and go further off from God, than the Pagans (which in this they ought) to judaize, and draw nearer to him. The natural sentiments of religion, which were common to all men, did run out only into mere external observances and empty (though somewhat different) formalities, that might well enough agree with a sen-
sual life, transacted in habitual estrangment from God, and as without him in the world; so as not only not to answer the true intent and use of a temple, but to frustrate and elude it.

When this was the state of things with this world, and the fulness of time was now come, wherein God intended, with more vigour and efficacy, to renew and reinforce his mighty and merciful work of setting up his temple, and to make it rise in splendour and glory in the world, he at length sends down his Son: he puts on man; becomes Immanuel; an incarnate God among men; and a Man inhabited by all the fulness of God. This man was, therefore, a most perfect Temple: the original one: that is, not only a single one himself, but an exemplary Temple, to which all other were to be conformed; the advantage whereof to the forming of more we shall see hereafter: whereby he was also a virtual one, from which life and influence were to be transfused to raise and form all others. But in order to its being so, this very temple must become a sacrifice; and by dying, multiply: a seminal temple, as we shall hereafter shew, and as he himself represents the matter, John 12. 24. And which is in the full sense of it said, 1 Peter 2. where, when we were first told, (v. 4, 5.) we must come to him as unto a living stone, and as lively stones be built up a spiritual house; we are further told, (v. 24.) that he himself bare our sins in his own body on the tree, (where he was offered as a sacrifice,) that we might die to sin and live to righteousness. For now, a temple being, in its proper use and design, intended for divine honour, could not have its foundation in the ruin thereof; or be built upon his unremedied dishonour: the Son of God, by tendering himself for a valuable recompense, must be the Corner-stone of this new building. The wrong that man had done to the divine majesty should be expiated by none but man, and could be by none but God. Behold then the wonderful conjunction of both in the one Immanuel! who was, by his very constitution, an actual Temple: "God with us:" the habitation of the Deity returned, and resettling itself with men: and fitted to be (what it must be also) a most acceptable sacrifice. For here were met together man that could die, and God that could overcome death; man, that might suffer, and God, that could give sufficient value to those sufferings; sufficient to atone the offended Majesty, and procure that life might be diffused, and spread itself to all that should unite with him; whereby they might become living stones, joined to that living Corner-stone;
a spiritual temple, again capable of that divine presence which they had forfeited, and whereof they were forsaken.

III. That all this may be the better understood, we shall endeavour to show, more distinctly, the sufficiency and aptness of the constitution and appointment of Immanuel, (considering what he was, and what was undertaken to be suffered and performed by him,) as the most proper and adequate means for the restoring of God's temple with men; and the necessity of this course for this end.

First, And for the aptness and sufficiency of this course, or what the setting up of Immanuel might do for this purpose, may be seen in the suitableness hereof to the foregoing state of the case, and by comparing therewith what he is, and hath done and suffered in order hereto. We have seen that the former desolate state of this temple was occasioned and inferred by man's apostasy, (whereby he became incapable of serving any longer the purposes of a temple,) and God's departure thereupon. There was therefore the concurrence of somewhat on man's part, and somewhat on God's, unto this desolation: on man's, what was unjust, leading, and causal; on God's, what was most just, consequent, and caused thereby: man's unrighteous and ill-deserving aversion from God, and God's most righteous and deserved aversion hereupon from him: the one caused by the other, but both causing in different kinds the vacancy and deserted state of this temple which ensued: the former as a sinning cause, the latter as a punishing. Now what we have considerable in the Immanuel towards the restoration of this temple, and that it might become again habitable and replenished by the Divine Presence as before, is answerable to this state of the case; and directly tending to compose things between the distanced parties, both on the one part and the other. And because God was to have the first and leading part in reconciliations, as man hath in disagreements, we have enough in him, whereupon—God might express himself willing to rebuild and return to his former dwelling;—and man be willing to render it back to him, and admit the operation of the fashioning hand whereby it is to be prepared and refitted for its proper use.

1. That God might rebuild and return to his former temple. This is effected; and a foundation is laid for the effecting of the other too, in his becoming a sacrifice to justice; a sacrifice so rich and fragrant, so full of value and grateful savour, as that abundant recompense is made by it for the
wrong man had done to the Majesty of heaven, by profaning and polluting this temple, and expelling so contumeliously its great Inhabitant:—an injury, to which the creation, consuming in a universal flame, had been an unproportionable sacrifice; but the sacrifice of himself, the Immanuel, God-Man, could be defective in nothing: was both suitable and equal to the exigency of the case. For the sacrifice of him who was man, was suitable to the offence of man; and of him who was God, was equal to the wrong done to God. Long before this sacrifice was offered, the expectation of it, and since, the remembrance, have been precious. It was of sufficient virtue to work and diffuse its influence at the greatest distance; and not of time only, but of place too: to perfume the world, and scatter blessings through all the parts and nations of it, as well as through all the ages. When no other sacrifice or offerings could avail any thing, (Ps. 40. Heb. 10.) lo! He comes into a body prepared on purpose: which, though it was not formed and assumed until the fulness of time, (Gal. 4. 4.) was yet reckoned as slain from the beginning of it, Rev. 13. 8. This was the seed in which, though it sprang up only in Judea, yet all the nations of the earth were to be blessed, Gen. 22. 18. Long was this body in preparing; and the seed transmitted through many generations, whence it was at length to arise; into which as its last preparation, the Deity descended; and that it might be a sufficiently costly sacrifice, filled it with the divine fulness; for in him dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, Col. 2. 9. When we read Abel's sacrifice to have been more excellent than Cain's, (Heb. 11. 4.) the Greek word is, it was fuller. How full a one was this! That was filled by faith with a derivative fulness; this, immediately by God himself, with his own self-fulness, which filleth all in all, and whence all must receive.

Being so filled, it was a temple, and must now further be a sacrifice. Both are signified in that one short passage, which himself let fall, (John 2. 19.) "Destroy this temple:" that is, that he was a Temple, and was to be destroyed; which is carried in the notion of a sacrifice. This he said of his body, v. 21. Strange mystery! The very temple itself a consuming oblation, self-devoted even to destruction, and out of that again self-raised! The divine justice could not hereby but be well satisfied, and say, It was enough, when the whole temple became all propitiatory, and the profanation of the former temple was expiated by the immolation of the new: so that, in point of honour and justice, no exception could now lie
against the return of the divine presence to its wasted and forsaken temple. Only his return could not, as yet, be presently to dwell there, (for it was most unfit,) but to refit and prepare it for his future dwelling. It had been long desolate, and hereby was become decayed and ruinous, full of noisome impurities: yea, the habitation of dragons and devils of Ziim, and Jiim, and Ochim. Many an abominable idol was set up here, that filled up the room of the one God that had forsaken and left it. It was wholly in the possession of false gods, for whose use it was the more fit, by how much it was the less fit for his; for amidst darkness, confusion, and filthiness, was the chosen seat of the principalities and powers that now did dwell and rule here. Here was the throne of the prince of darkness, the resort of his associates, the altars of as many lusts as the heart of man, now wholly given up to all manner of wickedness, could multiply unto itself; by whose consent and choice, this horrid alienation had been made and continued. Upon such terms the “strong man armed kept the house.”

The blessed God might now return, but he must build before he dwell, and conquer before he build. He might return, but not upon other terms than the expiatory value, and actual or ascertained oblation of that above-mentioned sacrifice: for when he forsook this his temple, he left it with just resentment, and his most righteous curse upon it—a curse that was of this import, “Never any thing holy or pure any more come here, or any thing good and pleasant. The light of the sun never shine any more at all on thee: the voice of joy and gladness never be heard any more at all in thee.” The powerful horror of this curse held it doomed to all the desolation and misery that were upon it: confirmed it in the power of him that ruled here, at his will. Hence, had the magic and charms of the evil one, their permitted, unresisted efficacy, rendered it an enchanted place; related and adjoined it to the nether world, the infernal region; made it the next neighbourhood, even of the very suburbs of hell; and barred out all divine light and grace, all heavenly beams and influences from it. So that, had it not been for this Sacrifice, this temple had been and remained, even in the same kind, an accursed place, as hell itself: the Spirit of God should have had no more to do here, than there; for so the sentence and curse of his violated law had determined: “Thou shalt die the death,” did say no less.

But now, Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the
law, being made a curse for us: for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree: that the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles; that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith. Gal. 3. He was made a curse for us; not the same in kind which we had incurred, (which it were horrid to think,) but such as his state could admit, and ours could require. For that a person so immutably pure and holy should become an impure thing, was what his state could not admit; and that one of so high dignity should willingly suffer to that degree which he did for us, was a thing of so great merit and value, as to answer the uttermost of our ill-deservings; than which the exigency of our case could not, in that respect, call for more. And the end or design of his becoming to that degree a curse for us, being expressly said to be this, that we might receive the promise of the Spirit, (or the promised Spirit,) implies, that the curse upon us had intercepted and cut off from us all influences of that holy blessed Spirit; for the fresh emission whereof, in God's own stated method, he had now again opened the way. That this blessing is hereby said to become the portion of the Gentiles, was enough to the apostle's present purpose, writing to the Galatians; the Jews having, upon the same terms, had the same privilege formerly from age to age: "Thou gavest thy good Spirit to instruct them;" (Nehem. 9. 20.) which also is implied in their being charged with vexing and rejecting this blessed Spirit, one generation after another, Isa. 63. 10. Acts 7. 51. And they had now the same gospel, and are here also included, in that it is said to be the blessing of Abraham; into the communion whereof the Gentiles are now declared to have been admitted, about which so great doubt had been in those days. That therefore the Spirit might be given for the mentioned purpose, on the account of the Son of God's oblation of himself, is out of question. The necessity that he should be only given on these terms, will be seen hereafter, in its proper place; in ch. 9.

But whereas it hath been designed in all this discourse to represent the constitution of Immanuel (being first made a personal Temple, then a Sacrifice) as an apt and fit means to multiply this one temple into many, and bring it about, that upon just and honourable terms God might again return to inhabit the souls of men: it may perhaps be alleged, by some,—That it seems an unrighteous thing God should appoint his own innocent Son to be punished for the sins of offending creatures, and let them escape. And then how could an unjust
act make for the honour of his justice, or that which was in itself unfit, be a fit means to any good end?—The loud clamours wherewith some later contenders have filled the Christian world upon this subject, make it fit to say somewhat of it; and the thing itself needs not that we say much. We do know that the innocent Son of God was crucified; we know it by God's determinate counsel; we know it was for the sins of men; (which the adversaries, in a laxer and less significant sense, deny not, though it must by no means be understood, say they, as a punishment of those sins:) we know many of those sinners do finally escape deserved punishment. The truth of these things, in fact, is disputed on neither side: all these then are acknowledged reconcilable and consistent with the justice of God. What then is to be inferred? Not that these things are not so, for that they are, is acknowledged on all hands. What then? That God is unjust? Will their zeal for the reputation of God's justice admit of this? No: but it is only unjust to count this suffering of his Son a punishment: that is, it is unjust he should suffer for a valuable and necessary purpose; not that he should suffer needlessly, or for no purpose that might not have been served without it! But why may not the sufferings of Christ be looked on as a punishment? Because they will have it be essential to punishment, that it be inflicted on the person that offended: and then inconsistent with its notion and essence, that it be inflicted on an innocent person. But if so, the pretence for the cry of injustice vanishes, unless they will be so absurd as to say, It is very just to afflict an innocent person, but not to punish him: when the punishment hath no more in it of real evil to him that suffers it, than the admitted affliction. And when they say, The very notion of punishment carries in it an essential respect to that personal guilt of him that bears it, it implies that in the present case punishment hath no place, not because it is unjust, but because it is impossible. In the meantime, how vain and ridiculous is that pretence, that all the real evil which God determined should befall his Son he should let come upon him with acknowledged justice, but that the injustice must lie only in a notion; that is, if he look upon it as a punishment. Yet also the punishing of one for another's offence is forbidden to men, as themselves allege from Deut. 24. 16. (as it is not strange God should disallow men that dominio: over one another, which he may claim to himself, and which he is in no such possibility to abuse as they,) which therefore shews their notion of punishment is false, by which they
would make it impossible for one man to be punished for another's faults, (as the learned Grotius acutely argues, De Satisfact.) inasmuch as it were absurd to forbid a thing that is impossible. And that God himself doth often punish the sins of some upon others, is evident enough from many places of holy Scripture; particularly the second commandment, (Exod. 20. 5.) "I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children," &c. 2 Sam. 24. 15, &c. 1 Kings 11, 1. am. 5. 7. Whereas therefore they are wont, on the contrary, to allege that of Ezek. 18. "Ye shall no more use this proverb, The fathers have eaten the sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge," v. 2, 3, and 19, 20, &c. It is plain, in that it is said, Ye shall no more, &c. that the blessed God speaks here of what, in merciful indulgence, he for the future would not do, not of what in strict justice he might not; for can it be supposed he owns himself to have dealt unjustly with them before?

It is evidently therefore neither impossible nor unjust to punish one for another's offence; and the matter only seems harsh, to such as have misshapen to themselves the notion of punishment, and make it only correspond to the appetite of private revenge; whereas it only answers to a just will of vindicating the rights and honour of government; which may most fitly be done, upon another than the offender, not at random, or in an undistinguishing promiscuous hurry, but upon the two suppositions mentioned by the above-recited author. First, If there be a near conjunction between the person punished, with the person offending. Secondly, If there be a consent and voluntary suspicion of the former on behalf of the other. And we add, as a third, Especially if there be thereupon a legal substitution, the supreme ruler upon that consent also agreeing, providing, by a special law made in the case, for such transferring of the guilt and punishment. All which have so eminently concurred in the present case, that it can proceed from nothing but a disposition to cavil, further to insist and contend about it. And we know that such translations have among men not only been esteemed just, but laudable; as in the known story of Zaleucus, who, having ordained that adultery among his Locriæs should be punished with the loss of both eyes, and his own son afterwards being found guilty of that crime, was content to lose one of his own eyes, that justice might be done to the public constitution, and mercy be shewn to his son in saving one of his: and that of the Pythagoreans, Damon and Pythias, the one of whom pawned his own life to
the tyrant, to procure time for the other (condemned to die) wherein to settle some affairs abroad before his death; who returning within the limited time to save his faith and his friend’s life, by surrendering his own, so moved the tyrant, that he spared both. The common case of man, forsaken of the divine presence, and not to be restored without recompense, was the most deplorable and the most important that could be thought. And it may now be compassionately cared for; this having been obtained by this great sacrifice, that the divine justice is so well satisfied, and his majesty and honour so fully asserted and vindicated, as that he now may, without wrong to himself, (his justice and the dignity of his government not reclaiming against it,) cast a compassionate and favourable eye upon the desolations of his temple; take up kind thoughts towards it; send forth his mightier Spirit to dispossess the “strong man armed,” to vanquish the combined enemy-powers, to build and cleanse and beautify the habitation of his holiness, and then inhabit and dwell in it: upon which account it is now called, the temple of the Holy Ghost; the Spirit which the Father sends, in the name of the Son, upon this errand; he having obtained that it should be sent. By which Spirit also the Immanuel was sufficiently enabled to gain our consent unto all this; for his dying on the cross was not that he might have the Spirit in himself, but that he might have the power of communicating it: and so (as was before intimated) might the foundation be laid for what is to be done on our part, by the offering of this sacrifice; of which we are next further to treat.

2. That which was to be done on our part, in order to the restoring of God’s temple in us, was, that we be made willing of his return, and that there be wrought in us whatsoever might tend to make us fitly capable of so great a presence. More needs not to be said (but much more easily might) to shew that we were most unwilling. And that our becoming willing was requisite, is sufficiently evident. For what sort of a temple are we to be? Not of wood and stone; but as our worship must be all reasonable service, of the same constitution must the temple be whence it is to proceed. We are to be temples, by self-dedication, separating ourselves unto that purpose; and are to be the voluntary under-labourers in the work that is to be done for the preparing of this temple for its proper use: and the use which is to be made of it, that there the blessed God and we might amicably and with delight converse together, supposes our continual willingness, which therefore
must be once obtained. Now unto this purpose also, the consti-
tution of Immanuel was most suitable; or the setting up of
this one eminent temple first, God in Christ. This was a lead-
ing case, and had a further design: it was never meant that
the divine presence should be confined to that one single Per-
son, or only that God should have a temple on earth as long
as the Man Christ should reside there; but he was to be the
prior any original Temple; and his being so, did contribute to
the making us willing to become his temples also.

(1.) As here was the fulness of that Spirit, by whose power
and influence that, and all the subsequent work, was to be
wrought in us: which fulness is by that blessed name, IM-
MANUEL, signified to be in him on purpose to be communi-
cated, or as what must be some way common unto God with
us. Our aversion was not easily vincible: the people, it was
said, (speaking of the reign of Immanuel,) should be willing in
the day of his power; (Ps. 110. 2.) and, as it follows, in the
beauties of holiness. This was a known name of God's tem-
ple, (1 Chr. 16. 29.) for the building whereof David was now
preparing, and where to the passages agree, Ps. 27. 4. Ps. 96.
8, 9. And that spiritual one whereof we speak must be here
chiefly meant, whereof the Christian world, in its exterior
frame, is but the outer court; or is subordinate to the interior
frame, and to the work thereof, but as scaffolds to the build-
ing which they inclose. The people shall be willing, but not
otherwise than being made so by his power; and that not al-
ways put forth, but in the day of his power; on a noted me-
morable day: a day intended for the demonstration and mag-
nifying of his power; that is, the season when Immanuel
(the Lord, to whom the speech is addressed) would apply and
set himself, even with his might, to the great work of restoring
and raising up the temple of God: a work not to be done by
might and power, (according to the common, vulgar notion
thereof, by which nothing is reckoned might and power but a
visible arm of flesh, hosts and armies, horses and chariots,) but
by my Spirit, saith the Lord of hosts, Zech. 4. Then,
though the spirits of men swell as mountains, in proud enmity
and opposition, (which must be levelled where this building is
designed,) those mountains shall appear bubbles: what are they
before this great Undertaker? They shall become a plain,
when the Head-stone is brought forth with shoutings, unto
which the cry shall be, Grace, grace. This is the Stone laid
in Zion for a foundation, (Isa. 28.) sure and tried, elect and
precious; (Ps. 118.) disallowed by men, but chosen of God;
the chief Stone of the corner; (1 Peter 2.) a living, spiritual Stone, from which is a mighty effluence of life and spirit, all to attract and animate other stones, and draw them into union with itself, so as to compact and raise up this admirable fabric, a spiritual house for "spiritual sacrifice, acceptable to God by Jesus Christ;" as a Stone that shall spread life through the whole frame: called therefore a Branch (Zech. 3. 8, 9.) as well as a Stone, whereof is attributed the work and the glory of building God's temple. "Behold the Man whose name is the Branch; and he shall grow up out of his place, and he shall build the temple of the Lord; even he shall build the temple of the Lord; and he shall bear the glory," &c. ch. 6. A plain indication, that the prophecies of that book did not ultimately terminate in the restoration of the temple at Jerusalem; but, more mystically, intended the great comprehensive temple of the living God, which the Messiah should extend and diffuse, by a mighty communication of his Spirit, through the world; when (as is afterwards said, v. 15.) "they that are afar off shall come and build in the temple of the Lord;" "and the inhabitants of one city shall go to another, saying, Let us go speedily to pray before the Lord, and to see the Lord of hosts; I will go also. Many people and strong nations," &c. (ch. 8. 20—22.) Ten men out of all languages to one Jew, that shall say, We will go with you, for we have heard that God is with you. See Mic. 4. 2. This, it is said, shall be at Jerusalem, but it must be principally meant of the New Jerusalem, that cometh down from heaven, that is from above, that is free with her children, and is the mother of us all. And how plentiful an effusion of Spirit! how mighty and general an attraction, by it, is signified in all this, by which so deeply rooted an aversion to God and serious living religion, as is known to be common to men, is overcome, and turned into willingness and inclination towards him! And whereby that great primary Temple, CHRIST repleth the divine fulness, multiplies itself into so many, or enlarges itself into that one, his church; called also his body, (as both his very body and that church are called his temple,) the fulness of him that filleth all in all. Nor needs it scruple us, or give us any trouble, that we find this name of a temple placed upon a good man singly and alone, sometimes upon the whole community of such together. Each one bears a double habit—direct towards God, by which he is capable of being his private mansion; collateral towards our fellow Christians, whereby he is a part of his more enlarged dwelling. When-
soever then any accession is made to this spiritual temple, begun in Christ himself, it is done by a further diffusion of that Spirit, whereof that original Temple is the first receptacle.

(2.) But moreover, because it was a rational subject that was to be wrought upon, it is also to be expected that the work itself be done in a rational way. These that must be made living, and that were before intelligent stones, were not to be hewed, squared, polished, and moved to and fro by a violent hand; but being to be rendered willing, must be dealt with in a way suitable to the effect to be wrought. They are themselves to come as lively stones, to the living Corner-stone, by a vital act of their own will; which, we know, is not to be moved by force, but rational allurement. Wherefore this being the thing to be brought about, it is not enough to inquire or understand by what power, but one would also covet to know by what motive or inducement is this willingness and vital co-operation brought to pass; and we shall find this original Temple, the Immanuel, had not only in it a spring of sufficient power, but also,

(3.) In its constitution a great accommodateness thereto; carrying with it enough of argument and rational inducement, whereby to persuade and overcome our wills into a cheerful compliance and consent. And that,

[1.] As it was itself the most significant demonstration of divine love; than which nothing is more apt to move and work upon the spirit of man. The bonds of love are the cords of a man, (Hos. 11. 4.) of an attractive power, most peculiarly suitable to human nature: We love him, because he first loved us. 1 John 4. This is rational magnetism. When in the whole sphere of beings we have so numerous instances of things that propagate themselves, and beget their like, can we suppose the divine love to be only barren and destitute of this power? And we find, among those that are born of God, there is nothing more eminently conspicuous, in this production, than love. This new creature were otherwise a dead creature. This is its very heart, life, and soul; that which acts and moves it towards God, and is the spring of all holy operations. Since then love is found in it, and is so eminent a part of its composition, what should be the parent of this love, but love? Nor is this a blind or unintelligent production, in respect of the manner of it, either on the part of that which begets, or of that which is begotten: not only he who is propagating his own love, designs it, and knows what he is
about, but he that is hereby made to love, knows whereunto he is to be formed, and receives, through an enlightened mind, the very principle, power, and spirit of love. Is his love the cause of ours; or do we love him, because he loved us first? And what sort of cause is it? or how doth it work its effect, otherwise than as his love, testifying and expressing itself, lets us see how reasonable and congruous it is, that we should love back again? As is more than intimated, by the same sacred writer, in that epistle: "Hereby perceive we the love of God," &c. ch. 5. 16. Somewhat or other must first render his love perceivable to us, that thereby we may be induced to love him for his own, and our brother for his sake. And again, "We have known and believed the love that God hath to us. God is love," &c. After which it shortly follows, "We love him, because he loved us first;" as if he should say, The way of God's bringing us to that love-union with himself, that we by love dwell in him, and he in us, is, by his representing himself a Being of love. Until he beget in us that apprehension of himself, and we be brought to know and believe the love that he hath towards us, this is not done. But where have we that representation of God's love towards us, save in Immanuel? This is the sum of the ministry of reconciliation, or, which is all one, of making men love God, to wit, that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, &c. 2 Cor. 5. 18, 19. This was the very make and frame, the constitution and design, of the original Temple, to be the "Tabernacle of witness;" a visible testimony of the love of God, and of his kind and gracious propensions towards the race of men, however they were become an apostate and degenerate race; to let them see how inclined and willing he was to become acquainted again with them, and that the old intimacy and friendship, long since out-worn, might be renewed. And this gracious inclination was testified, partly by Christ's taking up his abode on earth; or by the erecting of this original Temple, by the Word's being made flesh, (John 4.) wherein (as the Greek expresses it, δεκκών) he did tabernacle among us. That whereas we did dwell here in earthly tabernacles, (only now destitute and devoid of the divine presence,) he most kindly comes and pitches his tent amongst our tents; sets up his tabernacle by ours, replenished and full of God: so that here the divine glory was familiarly visible, the glory of the only-begotten Son of the Father, shining with mild and gentle rays, such as should allure, not affright us, nor their terror make us afraid. A vail
is most condescendingly put on, lest majesty should too potently strike disaffected and misgiving minds; and what is more terrible of this glory, is aiyed by being interwoven with "grace and truth." Upon this account might it now truly be proclaimed, "Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men!" That is performed which once seemed hardly credible, and (when that temple was raised that was intended but for a type and shadow of this) was spoken of with wondering expostulation: "In very deed will God dwell with men on earth!" Whereas it might have been reasonably thought this world should have been for ever forsaken of God, and no appearance of him ever have been seen here, unless with a design of taking vengeance: how unexpected and surprising a thing was this, that in a state of so comfortless darkness and desolation, the "day-spring from on high should visit it," and that God should come down and settle himself in so mean a dwelling, on purpose to seek the acquaintance of his offending, disaffected creatures! But chiefly and more eminently this his gracious inclination was testified,—

By the manner and design of his leaving this his earthly abode, and yielding that his temple to destruction: "Destroy this temple, and I will raise it up." This being an animated living temple, could not be destroyed without sense of pain, unto which it could not willingly become subject, but upon design; and that could be no other than a design of love. When he could have commanded twelve legions of angels to have been the guardians of this temple, to expose it to the violence of profane and barbarous hands; this could proceed from nothing but love; and greater love could none shew, especially if we consider what was the designed event. This temple was to fall but single, that it might be raised manifold: it was intended (as it came to pass) to be multiplied by being destroyed; as himself elegantly illustrates the matter: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit;" (John i2.) which he afterwards expresses without a metaphor. "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth," signifying, as it follows, the death he should die, "will draw all men unto me."

We will not here insist on what was said before, that hereby the way was opened for the emission of the Spirit, which, when it came forth, performed such wonders in this kind, creating and forming into temples many a disaffected unwilling heart.
Whence it may be seen, that he forsook that his present dwelling; not that he might dwell here no longer, but only to change the manner of his dwelling, and that he might dwell here more to common advantage: the thing he intended, when he came down. He came down, that by dying, and descending low into the lower parts of the earth, he might make way for a glorious ascent; and ascended, that he might fill all things; (Eph. 4.) that he might give gifts to men, even the rebellious also, that he might dwell among them, Ps. 68. Not, I say, to insist on this, which shews the power by which those great effects were wrought, we may also here consider the way wherein they were wrought: that is, by way of representation and demonstration of the divine love to men. How brightly did this shine, in the glorious ruin and fall of this temple! Herein, how did redeeming love triumph! how mightily did it conquer, and slay the enmity that wrought in the minds of men before! Here he overcame by dying, and slew by being slain. Now were his arrows sharp in the hearts of enemies, by which they became subject, Ps. 45. What wounded him, did, by a strong reverberation, wound them back again. How inwardly were thousands of them pierced by the sight of him whom they had pierced! How sharp a sting was in those words, “Therefore let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye crucified, both Lord and Christ!” Acts 2. For it immediately follows, “When they heard this, they were pricked to the heart.” They that crucified him, are crucified with him; are now in agonies, and willing to yield to any thing they are required: “Men and brethren, what shall we do?” He may have temples now, for taking them; the most obdurate hearts are overcome: and what could be so potent an argument? what so accommodating to the nature of man; so irresistible by it? To behold this live-temple of the living God, the sacred habitation of a Deity, full of pure and holy life and vigour, by vital union with the eternal Godhead, voluntarily devoted and made subject to the most painful and ignominious suffering, purposely to make atonement for the offence done by revolted creatures against their rightful Lord! What rocks would not rent at this spectacle? Enough to put the creation (as it did) into a paroxysm, and bring upon it travelling pangs! And how strange if the hearts of men, only next and most closely concerned, should alone be unmoved, and without the sense of such pangs! Well might it be said, “I, if I be lift up, will draw all men,” without any such diminishing sense as to mean
by that *all* a very few only; not intending so much by it the effect wrought, (though that also be not inconsiderable,) as the power, or natural aptitude of the cause. As if he should say, This were enough to vanquish and subdue the world, to mollify every heart of man; and to leave the character upon them of most inhuman creatures, and unworthy to be called men, that shall not be drawn. It might be expected, that every one that hath not abandoned humanity, or hath the spirit of a man in him, should be wrought upon by this means: and they cannot but incur most fearful guilt, even all men, who once having notice of this matter, are not effectually wrought upon by it.

Upon which account, the apostle asks the Galatians, (who had not otherwise seen this sight than as the gospel-narrative had represented it to them,) who had bewitched them that they should not obey, before whose eyes Christ had been set forth crucified among them; intimating, that he could not account them less than bewitched, whom the representation of Christ crucified did not captivate into his obedience. And since, in his crucifixion, he was a sacrifice, that is, placatory and reconciling, and that reconciliations are always mutual, of both the contending parties to one another, it must have the proper influence of a sacrifice immediately upon both, and as well mollify men's hearts towards God, as procure that he should express favourable inclinations towards them. That is, that all enmity should cease, and be abolished for ever; that wrongs be forgotten, rights restored, and entire friendship, amity, and free converse, be renewed, and be made perpetual. All which signifies, that by this means the spirits of men be so wrought upon that they render back to God his own temple, most willingly, not merely from an apprehension of his right, but as overcome by his love; and valuing his presence more than their own life. Guilt is very apt to be always jealous. No wonder if the spirits of men, conscious of so great wrong done to God, (and a secret consciousness there may be even where there are not very distinct and explicit reflections upon the case,) be not very easily induced to think God reconcilable. And while he is not thought so, what can be expected but obstinate aversion on their part? For what so hardens as despair? Much indeed might be collected, by deeply-considering minds, of a propension, on God's part, to peace and friendship, from the course of his providence, and present dispensation towards the world; his clemency, long-suffering, and most of all his bounty, towards them. These lead
to repentance in their own natural tendency: yet are they but dull insipid gospel in themselves, to men drowned in sensuality, buried in earthliness, in whom the divine Spirit breathes not, and who have provoked the blessed Spirit to keep at a distance, by having stupified and laid asleep the considering power of their own spirit. Nor are these the usual means, apart and by themselves, which the Spirit of God is wont to work by upon the hearts of men, as experience and observation of the common state of the Pagan world doth sadly testify, and without the concurrence of that blessed Spirit, even the most apt and suitable means avail nothing.

But now where there is so express a testification, as we find in the gospel of Christ, of God’s willingness to be reconciled; a proclamation distinctly made, that imports no other thing but glory to God in the highest, peace on earth, and goodwill towards men; (for confirmation whereof, the Son of God incarnate is represented slain, and offered up a bloody sacrifice; and that we might see at once both that God is reconcilable, by the highest demonstration imaginable, and how or upon what terms he comes to be so;) no place for reasonable doubt any longer remains. We have before our eyes what, by the wonderful strangeness of it, should engage the most stupid minds to consider the matter; what ought to assure the most misgiving, doubtfull mind, that God is in good earnest, and intends no mockery or deceit in his offer of peace; and what ought to melt, mollify, and overcome the most obdurate heart. Yea, not only what is in its own nature most apt to work towards the producing these happy effects is here to be found, but wherewith also the Spirit of grace is ready to concur and cowork; it being his pleasure, and most fit and comely in itself, that he should choose to unite and fall in with the aptest means, and apply himself to the spirits of men in a way most suitable to their own natures, and most likely to take and prevail with them: whereupon the gospel is called the “ministration of spirit and life, and the power of God to salvation.” But that this gospel, animated by that mighty and good Spirit, hath not universally spread itself over all the world, only its own resolved and resisting wickedness is the faulty cause; otherwise there had been gospel, and temples raised by it, everywhere.

[2.] This original primary temple hath matter of rational inducement in it; as it gives us a plain representation of divine holiness, brightly shining in human nature. For here was to be seen a most pure, serene, dispassionate mind, un-
polluted by any earthly tincture, inhabiting an earthly tabernacle, like our own. A mind adorned with the most amiable, lovely virtues, faith, patience, temperance, godliness; full of all righteousness, goodness, meekness, mercifulness, sincerity, humility; most abstracted from this world, unmoveably intent upon what had reference to a future state of things, and the affairs of another country; inflexible by the blandishments of sense: not apt to judge by the sight of the eye, or be charmed by what were most grateful to a voluptuous ear; full of pity towards a wretched, sinful world, compassionate to its calamities, unprovoked by its sharpest injuries; bent upon doing the greatest good, and prepared to the suffering of whatsoever evil. Here was presented to common view a life transacted agreeably to such a temper of mind; of one invariable tenor; equal, uniform, never unlike itself, or disagreeing with the exactest or most strict rules. Men might see a God was come down to dwell among them; "The Brightness of the Father's glory, and the express Image of his person:" a Deity inhabiting human flesh; for such purposes as he came for, could not be supposed to carry any more becoming appearance than he did. Here was, therefore, an exemplary temple; the fair and lovely pattern of what we were each of us to be composed and formed unto: imitating us (for sweeter insinuation and allurement) in what was merely natural, and inviting us to imitate him in what was (in a communicable sort) supernatural and divine. Every one knows how great is the power of example, and may collect how apt a method this was to move and draw the spirits of men. Had only precepts and instructions been given men, how they were to prepare and adorn in themselves a temple for the living God, it had, indeed, been a great vouchsafement; but how much had it fallen short of what the present state of man did, in point of means, need, and call for! How great a defalcation were it from the gospel, if we did want the history of the life of Christ! But not only to have been told of what materials the temple of God must consist, but to have seen them composed and put together; to have opportunity of viewing the beautiful frame in every part, and of beholding the lovely, imitable glory of the whole, and which we are to follow, though we cannot with equal steps: how merciful condescension, and how great an advantage, is this unto us! We have here a state of entire devotedness to God (the principal thing in the constitution of his temple) exemplified before our eyes, together with what was most suitable besides to such a state. Do we not see how, in a body of
flesh, one may be subject to the will of God; to count the doing of it our meat and drink? When it imposes any thing grievous to be suffered, to say, "Not my will, but thine be done?" How in all things to seek not our own glory, but his? and not to please ourselves, but him? How hereby to keep his blessed presence with us, and live in his constant converse and fellowship, never to be left alone; but to have him ever with us, as always aiming to do the things that please him? Do we not know how to be tempted, and abstain; injured, and forgive; disoblige, and do good; to live in a tumultuous world, and be at peace within; to dwell on earth, and have our conversation in heaven? We see all this hath been done, and much more than we can here mention; and by so lively a representation of the brightest divine excellencies, beautifying this original exemplary temple, we have a two-fold most considerable advantage towards our becoming such: namely, that hereby both the possibility and the loveliness of a temple (the thing we are now ourselves to design) are here represented to our view: by the former whereof we might be encouraged, by the latter allured, unto imitation; that working upon our hope, this upon our desire, and love in order hereto.

First, The possibility. I mean it not in the strict sense only, as signifying no more than that the thing, simply considered, implies no repugnance in itself, nor is without the reach of absolute omnipotence; for as no one needs to be told that such a thing is (in this sense) possible, so to be told it, would signify little to his encouragement. There are many things in this sense not impossible, whereof no man can, however, have the least rational hope: as, that another world may shortly be made; that he may be a prince, or a great man therein; with a thousand the like. But I mean it of what is possible to divine power, (that is, to the grace and Spirit of God,) now ready to go forth in a way and method of operation already stated and pitched upon for such purposes. For having the representation before our eyes of this original Temple, that is, God inhabiting human flesh on earth, we are not merely to consider it as it is in itself, and to look upon it as a strange thing, or as a glorious spectacle, wherein we are no further concerned, than only to look upon it, and take notice that there is or hath been such a thing: but we are to consider how it came to pass, and with what design it was that such a thing should be, and become obvious to our view. Why have we such a sight offered us? or what imports it unto us? And when we have informed ourselves, by taking the account the gospel
gives us of this matter, and viewed the inscription of that great name Immanuel, by wonderful contrivance, inwrought into the very constitution of this temple, we shall then find this to be intended for a leading case; and that this temple was meant for a model and platform of that which we ourselves are to become; or, after which the temple of God in us must be composed and formed: and so, that this matter is possible to an ordinate, divine power, even to that mighty Spirit that resides eminently in this temple, on purpose to be transmitted thence to us, for the framing of us to the likeness of it; and so that the thing is not merely possible, but designed also, namely, that as he was, so we might be in this world: (1 John 4.) unto which is necessary our believing intuition towards him, or a fiducial acknowledgment that this Jesus is the Son of God, come down on purpose into human flesh, to bring about a union between God and us; whereupon that union itself ensues: the matter is brought about, we come to dwell in God, and he in us, v. 15. And this we collect and conclude from hence, that we find the same Spirit working and breathing in us, which did in him: "Hereby know we that we dwell in him, and he in us, because he hath given us of his Spirit," v. 13. And though it was an unmeasured fulness of this Spirit which dwelt in this primary temple, yet we are taught and encouraged hence to expect that a sufficient and proportionable measure be imparted to us, that we may appear not altogether unlike or unworthy of him; that this temple and ours are of the same make, and "both he that sanctifieth, and they that are sanctified, are all of one;" that we so far agree with our original, that he may not be ashamed to call us brethren, Heb. 2. And how aptly doth this tend to excite and raise our hope of some great thing to be effected in this kind in us, when we have the matter thus exemplified already before our eyes, and do behold the exact and perfect model according whereto we ourselves are to be framed. Nor doth that signify a little to the drawing of our wills, or the engaging us to a consent and co-operation, as the under-builders, in the work of this temple. A design that in itself appears advantageous, needs no more to set it on foot, than that it be represented hopeful. No one, that understands any thing of the nature of man, is ignorant of the power of hope. This one engine moves the world, and keeps all men busy. Every one soon finds his present state not perfectly good, and hopes some way to make it better; otherwise, the world were a dull scene. Endeavour would languish, or rather be none at all: for there were no room left for design, or a rational
enterprising of any thing; but a lazy unconcerned trifling, without care which end goes forward, and with an utter indifference whether to stir or sit still. Men are not, in their other designs, without hope, but their hope is placed upon things of no value; and when they have gained the next thing they hoped for and pursued, they are as far still as they were from what they meant that for. They have obtained their nearer end, but therein mistook their way, which they designed by it, to their further end. When they have attained to be rich, yet they are not happy; perhaps much further from it than before. When they have preyed upon the pleasure they had in chase, they are still unsatisfied; it may be, guilty reflections turn it all to gall and wormwood. Many such disappointments might make them consider, at length, they have been out all this while, and mistaken the whole nature and kind of the good that must make them happy. They may come to think with themselves, Somewhat is surely lacking, not only to our present enjoyment, but to our very design: somewhat it must be without the compass of all our former thoughts, wherein our satisfying good must lie. God may come into their minds; and they may cry out, Oh! that is it; here it was I mistook, and had forgot myself. Man once had a God! and that God had his temple, wherein he resided, and did converse with man: hither he must be invited back. Yea, but his temple lies all in ruin, long ago deserted and disused, forsaken upon provocation, and with just resentment; the ruin to be repaired by no mortal hand; the wrong done to be expiated by no ordinary sacrifice. All this imports nothing but despair. But let now the Immanuel be brought in; this original Temple be offered to view, and the design and intent of it be unfolded and laid open, and what a spring of hope is here! Or what can now be wanting to persuade a wretched soul of God’s willingness to return? Or, being now sensible of his misery by his absence, to make it willing of his return; yea, and to contribute the utmost endeavour that all things may be prepared and put into due order for his reception? Or if any thing should be still wanting, it is but what may more work upon desire, as well as beget hope: and to this purpose, a narrower view of this original Temple also serves; that is, it not only shews the possibility, but gives us opportunity to contemplate.

Secondly, The loveliness too of such a temple. For here is the fairest representation that ever this world had, or that could be had, of this most delectable object. The divine holiness
incarnate did never shine so bright. And we may easily appre hend the great advantage of having so lively and perfect a model set before us of what we are to design and aim at. Rules and precepts could never have afforded so full a description, or have furnished us with so perfect an idea. He that goes to build a house, must have the project formed in his mind before; and (as hath been said) he is to make a material house of an immaterial. So here, we may say the real house is to be built out of the mental or notional one. It is true indeed, when we have got into our minds the true and full idea or model of this temple, our greatest difficulty is not yet over: how happy were it, if the rest of our work would as soon be done, and our hearts would presently obey our light! If they were ductile, and easy to yield, and receive the stamp and impression that would correspond to a well enlightened mind; if we could presently become conform and like to the notions we have of what we should be; if on the sudden our spirits did admit the habitual, fixed frame of holiness, whereof we sometimes have the idea framed in our minds, what excellent creatures should we appear! But though to have that model truly formed in our understandings be not sufficient, it is however necessary; and although our main work is not immediately done by it, it can never be done without it. Truth is the means of holiness: “Sanctify them through thy truth,” John 17. 17. God hath chosen us to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth, 2 Thes. 2.13. Therefore it is our great advantage to have the most entire and full notion that may be, of that temper and frame of spirit we should be of. When the charge was given Moses of composing the tabernacle, (that moveable temple,) he had the perfect pattern of it shewn him in the mount. And to receive the very notion aright of this spiritual living temple, requires a some-way prepared mind, purged from vicious prejudice and perverse thoughts, possessed with dislike of our former pollutions and deformities; antecedent whereunto is a more general view of that frame whereunto we are to be composed, and then a more distinct representation is consequent thereon. As we find the prophet is directed first to shew the people the house, that they might be ashamed; whereupon it follows, if they be ashamed of all that they have done, then he must shew them the form of the house, and the fashion thereof, and the goings out thereof, and the comings in thereof, and all the ordinances thereof, Ezek. 43. 10, 11. How much would it conduce to the work and service of God’s temple in us, if upon our
having had some general intimation of his gracious propen-
sions towards us, to repair our ruins, and restore our forlorn,
decayed state, we begin to lament after him, and conceive in-
ward resentments of the impurities and desolations of our souls:
and shall now have the distinct representation set before our
eyes, of that glorious workmanship which he means to express
in our renovation! How taking and transporting a sight will
this be to a soul that is become vile and loathsome in its own
eyes, and weary of being as without God in the world! But
now, wherein shall he be understood to give us so exact an ac-
count of his merciful intendments and design in this matter, as
by letting us see how his glory shone in his own incarnate Son,
his express Image; and then signifying his pleasure and pur-
pose to have us conformed to the same image. This is his
most apt and efficacious method, when he goes about to raise
his new creation, and erect his inner temple; (as it was, in some
respect, his way, when he made his first great outer temple of
the world;) "God, that commanded light to shine out of dark-
ness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the know-
ledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ," 2 Cor. 4.
That glory shines with greatest advantage to our transforma-
tion, in the face or aspect of Immanuel. When we set our
faces that way, and our eye meets his, we put ourselves into a
purposed posture of intuition, and do steadily look to Jesus;
"when we, with open face, behold as in a glass the glory of
the Lord, we are changed from glory to glory, as by the Spirit
of the Lord," 2 Cor. 3. His very Spirit enters with those vital
beams; enters at our eye, and is thence transfused through our
whole soul.

The seed and generative principle of the new creature is
truth; "Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but incor-
ruptible, the word of God," 1 Peter 1. 23. We must un-
derstand it of practical truth, or that which serves to shew what
we are to be and do, (ch. 2. 1—4.) in our new and regene-
rate state. Hereby souls are begotten to God, hereby they
live and grow, hereby they come and join as living stones
to the living Corner-stone, in the composition of this spiri-
tual house: as we see the series of discourse runs in this
context. Now we have this practical truth, not only ex-
hibited in aphorisms and maxims in the word, but we have
it exemplified in the life of Christ. And when the great re-
novating work is to be done, the old man to be put off, the new
man to be put on, the spirit of our mind to be renewed, our
business is to learn Christ, and the truth as it is in Jesus:
(Eph. 4. 20—24.) so is accomplished the formation of that new man that is after God. And when we become his (second) workmanship, we are created in Christ Jesus unto good works; caught into union with that Spirit, which shewed itself in the whole course of his conversation on earth, and is gradually to work and form us to an imitation of him. Whereunto we are not formed by mere looking on, or by our own contemplation only of his life and actions, on the one hand: (our rigid hardness and stiff aversion to such a temple and course as his was, are not so easily altered and overcome;) nor, on the other hand, is our looking on useless and in vain, as if we were to be formed, like mere stones, into dead unmoving statues, rather than living temples; or as if his Spirit were to do that work upon us, by a violent hand, while we know nothing of the matter, nor any way comply to the design. But the work must be done by the holding up the representation of this primary temple before our eyes, animated and replenished with divine life and glory, as our pattern, and the type by which we are to be formed, till our hearts be captivated and won to the love and liking of such a state; that is, to be so united with God, so devoted to him, so stamped and impressed with all imitable Godlike excellencies, as he was: we are to be so enamoured herewith, as to be impatient of remaining what we were before. And such a view contributed directly hereto, and in a way suitable to our natures. Mere transient discourses of virtue and goodness, seem cold and unsavoury things to a soul drenched in sensuality, sunk into deep forgetfulness of God, and filled with aversion to holiness: but the tract and course of a life evenly transacted, in the power of the Holy Ghost, and that is throughout uniform, and constantly agreeable to itself, is apt, by often repeated insinuations, (as drops wear stones,) insensibly to recommend itself as amiable, and gain a liking even with them that were most opposite and disaffected. For the nature of man, in its most degenerate state, is not wholly destitute of the notions of virtue and goodness, nor of some faint approbation of them. The names of sincerity, humility, sobriety, meekness, are of better sound and import, even with the worst of men, than of deceit, pride, riot, and wrathfulness: nor are they wont to accuse any for those former things, under their own names. Only when they see the broken and more imperfect appearances of them, and that they are rather offered at than truly and constantly represented in practice; this begets a prejudice, and the pretenders to them become suspected of hypocrisy, or a concealed singularity, and are
not censured as not being grossly evil, but rather that they are not thoroughly good. But when so unexceptionable a course is in constant view as our Saviour's was, this procures, even from the ruder vulgar, an acknowledgment that he doth all things well, and carries that lustre and awful majesty, as to command a veneration and respect; yea, is apt to allure those that more narrowly observe into a real love both of him and his way; especially when it hath such a close and issue, as appear no way unworthy of himself, or his former pretensions. But all being taken together, resolves into the plainest demonstration of most sincere devotedness to God, and good-will to men; upon which the great stress is laid: "And I, if I be lift up, will draw all men unto me." And how great a thing is done towards our entire compliance with the Redeemer's design of making us temples to the living God, as he himself was, when he, under that very notion, appears amiable in our eyes! How natural and easy is imitation unto love! All the powers of the soul are now, in the most natural way, excited and set on work; and we shall not easily be induced to satisfy ourselves, or admit of being at rest, till we attain a state, with the loveliness whereof our hearts are once taken and possessed beforehand. But nothing of all this is said with design, nor hath any tendency, to diminish or detract from that mighty power of the blessed Spirit of God, by whom men become willing of the return of the divine presence into its ancient residence, and, in subordination, active towards it; but rather to magnify the excellency of that wisdom, which conducts all the exertions and operations of that power so suitably to the subject to be wrought upon, and the ends and purposes to be effected thereby.

Upon the whole, the setting up of this original temple, inscribed with the great name Emmanuel, or the whole constitution of Christ the Mediator, hath, we see, a very apparent aptitude and rich sufficiency in its kind, to the composing of things between God and men; the replenishing this desolate world with temples again everywhere; and those with the divine presence; both as there was enough in it to procure remission of sin, enough to procure the emission of the Holy Spirit: an immense fulness both of righteousness and Spirit; of righteousness for the former purpose, and of Spirit for the latter; and both of these, in distinct ways, capable of being imparted; because the power of imparting them was upon such terms obtained, as did satisfy the malediction and curse of the violated law, which must otherwise have everlastingliy withheld both
from apostate, offending creatures. It is not the righteousness of God, as such, that can make a guilty creature guiltless, (which must rather oblige him still to hold him guilty,) or the Spirit of God, as such, that can make him holy. Here is a full fountain, but sealed and shut up; and what are we the better for that? But it is the righteousness and Spirit of Immanuel, God with us; of him who was made sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him; and who was made a curse for us, that we might have the blessing of the promised Spirit; otherwise, there were not in him a sufficiency to answer the exigency of the case; but as the matter is, here is abundant sufficiency in both respects, as we have already seen. And therefore, the only thing that remains to be shewn herein,—is the necessity and requisiteness of such means as this, unto this end. For when we take notice of so great and so rare a thing as an Immanuel, set up in the world; and find by this solemn constitution of him, by the condition of his person, his accomplishments, performances, sufferings, acquisitions, the powers and virtues belonging to him, that every thing hath so apt an aspect, and is so accommodate to the restitution of lost man, and of God's temple in and with him; we cannot but confess, here is a contrivance worthy of God, sufficient for its end. So that the work needs not fail of being done, if in this way it prove not to be overdone; or if the apparatus be not greater than was needful for the intended end; or that the same purposes might not have been effected at an easier rate. I design therefore to speak distinctly and severally of the necessity of this course, in reference to the remission of sin, and to the emission or communication of the Spirit: and do purposely reserve several things concerning this latter, to be discoursed under this head: after the necessity of this same course for the former purpose (wherein the latter also hath its foundation) hath been considered.
CHAP. VI.

THE LIVING TEMPLE.

II.

I. An objection supposed. II. The subject of the preceding chapter continued: and, Secondly, The necessity of this constitution of Immanuel to the erecting God's temple in the world. The discoursing of this matter, proper on this occasion. I. As to God's part herein, it is proposed to shew, (1.) That a recompense was necessary to be made; and, (2.) That it could be made no other way. Towards the evincing the former, [1.] Sundry things are gradually laid down. [2.] The point itself argued, by comparing the injury done to the divine, with what we may suppose done to a human government, where, First, Repentance not constantly thought a sufficient recompense; otherwise, a penitent delinquent was never to be punished. Secondly, Difference between God's pardon and man's in most usual cases. A comparative view of the curse of the law and the blessing of the gospel. Thirdly, Recompense for wrong done to government, quite another thing from what answers the appetite of private revenge. Fourthly, Expressions that seem to import it in God, how to be understood. Fifthly, Shewn that they import no more than a constant will so far to punish offences, as is necessary for the asserting and preserving the rights and dignity of his government. Sixthly, So much most agreeable, and necessarily belonging to the perfection of the divine nature. Seventhly, And if the justice of a human government requires it, of the divine much more.

I. It may here perhaps be said, Why might not the matter have been otherwise brought about? Or, might not God of his mere sovereignty have remitted the wrong done to him, without any such atonement; and, upon the same account, have sent forth his Spirit to turn men's hearts? And if that must work by arguments and rational persuasives, were there no others to have been used, sufficient to this purpose, though the Son of God had never become man, or died upon this account? That to use means exceeding the value of the end, may seem as unsuitable to the divine wisdom, as not to have used sufficient. And who can think the concerns of silly worms impossible to be managed, and brought to a fair and happy issue, without so great things as the incarnation and death of God's own Son?

II. The subject of the preceding chapter is therefore continued, in which we proceed to shew, as was promised,
Secondly, The necessity, as the case stood, that this course should be taken for this end. No man can here think we mean that the end itself was otherwise necessary, than as the freest love and good-will made it so; but that supposed, we are only to evince that this course was the necessary means to attain it. And as to this, it indeed that modesty and reverence were every where to be found, wherewith it would become dim-sighted man to judge of the ways of God, any inquiry of this kind might be forborn; and it would be enough to put us out of doubt, that this was the most equal and fittest way, that we see it is the way which God hath taken. But that cross temper hath found much place in the world, rather to dispute God's methods, than comport with them, in an obedient thankful compliance and subserviency to their intended ends. And how deeply is it to be resented, that so momentous a thing in the religion of Christians, and that above all other should be the subject and incentive of admiring, devout thoughts and affections, should ever have been made intricate and perplexed by disputation! That the food of life should have been filled with thorns and gravel! And what was most apt to beget good blood, and turn all to strength, vigour, and spirit, should be rendered the matter of a disease! This can never enough be taken to heart. What complaints might the tortured, famish'd church of Christ send up against the ill instruments of so great a mischief! "Lord! we asked bread, and they gave us a stone. They have spoiled the provisions of thy house. Our pleasantest fare, most delicious and strengthening viands, they have made tasteless and unsavoury." What expostulations might it use with them! "Will you not let us live? Can nothing in our religion be so sacred, so important, as to escape your perverting hands?"

The urgency of the case itself permits not that this matter be silently passed over: a living temple needs the apt means of nourishment and growth; and it must be nourished and grow, by what is suitable to its constitution: unto which nothing is more inward, than the laying this "living Cornerstone."

We will acknowledge that the reasons of divers things in God's determinations and appointments may be very deeply hidden, not only from our more easy view, but our most diligent search: where they are, his telling us, the matter is so, or so, is reason enough to us to believe with reverence. But when they offer themselves, we need not be afraid to see them;
and when the matter they concern is brought in question, should be afraid of being so treacherous as not to produce them.

Now that it was requisite this temple should be so founded as hath been said, is a matter not only not repugnant to the common reason of man, but which fairly approves itself thereunto: that is, so far as that though it exceed all human thought, the great Lord of heaven and earth, infinitely injured by the sin of man, should so wonderfully condescend; yet when his good pleasure is plainly expressed, touching the end, that nothing could be so apparently congruous, so worthy of himself, so accommodate to his design, as the way which he hath avowedly taken to bring it about. That it might be brought about, (as in all reconciliations, and as hath been said concerning this,) a compliance was necessary, and a mutual yielding of both the distanced parties; that is, that God consent to return to his desolate temple, and that man consent or be willing he should.

We have shewn that the constitution and use of the original temple, whereof the account hath been given, was sufficient, and aptly conducing unto both. Now being to shew wherein they were also requisite or necessary to the one and the other, we must acknowledge them not alike immediately necessary to each of these; and must therefore divide the things in order whereunto this course was taken, and speak of them severally. Nor are they to be so divided, as though the procurement of God's return for his part, and of man's admitting thereof for his part, were throughout to be severally considered; for God's part is larger than man's, and someway runs into it: he is not only to give his own consent, but to gain man's; and besides his own willing return to repossess this his temple, he is to make man willing also: or rather that return or repossession, rightly understood, will be found to include the making of man willing; that is, in that very return and repossession, he is to put forth that measure of power and influence, by which he may be made so. All this is God's part, which he doth graciously undertake, and without which nothing could be effected in this matter. But then because man is to be wrought upon in a way suitable to his reasonable nature, he is to have such things offered to his consideration, as in their own nature tend to persuade him; and which that power and spirit, to be put forth, may use as proper means to that purpose. Now it is man's part to consider such things, and consent thereupon. Our business here, therefore, is to shew how necessary the
constitution of Immanuel was, chiefly and principally as to what now appears to be God's part; and afterward, to say somewhat as to our own.—To the former, it was requisite that the Original Temple, Immanuel, should be set up, and be used to such immediate purposes as have been expressed: to the latter, was requisite the declaration hereof.—To the one, that such a constitution should be; to the other, that it be made known to man.

1. In reference to God, this constitution was necessary, that so there might be a sufficient means for the previous expiation of the offence done to the divine majesty; or that the injurious violation of his sacred rights might be sufficiently recompensed. And here, more particularly, two things are to be cleared; namely, that in order to God's return, it was necessary such a full recompense should be made him; and that it could not be full any other way than this, by Immanuel. In discoursing of which things, it is not intended to go in the usual way of controversy, to heap up a great number of arguments, and discuss particularly every little cavil that may be raised on the contrary part; but plainly to offer such considerations as may tend to clear the truth, and rather prevent than formally answer objections against it. Wherefore we say,

(1.) It was necessary God's return and vouchsafement of his gracious restored presence to man, as his temple, should be upon terms of recompense made him (or as certain to be made) for the indignity and wrong done in the former violation thereof. Towards the evincing of which,

[1.] Several things are gradually laid down. We do not here need to be curious in inquiring, whether the consideration of this recompense to be made, had influence on the gracious purpose of God in this matter, or only on the execution thereof. Nor indeed hath the doubt any proper ground in the present case, which, where it hath disquieted the minds of any, seems to have proceeded from our too great aptness to measure God by ourselves, and prescribe to him the same methods we ourselves are wont to observe. That is, we find it is our way, when we have a design to bring about, upon which we are intent, first to propound the end to ourselves which we would have effect ed, then to deliberate and consult by what means to effect it: whereupon, we assign to the blessed God the same course. But to him, all his works are known from the beginning of the world: and he ever beheld, at one view, the whole tract and course of means whereby any thing is to be done, which he intends with the intended end itself. So that we have no reason
to affix to him any thought or purpose of favour towards the sinful sons of men, ancients or more early than his prospect of the way wherein that favourable purpose was to be accomplished.

Nor again can any act or purpose of his towards his creatures be otherwise necessary to him, than from the essential rectitude of the counsels of his own will; the determinations whereof are such as might not have been, or might have been otherwise, where the thing determined was, by those measures, a matter of indifferency. Where it was not so, they are (however necessary, yet also) in that sense most free; as they are directed and approved by his infinite wisdom, and attended with that complacency which naturally accompanies any act or purpose that is in itself most unexceptionably congruous, just, and good.

It may furthermore be truly said, that nothing ought to be reckoned possible to him, upon the agreement only which it holds to some one attribute of his, considered singly and apart from all the rest: as, for instance, in what is next our present case, to forgive all the sins that ever were committed against him, without insisting upon any compensation, were vainly alleged to be correspondent to boundless sovereign mercy, if it will not as well accord with infinite wisdom, justice, and holiness; as it would be unreasonably said to be agreeable enough to him, to throw all the creatures that never offended him into an endless nothingness, in consideration only of the absoluteness of his power and dominion. But whatsoever he can do, must be understood to be agreeable to a Being absolutely and every way perfect.

Moreover we add, that whatsoever is most congruous and fit for him to do, that is truly necessary to him: he cannot swerve in the least title, we will not only say from what strict and rigorous justice doth exact and challenge, but also not from what is requisite, under the notion of most comely and decent. Hath it been said of a mortal man, that it was as easy to alter the course of the sun, as to turn him from the path of righteousness? We must suppose it of the eternal God equally impossible that he should be diverted from, or ever omit to do, what is most seemly becoming, and worthy of himself. In such things wherein he is pleased to be our pattern, what we know to be our own duty, we must conclude is his nature: we ought to be found neither in an unjust act or omission, nor undecent one; and he cannot. And if it belong to us to do what is good, it more necessarily belongs to him to do what is best; that is, in
all things that are any way capable of coming under a moral consideration: for as in other matters it is permitted to us to act arbitrarily, so there is nothing hinders but he may much more. Wherefore it is not hence to be thought that therefore it was necessary this universe and every thing in it should have been made as perfect as they could be: as if we ourselves will make any thing for our own use, nothing obliges us to be so very curious about it, as that it may be as neat and accurate as we can devise to make it; it will suffice if it be such as will serve our turn. And indeed, in the works of nature, it would have been less worthy of God to have expressed a scrupulous curiosity that nothing might ever fall out besides one fixed rule, (especially in a state of things designed for no long continuance,) that should extend to all imaginable particularities; as that all men should be of the comeliest stature, all faces of the most graceful aspect, with a thousand the like. But in matters wherein there can be better and worse, in a moral sense, it seems a principle of the plainest evidence, that the blessed God cannot but do that which is simply the best: yea, while a necessity is upon us not only to mind things that are true, and just, and pure, but also that are lovely and of good report, we have no cause to doubt, but whatsoever is comely, and becoming his most perfect excellencies, is an eternal, indispensable law to him: wherefore it is not enough to consider, in the present case, what it were strictly not unjust for him to do, but what is fit and becoming so excellent and glorious a majesty as his.

Nor now can it be a doubt, but that he only is the competent Judge of what is becoming and worthy of himself: or what is most congruous and fit in itself to be done; (Isa. 40.) "Who hath directed the Spirit of the Lord, or being his counsellor, hath instructed him?" &c. Surely the best reason we can exercise in this case, is to think that course reasonable which we find God hath chosen, although we had no insight at all into the matter. There are many constitutions which we have occasion to observe in the course of God's government over the world, which, by the constancy of them, we have ground to think founded in indispensable necessity; though the reasons whereupon they are necessary, are most deeply latent and hidden from us. Not to speak of the abstruser paths and methods of nature, wherein while we observe a constancy, yet perhaps we apprehend it might have been some other way as well: perhaps it might, but it is more than we know. And though, as hath been said, we have reason to suppose that the ways God
hath taken in matters of this sort may be more absolutely arbitrary, yet the constant iteration of the same thing, or continuation of the ancient settled course, shews the peremptoriness of the Creator's counsel; and seems to carry with it an implied rebuke of our ignorant rashness, in thinking it might as well be otherwise: and a still asserting of his determinations against us. There are none so well studied naturalists, as to be able to give a rational account why it is so, and so, in many instances: wherein they may yet discern the inflexibleness of nature, and perceive her methods to be as unalterable as they are unaccountable. It is true, this is obvious to be seen by any eye, that where things are well, as they are, constancy doth better than innovation or change: but it very much becomes human modesty, to suppose that there may, in many cases, be other reasons to justify the present course, which we see not: But we may, with more advantage, consider the fix edness of that order which God hath set unto the course of his dispensation towards his intelligent creatures, wherein we shall only instance in some few particulars.

As, first, that there is no little discernible commerce, in the present state, between the superior rank of these creatures and the inferior. That whereas we are well assured there are intelligent creatures, which inhabit not earthly bodies like ours, but hold an agreement with us in greater things; they yet so rarely converse with us. When we consider, that such of them as remain innocent, and such of us as are, by divine mercy, recovered out of a state of apostasy, are all subject to the same common Lord; observe the more substantial things of the same law; have all the same common end; are actuated by the same principle of love, devotedness, and zeal for the interest and honour of the great Maker and Lord of all things. We are all to make up one community with them, and be associates in the same future blessed state; yet they have little intercourse with us—they shun our sight. If sometimes they appear, it is by transient, hasty glances: they are strangely shy and reserved towards us; they check our inquiries: put us, and appear to be themselves, in reference thereto, under awful restraints. We know not the reason of all this: sometimes we may think with ourselves, those pure and holy spirits cannot but be full of kindness, benignity, and love, and concerned for us poor mortals, whom they see put to tug and conflict with many difficulties and calamities; abused by the cunning malice of their and our enemy; imposed upon by the illusions of our own senses. How easily might they make many useful discoveries to us;
relieve our ignorance in many things; acquaint us more expressly with the state of things in the other world; rectify our dark or mistaken apprehensions, concerning many both religious and philosophical matters! But they refrain, and we know not why.

Again, that in the days of our Saviour's converse on earth, there should be so strange a connection, as to them on whom he wrought miraculous cures, between the divine power and their faith; so that sometimes we find it expressly said, "He could do no mighty work, because of their unbelief."

And we lastly instance, in the fixatedness of that course which God hath set for making known to the world the contents of the gospel of Christ: so that little is ever done therein, immediately, or by extraordinary means. The apostle Paul is stopped in the career of his persecution, by an amazing voice and vision; but he is left for instruction as to his future course, to Ananias. Unto Cornelius an angel is sent, not to preach the gospel, but to direct him to send for Peter for that purpose. The Lord doth not immediately himself instruct the Eunuch in the faith of Christ, but directs Philip to do it. And experience shews, that (according to the rule set in that case, Rom. 10.) where they have no preachers, they have no gospel.

Now as to all these cases, and many more that might be thought on, can it be said it would have been unjust, if God had ordered the matter otherwise than he hath? That, we cannot so much as imagine; nor are we to think the matter determined as it is, in all such cases, by mere will and pleasure, without a reason; which were an imagination altogether unworthy the supreme wisdom: but that there are reasons of mighty force and weight, or certain congruities, in the natures of things themselves, obvious to the divine understanding, which do either wholly escape ours, or whereof we have but very shallow, dark, conjectural apprehensions; as he that saw men as trees, or as some creatures of very acute sight perceive what to us seems invisible. And yet those occult and hidden reasons and congruities have been the foundation of constitutions and laws that hold things more steadily than adamantine bands, and are of more stability than the foundations of heaven and earth.

Furthermore, it is to be considered that the rights of the divine government; the quality and measure of offences committed against it, and when or upon what terms they may be remitted; or in what case it may be congruous to the dignity of that government to recede from such rights; are matters of
so high a nature, that it becomes us to be very sparing in making an estimate about them; especially a more diminishing one than the general strain of Scripture seems to hold forth. Even among men, how sacred things are majesty and the rights of government, and how much above the reach of a vulgar judgment! Suppose a company of peasants, that understand little more than what is within the compass of their mattock, plough, and shovel, should take upon them to judge of the rights of their prince, and make an estimate of the measure of offences committed against the majesty and dignity of government; how competent judges would we think them? And will we not acknowledge the most refined human understanding as incompetent to judge of the rights of the divine government, or measure the injuriousness of an offence done against it, as the meanest peasant to make an estimate of these matters in a human government? If only the reputation be wronged of a person of better quality, how strictly is it insisted on to have the matter tried by peers, or persons of equal rank; such as are capable of understanding honour and reputation! How would it be resented, if an affront put upon a nobleman should be committed to the judgment of smiths and cobblers; especially if they were participes criminis—sharers in the crime, and as well parties as judges?

When the regalia of the great Ruler and Lord of heaven and earth are invaded, his temple violated, his presence despised, his image torn down thence and defaced; who among the sons of men are either great, or knowing, or innocent enough, to judge of the offence and wrong, or how fit it is that it be remitted without recompense, or what recompense would be proportionable? How supposable is it, that there may be congruities in this matter obvious to the divine understanding, which infinitely exceed the measure of ours?

[2.] And yet, because God speaks to us about these matters, and they are our own concernsments, as being of the offending parties, it is necessary we apply our minds to understand them, and possible to us to attain to a true, though not to a full, understanding of them. And though we can never fully comprehend in our own thoughts the horror of the case, that reasonable creatures, made after God's image, so highly favoured by him, capable of blessedness in him, uncapable of it any other way, should have arrived to that pitch of wickedness towards him, and unnaturalness towards themselves, as to say to him, "Depart from us," and cut themselves off from him; though we may sooner lose ourselves in the contempla-
tion, and be overwhelmed by our own thoughts, than ever see through the monstrous evil of this defection, yet we may soon see it incomparably to transcend the measure of any offence that can ever be done by one creature against another, or of the most scandalous affront the meanest, the vilest, the most ungrateful, ill-natured, wretch could have devised to put upon, the greatest, the most benign, and best deserving prince the world ever knew. And if we can suppose an offence of that kind may be of so heinous a nature, and so circumstanced as that it cannot be congruous it should be remitted without some reparation made to the majesty of the prince, and compensation for the scandal done to government, it is easy to suppose it much more incongruous it should be so in the present case. Yea, and as it can never be thought congruous that such an offence against a human governor should be pardoned without the intervening repentance of the delinquent, so we may easily apprehend also the case to be such as that it cannot be fit it should be pardoned upon that alone, without other recompense: whereof if any should doubt, I would demand, Is it in any case fit that a penitent delinquent against human laws and government should be punished, or a proportionable recompense be exacted for his offence, notwithstanding? Surely it will be acknowledged ordinarily fit: and who would take upon him to be the censor of the common justice of the world in all such cases: or to damn the proceedings of all times and nations whereas ever a penitent offender hath been made to suffer the legal punishment of his offence, notwithstanding his repentance?

First. How strange a maxim of government would that be, That it is never fit an offender, of whatsoever kind, should be punished, if he repent himself of his offence! And surely if ever in any case somewhat else than repentance be fitly insisted on as a recompense for the violation of the sacred rights of government, it may well be supposed to be so in the case of man's common delinquency and revolt from God, much more.

Secondly. Unto which purpose it is further to be considered, that in this case the matter is much otherwise between God and man, than for the most part between a secular prince and a delinquent subject: that is, that pardon, be it ever so ple-
nary, doth, as pardon, no more than restore the delinquent into as good a condition as he was in before. But what was, for the most part, the case before of delinquent subjects? There are very few that were before the prince's favourites, his intimate associates and friends, with whom he was wont familiarly
to converse. Very often the condition of the offender was such before, that his pardon only saves him from the gallows; lets him live, and enjoy only the poor advantages of his former mean condition; and not always that neither: yea, or if he were one whose higher rank and other circumstances had entitled him to a nearest attendance on the person of the prince, and a daily, inward conversation with him: it is possible he might be pardoned with limitation as to his life, or it may be, further, to his estate, without being restored to the honours and offices about the person of the prince, which he held only by royal favour; for though princely compassion might extend so far as to let his offence be expiated by less than his utter ruin, yet also his prudent respect to the dignity of his government might not admit that a person under public infamy should have the liberty of his presence, intermingle with his councils, or be dignified with more special marks of his favour and kindness. Whereas in the restitution of man, inasmuch as before he was the temple and residence of the great King, where he afforded his most inward, gracious presence, the design is to restore him into the same capacity, and to as good condition as he was in before in these respects: yea, and not only so, but unspeakably to better his case, to make him much nearer to himself than ever, and into a more exalted state. In order whereto, it was the more highly congruous that his offence be done away by a most perfect, unexceptionable expiation; that so high and great an advancement of the most heinous offenders, might not be brought about upon other terms than should well accord with the majesty of his government over the world.

Here, therefore, let a comparative view be taken of the fearful malediction and curse of God’s law upon the transgressors of it, and of the copious blessing of the gospel: that thereupon we may the more clearly judge how improbable it was there should be so vast a difference and translation between two so distant states, without atonement made for transgression of so high demerit, and so deeply resented.

As to the former, we are in the general told, (Gal. 3.) that "cursed is every one that continues not in all things written in the book of the law, to do them." Astonishing thing! That he should curse me, who made me! That my being, and a curse upon me, should proceed from the word and breath of the same sacred mouth! Of how terrible import is his curse! To be made an anathema, separate and cut off from God, and from all the dutiful and loyal part of his creation! Driven
forth from his delightful presence! In the same breath, it is said to be the loathed wretch, Depart—accursed! To be reduced to the condition of a vagabond on the earth, not knowing whither to go! Naked of divine protection from any violent hand: yea, marked out for the butt of the sharpest arrows of his own indignation! How voluminous and extensive is his curse! reaching to all one’s concernments in both worlds, temporal and eternal, of outward and inward man. To be cursed in one’s basket and store, in the city and field, in going out and coming in! Especially to have all God’s curses and plagues meeting and centering in one’s very heart, to be there smitten with blindness, madness, and astonishment! How efficacious is this curse! Not a faint, impotent wishing ill to a man, but under which he really wastes, and which certainly blasts, withers, and consumes him, and even turns his very blessings into curses! How closely adhering, as a garment wherewith he is clothed, and as a girdle with which he is girt continually! How secretly and subtly insinuating, as water into his bowels, and oil into his bones! And how deservedly doth it befal! The curse causeless shall not come; this can never be without a cause. If another curse me, it shews he hates me; if the righteous God do so, it signifies me to be in myself a hateful creature, a son and heir, not of peace, but of wrath and a curse. And the effect must be of equal permanency with its cause; so as that God is angry with the wicked every day, and rains upon them fire and brimstone, and a horrible tempest, as the portion of their cup; indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that does evil, and continually growing into a treasure, against the day of wrath.

View, on the other hand, the copious, abundant blessing contained and conveyed in the gospel. It is a call to blessing, that we may inherit a blessing: it discovers a state begun with the blessedness of having iniquity forgiven; a course, under a continued blessing, of meditating on the word of God with delight, day and night; of being undefiled in the way: gives characters of the subjects of blessings showered down from the mouth of Christ on the poor in spirit, pure in heart, the meek, merciful, &c.: aims at making them nigh, that were afar off; taking them into God’s own family and household; making them friends, favourites, domestics, sons, and daughters; engaging them in a fellowship with the Father and Son: yet were all these the children of wrath, by nature. Whence is this change? A regression became not the majesty of heaven.
God’s original constitution, that connected sin and the curse, was just; he abides by it, reverses it not. To have reversed it, was not to have judged the offenders, but himself: but having a mind to shew men mercy, he provides for the expiation of sin, and salvying the rights of his government, another way—by transferring guilt and the curse, not nulling them.

Thirdly, Whereupon, we may also see what made atone ment for sin so fundamental to a design of grace; the magnifying the divine law; (Isa. 42. 21.) the asserting the equity and righteousness of the supreme government; not, as some odiously suggest, the gratifying of what, with us, is wont to go for a private appetite of revenge, from which the support of the honour and dignity of the government is most remote: yea, it were horrid to suppose that any such thing can have place with the blessed God, which is one of the most odious things in the disposition of lapsed, degenerate man—an aptness to take complacency in the pains and anguish of such as have offended us; unto which purpose, how feelingly would a malicious, ill-minded man, oftentimes utter the sense of his heart, and say, O the sweetness of revenge! So black a thought of God will be most remote from every pious breast, or that is capable of savouring real goodness. Nor doth any precept within the whole compass of that revelation which he hath given us, express more fully, at once, both our duty and his own nature, than that of loving our enemies, or of forgiving men their trespasses. There is, perhaps, somewhere (but O how rarely!) to be found among men, that benign, generous temper of mind, as when an enemy is perfectly within one’s power, to be able to take a real solace in shewing mercy; when he is in a fearful, trembling expectation, and hath even yielded himself a prey to revenge, to take pleasure in surprising him by acts of kindness and compassion: one that can avow the contrary sentiment to the spirit of the world, and to them who so emphatically say, How sweet is revenge! and can with greater—pathos oppose to it that, as the undisguised sense of his soul, O but how much sweeter is it to forgive! Than which, there is nowhere to be seen a more lively resemblance of God; a truer and more real part of his living image, who hath commanded us to love our enemies; if they hunger, to feed them; to bless them that curse us; to pray for them that despitefully use us, and persecute us; that we may be his children, that we may shew ourselves born of him, and to have received from him a new, even a divine nature, one truly agreeable to, and resembling his own: and unto whom, therefore, the acts and
operations that naturally proceed from this temper of spirit, are more grateful and savoury than all whole burnt-offerings and sacrifice. So are we to frame our conceptions of the ever blessed God, if either we will take the rationally coherent and self-consistent idea of an absolutely perfect Being, or his own frequent affirmations who best understands his own nature, or the course of his actual dispensations towards a sinful world, for our measure of him.

Fourthly, But is it a difficulty to us to reconcile with all this such frequent expressions in the sacred volume, as import a steady purpose that all the sins of men shall be answered with an exactly proportionable measure of punishment? That every transgression shall have a just recompense of reward? That death is the stated wages of sin? Or do we find ourselves more perplexed how to understand, consistently with such declarations of his merciful nature, those passages which sometimes also occur, that seem to intimate a complacental vindictiveness, and delight taken in punishing—the Lord is "jealous, the Lord revengeth;" yea, that he seems to appropriate it as peculiar to himself—"Vengeance is mine, and I will repay it;" that "indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, shall be upon every soul of man that doeth evil:" that speak of his laying up sin, sealing it among his treasures; of his waiting for a day of recompenses; of his whetting his glittering sword, his making his bow ready, and preparing his arrows on the string; of his being refreshed by acts of vengeance, his satiating of his fury, and causing it hereupon to rest, as having highly pleased and satisfied himself therewith. If any thing alien to the divine nature, and disagreeable to the other so amiable discoveries of it, be thought imported in such expressions, let it only be considered, first, what must be allowed to be their import; and, next, how well so much will agree with a right conception of God.

For the former, it is not necessary that such expressions be understood to intend more, and it seems necessary they be not understood to import less, than a constant, calm, dispassionate, complacental will, so far to punish sin, as shall be necessary to the ends of his government. That they do import a will to punish, is evident; for they are manifest expressions of anger, whereof we can say nothing more gentle, than that it is a will to punish. It cannot signify punishment, without that will: for though the word anger, or wrath, be sometimes used in Scripture for the punishment itself, yet even then that will is supposed, otherwise what is said to be punishment, were an
unintended accident; and then how were it a punishment? Much less can it signify only God’s declaration of his will to punish, excluding that will itself; for then what is it a declaration of? Or what doth it declare? Surely we will acknowledge it a true declaration; then it cannot be the declaration of nothing, but must have somewhat in God correspondent to it; namely, the will which it declares. Which being plain, that it be also,

Fifthly, A dispassionate will, accompanied with nothing of perturbation; that it be a constant will, in reference to all such occasions, wherein the sacredness of the divine government, violated, requires such reparation; and without any change, (other than what we may conceive imported in the different aspects of the same object, conceived as future, present, or past, and beheld before, with purpose, afterwards with continual approbation,) the most acknowledged perfection of the divine nature doth manifestly not admit only, but require. For that such a calm, sedate, steady, fixed temper of mind in a magistrate is an excellency, even common reason apprehends: therefore is it said, by a noted Pagan, that judges ought to be *legum similes—like the laws themselves*; which are moved by no passion, yet inflexible: and then where can such an excellency have place in highest perfection, but in the blessed God himself? Yea, and that it be also a complacent will, as some of the expressions above recited seem to import, may very well be admitted, if we rightly conceive and state in our own minds the thing willed by it; that is, the preserving the honour and dignity of the supreme government. Indeed, simply to take pleasure in the pain and misery of another, is so odd and unnatural a disaffection, that it is strange how it can have place any where; and where it seems to have place among men, though too often it really hath so in more monstrously vicious tempers, yet, with many others, (who herein are sufficiently blameable also,) the matter may, perhaps, be somewhat mistaken; as that pleasure may possibly not be taken in the afflicted person’s mere suffering, for itself, but only as it is an argument or evidence of the other’s superiority, wherein he prides himself, especially if he before misdoubted his own power, and that there hath been a dispute about it, which is now only thus decided: for then a secret joy may arise unto the prevailing party, upon his being delivered from an afflicting fear of being so used himself: and whereas he took it for a disparagement that the other did so far lessen and diminish him in his own thoughts, as to suppose or hope he
should prove the stronger; a pleasure is now taken in letting
him feel and have so sensible a demonstration of his error.

Sixthly, But that wherewith we must suppose the blessed
God to be pleased, in the matter of punishing, is the con-
gruity of the thing itself, that the sacred rights of his govern-
ment over the world be vindicated; and that it be understood
how ill his nature can comport with any thing that is impure:
and what is in itself so highly congruous, cannot but be the
matter of his delectation. He takes eternal pleasure in the
reasonableness and fitness of his own determinations and ac-
tions, and rejoices in the works of his own hands, as agreeing
with the apt, eternal schemes and models which he hath con-
ceived in his most wise and all-comprehending mind: so that
though he desireth not the death of sinners, and hath no de-
light in the sufferings of his afflicted creatures, which his im-
mense goodness rather inclines him to behold with compassion,
yet the true ends of punishment are so much a greater good
than their case, and exemption from the suffering they had
deserved, that they must rather be chosen, and cannot be
eligible for any reason, but for which also they are to be de-
lighted in; that is, a real goodness, and conducibleness to a
valuable end, inherent in them. Upon which account, the just
execution of the divine pleasure in the punishment of insolent
offenders is sometimes spoken of under the notion of a solemn
festival, a season of joy, yea even of a sacrifice, as having a
fragrancy or delectable savour in it. But whereas some of
the above-mentioned expressions do seem to intimate a delight
in satisfying a furious, vindictive appetite; we are to consider,
that what is spoken for the warning and terror of stupid, be-
sotted men, was necessarily to be spoken with some accommo-
dation to their dull apprehension of the things which they
yet see and feel not. For which purpose the person is
put on, sometimes, of an enraged, mighty man; the terror of
which representation is more apprehensible to vulgar minds,
than the calm, deliberate proceedings of magistral justice;
if being many times more requisite, that expressions be rather
suited to the person spoken to, though they somewhat less ex-
actly square with the thing itself intended to be spoken.

Wherefore this being all that we have any reason to un-
derstand imported in such texts of Scripture as we before
mentioned, namely, a calm and constant will of preserving
the divine government from contempt, by a due punishment
of such as do offer injurious affronts to it; and that takes
pleasure in itself, or is satisfied with the congruity and fitness of
its own determination; what can there be in this unworthy of
God? What that disagrees with his other perfections? Or
that the notion of a Being, every way perfect, doth not exact
and claim as necessarily belonging to it? For to cut off this
from it, were certainly a very great main to the notion of such
a Being, if we consider it as invested with the right and office
of supreme rector, or ruler of the world. For if you frame
such an idea of a prince as should exclude a disposition to
punish offenders, who would not presently observe in it an in-
tolerable defect? Suppose Xenophon to have given this cha-
acter of his Cyrus:—That he was a person of so sweet a nature,
that he permitted every one to do what was good in his own
eyes; if any one put indignities upon him, he took no offence
at it; he dispensed favours alike to all; even they that de-
spised his authority, invaded his rights, attempted the sub-
version of his government, with the disturbance and confusion
of all that lived under it, had equal countenance and kindness
from him, as they that were most observant of his laws, and
faithful to his interest; and it were as safe for any one to be
his sworn enemy, as his most loyal and devoted subject:—who
would take this for a commendation, or think such a one fit
to have swayed a sceptre? Can there be no such thing as good-
ness, without the exclusion and banishment of wisdom, right-
ousness, and truth? Yea, it is plain they not only consist with
it, but that it is a manifest inconsistency it should be without
them. The several virtues of a well-instructed mind, as they
all concur to make up one entire frame, so they do each of them
cast a mutual lustre upon one another; much more is it so
with the several excellencies of the Divine Being. But how
much too low are our highest and most raised thoughts of the
Supreme Majesty! How do we falter when we most earnestly
strive to speak and think most worthy of God, and suitably
to his excellent greatness!

Seventhly, If the justice of a human government requires
such a recompense, much more is it required by that of the
Divine government. This is discussed in the following chap-
ter. And the second thing proposed in page 360, namely,
"That no recompense could be adequate but that made by
Immanuel," is considered in Chap. VIII.
CHAP. VII.

The notion of justice in the divine government, and in a human, not altogether the same.—A thing said to be just, in a negative, and a positive sense:—the question discussed, Whether God’s will to punish sin were, antecedently to his legal constitution to that purpose, just, not only in the former sense, but in the latter also?—*Voleni non fit injuria*—To him who consents, no wrong is done, as to man, needs limitation.—Holy Scripture speaks of God’s punishing sin, not merely as a concomitant of justice, but an effect:—his will to punish it must proceed from justice; not, primarily, according to the common notion of justice, as it respects the rights of another; therefore another notion of it (as to him) to be sought.—God’s rights so unalienable, that he cannot quit them to his own wrong, as man can.—Secondarily, according to the other notion, his right to punish depends not on his legal constitution, but that on it.—That he cannot altogether quit it, no detraction from him.—Justice, in a larger notion, doth further oblige to insist upon recompense; namely, universal justice, as especially it comprehends his *holiness*, and also his *wisdom*.—The fitness of God’s methods herein not to be contemplated by men only, but angels.—In what sense punishments to be reckoned debts.—This matter summed up.

We must also acknowledge a very vast difference between God’s government over his intelligent creatures, and that of a secular prince over his subjects; and are thereupon to inquire, whether the notion of justice, as it is applied to the one government and the other, can be the same. A secular ruler is set up and established purposely for the good of the community, as the more principal end of his constitution. The people are not formed for him, but he for them; whence the administration of justice is a public and common right, wherewith he is intrusted by the Supreme Ruler for them, in order to the common good. Well, therefore, may his decrees and edicts go in this form, and have this for their chief scope and end: *Ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat*—Let the state receive no injury. And hence the neglect duly and seasonably to animadvert upon offenders, is a violation of the public justice committed to his management, for which he is accountable to him that intrusted him: it is a wrong done to the community, of whose rights he is the appointed guardian. And
Whereas such offences as more directly strike at his crown and dignity, as treason or rebellion, seem more principally levelled against himself and his own rights, so is the legal punishment of them to be more at his arbitrement, whether to inflict or not inflict it; because it may seem in any one's power to dispense with or recede from his own rights. Yet indeed if the matter be more narrowly scanned, the relaxation of these should be, in reason, less in his power than of any other; because they more directly affront that Supreme Ruler whom he represents, and threaten the dissolution of the government, which is the principal civil good of the whole community, and the benefits whereof are their highest right. If violence be done to a private subject, the impunity of the offender would be a public wrong; because it remotely tends, by the badness of the example, to the hurt of the whole community. But in this case, without any such circulation, all the rights of the community are immediately struck at together, in their central knot and juncture: wherefore here, most of all, the prince is debtor to the community. But now, the great Lord and Ruler of the world owes his own creatures nothing: he is, by his goodness, inclined to take care of them, and preserve common order among them; but not owing them any thing, (except by his own word he makes himself debtor,) he cannot be said to wrong the community, by not providing that punishments be inflicted upon delinquents, according to demerit. What he can be understood, originally, to owe herein, he owes only to himself: whence also the notion of justice which we herein attribute to him, seems very different from that which belongs to human governments; which, though it allows not the disposal of another's right, to his prejudice, forbids not the remitting of one's own.

Whereas, therefore, a thing may be said to be just, in a twofold sense; either negative, as it is that which justice does not disapprove, or positive, as that whereunto also justice doth oblige: it is hereupon a question of great moment, Whether God's will to punish sinners, antecedent to his legal constitution to that purpose, were just in the former sense only, or also in the latter? Can we say, God had been unjust, in not so determining? Whose rights had he violated in willing otherwise? Not man's, to whom he did owe nothing. Will we say, His own? But volenti non fit injuria—to him who consents, no wrong is done: which maxim doth not set us at liberty absolutely to do whatsoever we will with ourselves, and
what is ours; because of others, whose rights are complicated with ours, the chief Ruler and Lord of all especially, who hath principal interest in us, and all that we have. Yet it holds even as to us: for though we may injure others, God especially, by an undue disposition of our properties, which he intrusts us with; (not for ourselves only, but for himself chiefly, and for other men, whom therefore, in the second place, we may wrong, by disabling ourselves to do them that good which we ought;) and though we may also prejudice ourselves, yet, ourselves apart, we cannot be said so far to wrong, by our own consent, as to be able to resume our right; because, by that consent, (supposing it imprudent, or any way undue,) we have quitted and even forfeited the right, which, for ourselves, we had. But as to God, who has no superior, nor owes any thing to any one, whom can he be thought to wrong, by departing from any of his own rights?

Inasmuch therefore as justice, in the common and most general notion of it, is ever wont to be reckoned conversant about ἀλλαθέων ἀγαθῶν—the good of others, even that whereof they have a right; it seems not intelligible, how justice, according to this usual notion of it, could primarily oblige God to inflict deserved punishment upon transgressors, if he had not settled a legal constitution to this purpose, and declared that this should be the measure of his proceedings therein; both because it is so little conceivable how the punishments of the other state (which we are chiefly to consider) can be a good to them who do not suffer them, (as we are sure they can be none to them that do,) and also that it is not to be understood how, if they were, they could otherwise have any right thereto, than by that constitution by which (as, before, God’s dominion was that of an absolute, sovereign Lord) he now undertakes the part of a governor, ruling according to known and established laws.

Yet it is very plain, that for the actual infliction of such punishments, holy Scripture speaks of it not merely as a concomitant of justice, or as that which may consist with it, but as an effect; which the ἀνάθλωσις, mentioned by the apostle, plainly signifies, (2 Thess. 1. 6.) when he tells us, it is with God δίκαιον—a righteous thing, (that must be not only what justice doth admit, but exact,) ἀνάθλωσις—to recompense tribulation to the trouble of his people, &c. And when we are told, (Rom. 2. 6.) that God ἀνάθλουσι—will render (or recompense) to every one according to his works, even in the
day above mentioned, (v. 5.) which is called, ὁμέρα ἀργυρίου, καὶ ἀποκαλύφθων δικαιοκρίσιας, τῷ θεῷ—the day of wrath, and of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God; and that it is said, the world was to become ἵδιαντι—guilty, (we read,) liable to be impleaded before God, Rom. 3. 19. And again, (ch. 12. 19.) that ἵδιαντι—vengeance is said to belong to him, and he will repay; with many more passages of like import.

But to carry the matter higher: it being evident it is that which justice doth require, to punish sin, according to such a constitution once made; yet, all this while, how the constitution was any necessary effect of justice, appears not. Nor are we helped by the common notion of justice herein, and are therefore cast upon the inquiry, Whether any other notion of justice be fitly assignable, according whereto it may be understood to have required the making that constitution itself?

It is here to be considered, whence, or from what fountaine, any man, or community of men, come to have right to any thing. It cannot be; but that the Fountain of all being must be the Fountain of all rights. From whence things, absolutely considered, descend, all the relations that result must also descend. There can therefore be no presence of right to any thing, among creatures, but from God; He, as the Sovereign Proprietor and Lord of all, settles such and such rights in creatures, which they hold and retain dependently on him, upon terms and according to rules which he hath prescribed; so as that by transgression men may forfeit such rights, or by consent and mutual contracts transfer them to one another. Whereupon they have no unalienable rights, none whereof they may not be divested, either by their default or consent; sometimes by both together, as by a faulty consent. And indeed if it be by the former, it must be by the latter; because no man is supposed to commit a fault against his will. But it may be by the latter without the former, as none can doubt but one may innocently divest himself, in many cases, of his own present right; otherwise, there could be no such thing in the world as either gift or sale. And hence it comes to pass, that the justice which is inherent in any man, comes to be conversant about the rights of another, not his own; so far as to oblige him not to intrench upon the rights of another, while yet it forbids him not to dispose of his own, as they are merely his. And there is no such thing as justice towards a man’s self, so inhibiting him as (though

VOL. I.
perhaps such an act ought not to have been done) to make his act in that kind invalid, when he hath done it, only because he hath thereby wronged himself; or which he can, afterwards, allege against his own act or deed. For he hath no other rights in any thing, than what are derived, borrowed, dependent on the Supreme Proprietor, measurable by his rules, by which they are not unalienable; yea, justice obliges, if he swear to his own hurt, not to change, Ps. 15.

But now, with the Supreme Proprietor, there cannot but be unalienable rights, inseparably and everlastingly inherent in him: for it cannot be, but that He that is the Fountain of all rights, must have them primarily and originally in himself; and can no more so quit them, as to make the creature absolute and independent, than he can make the creature God. Wherefore, though with man there can be no such thing as justice towards one's self, disenabling him to forego his own rights, the case cannot but be quite otherwise as to God, and for the same reason for which it cannot agree to man; because man hath none but borrowed and alienable rights, which he can forego to his own prejudice, and God hath none that he can so part with. Hereupon, therefore, God did owe it to himself primarily, as the absolute Sovereign and Lord of all, not to suffer indignities to be offered him, without animadverting upon them, and therefore to determine he would do so.

But withal, he having undertaken the part of a legal Governor, and to rule by established laws, which should be the stated measures of sin and duty, of punishments and rewards; hereby common order was to be preserved in the governed community: and having published his constitution in his word and otherwise sufficiently to that purpose, he hath hereby, secondarily, made himself Debtor to the community, and by his constitution given men some right to the benefit of that order which was to be maintained among them by these means: which benefit they do here, in this present state, actually partake in some measure; and might in a greater measure, if they were more governable, or would regard and be awed more by the laws (with their sanctions) of their great and rightful Ruler and Lord. Wherefore, though men have no benefit by the punishments of the future state, they have, or might have, by the feared commination of them, which, neglected, made the actual infliction of them necessary. Nor had they only the probable benefit of present order hereby,
but of a future well-being; it being the design of that, as of all the comminations of wise and good rulers, to prevent the desert of the threatened punishment, and consequently the punishment itself. And though men could have no right to any such benefit, before the constitution; yet it is not inconceivable, that by it they might have some; namely, an inferior and secondary right.

Wherefore the blessed God, by making the legal constitution, which he will have to stand as the measure of his government, hath not added to his own right to govern and punish as there is cause; for it was natural, and needed nothing to support it. The constitution rather limits than causes his right, which depends not on it, but gives rise to it rather. He gives assurance, by it, of his equal dealing, and that he will not lay upon man more than is right, that he should enter into judgment with God, Job 34. 12, 23. And whereas he hath been pleased to publish his constitution, in the form of a covenant, variously attempered to the different states of men, nothing accrues to him by their stipulating with him thereupon. He is their Governor, as he is their Maker; not at their choice, which in propriety the case admits not, there being no competitor that pretends against him; but is only a loyal, dutiful consent, or recognising his former right. They that consent to it, do therefore more deeply oblige themselves to their own duty, and entitle themselves to his covenanted favours; but can entitle him to nothing, for their all was his before: his contract shews his condescension, not defective title. And this his antecedent, original right, that peculiar excellency of his nature, his justice to himself inviolably preserves, as the faithful guardian of all his sacred rights. So that when he undertakes the part of a legal Governor, it indispensably necessitates his doing whatsoever is requisite for supporting the honour and dignity of his government; and can permit nothing that shall detract from it, or render it less august and awful.

Yet need we not here over scrupulously defend the common notion of justice, in the utmost strictness of it, that makes it conversant only about another's right, and seems therefore to imply that a man can owe nothing to himself. That love to others which comprehends all our duty to them, is to be measured by love to ourselves, which seems equally comprehensive of duty which we are supposed to owe to ourselves. Nor shall we dispute whether in no sense one can be both creditor and debtor; or whether insobriety be not properly un-
righteousness, and sobriety justice, even towards one's self: subordination to God being still preserved, under whom, and for whom, only we can owe any thing to ourselves or others. Only supposing, among men, such a thing as self-justice, it is with them a weaker and more debile principle, that may betray and lose their rights, which then no justice can reclaim. Whereas, with God, it is, as all other excellencies are, in highest perfection, and hath always the force with him of an eternal and immutable law.

And if any should imagine this to detract from the absoluteness of God's dominion and sovereignty, and set him in this respect beneath his own creatures, that whereas they can quit their rights, it should be supposed he cannot forego his; it is answered, It hath not been said, that God can forego none of his own rights; it is plain he doth, when having the right to punish a sinner, he by pardon confers upon him right to impunity: but he cannot do it to the prejudice and dishonour of his glorious excellencies, and the dignity of his government. And therefore, if some preparation were requisite to his doing it, consistently with the due honour and reputation thereof, justice towards himself required he should insist upon it; which is no more a detractation from his absoluteness, than that he cannot lie, or do any thing unworthy of himself. He is so absolute, that he can do whatever he pleases; but so just, that he cannot be pleased to do an unrighteous thing.

But besides that stricter notion of God's justice, as it is conversant about, and conservative of, his own rights; we may also consider it in a larger and more comprehensive notion, as it includes his several moral attributes and excellencies, and answers to that which among men is called universal justice, and reckoned to contain in it all virtues.* For so taken, it comprehends his holiness, and perfect detestation of all impurity, in respect whereof he cannot but be perpetually inclined to animadvert with severity upon sin; both because of its irreconcilable contrariety to his holy nature, and the insolent affront which it therefore directly offers him; and because of the implicit, most injurious misrepresentation of him, which it contains in it, as if he were either kindly or more indifferently affected towards it: upon which accounts, we may well sup-

* Ἄν ὁ δὲ δικαιότης συνελάβεται τὰς ἄγετ' ις—Righteousness comprises every virtue.
pose him to esteem it necessary for him, both to constitute a rule for punishing it, and to punish it accordingly; that he may both truly act his own nature, and truly represent it.

And again, if we take the notion of his justice in this latitude, it will comprehend his governing wisdom; the part of which attribute it is, to determine and direct the doing whatsoever is fit to be determined and done; as it is the part of his righteousness (taken in the strictest sense) to resolve upon and execute whatever the rules of justice do require and call for. It is the judge of decencies, or what it is meet and becoming him, as the Lord and Ruler of the world, to do or not do. And a very reasonable account might be given of this matter, that we may renew and somewhat further insist on what was said before, chap. vi. p. 360. There are many just laws made by human legislators, to the making whereof, though justice (in the stricter sense) did not rigidly oblige them, so that they had been unjust if they had not made them, yet this other principle, of equal importance to government, and which also doth not altogether refuse the name of justice, might require the making them, and would not be well comported with by omitting to make them.

Hereupon therefore if it should be inquired, Was it, antecedently to the making of this constitution, an indifferent thing with God, whether to determine sin should be punished, or not? I answer, even upon this ground, No; it was not indifferent, but indispensably necessary. Any thing is with him necessary, as he is the Supreme Governor, that is upon a prudential account most fit and conducible to the ends of government. An antecedent necessity we might therefore assert, such as not only arises from his justice, most strictly taken, but his wisdom also; whose part it is to judge of congruities, as it is the part of strict justice to determine matters of right. Nor is it unfit to say, Wisdom is the chief principle exercised in making laws, justice in governing according to laws already made. I say, the chief; for justice hath that part in legislation too, which hath been assigned it, as wisdom hath also its part in the consequent administration. And what can be more necessary to the great God, than to do ever what is most becoming and worthy of himself? And what could have been so becoming of him, as to let it appear to the world how sacred the rights of his empire over it are! how horrid a thing the defection of a reasonable creature is, from the great Author
and Lord of its life and being! how costly an expiation it did require! how solemn rights were to be performed! how great and awful transactions, that sin might become pardonable! What could so tend to exalt majesty, to magnify the reputation of his government, to possess his reasonable creatures with awful apprehensions, and make them dread to offend? In a prudent government, how great a thing is reason of state! Even where there is the greatest inclination imagina
table to be in all things most strictly and unexceptionably just, yet is that the only care with prudent governors, that they may be able to approve the justice of their administrations? There are many things which, without transgressing parti
cular rules of justice, might have been omitted, from which yet, upon mere reason of state, you can no more make them swerve one ace, than you can remove the earth from its centre, or change the ordinances of day and night; and whereas that hath place in all things that tend to the keeping up the reputa
tion and grandeur of government, where can it claim to have place with equal right as here? Whereupon we may, with greatest assurance, assert, that in things which have this re
dence, it is equally impossible to the absolute perfection of the divine nature, that God should do an inept or unfit thing, as an unjust. And whereas his righteousness is the directive principle, in respect of equity or iniquity; so is his wisdom, of congruity and incongruity, decency and indecency: and that it is equally necessary to him to do what is most worthy of himself; and most becoming his excellent greatness, as what is most strictly just. Therefore that when his most transcendent greatness is represented in terms as high and great as could come under human conception, (Heb. 2. 10.) He, namely, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things; (and what could sound higher?) it is considered what was most becoming of him, as such; and determined that it became Him, for and by whom all things were, since there was one (though so great a one) that had undertaken for sinners, to be the Prince or Prefect (ἀρχηγός) over the great affair of their salvation, espe
cially being to make them, of rebels, sons, and as such, bring them to glory, out of the meanest and most abject state; that he should not be made perfect, (not be duly initiated into his great office, or not be complete master of his design,) otherwise than by his own intervening suffering. Meaner persons might do as became their meaner condition; but He, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, must do
as best became the most glorious greatness of Him, who is the First and the Last, the Author and the End of all things!

We are prone to confine our apprehensions of things to our own narrow sphere, that have reference also to another besides, and greater than ours. If God had no creatures but man, capable of government by laws, the case had been much other than it is; for considering that men have all been in one common case of apostasy and condemnation, they who should be restored to favour and a happy state, should have no reason to look strangely upon one another, whatsoever the way and terms were of their restitution, being all dealt with alike. But we are to design a larger field and scene for our thoughts, and to consider, that besides men, that shall be restored from a fallen and lapsed state, there are numberless myriads of pure and loyal spirits, that never fell, and with whom restored men are to make one entire, happy community, for ever. Now we are to consider what aspect the matter would have in their eyes, if not a single person, or two, but so vast a multitude, (and not guilty of some light, transient offence only, but of insolent, malicious enmity and rebellion against the divine government, propagated and transmitted from age to age, through all the successions of time,) should be brought in upon them, to partake in the dignities and blessedness of their state, without any reparation made of so great and continuing an injury! Though their perfect subjection in all things to the good pleasure of God would not allow them to be exceptions, and apt to censure his doings or determinations, yet also his most perfect wisdom and exact judgment, and knowledge of what is in itself most fit, could much less admit he should do any thing liable to be censured by his creatures, as less fit. And no doubt so large and capacious intellects may well be supposed to penetrate far into the reason and wisdom of his dispensations; and so not only to exercise submission, in an implicit acquiescence in the unseen and only believed fitness of them, but also to take an inexpressible complacency and satisfaction in what they manifestly discern thereof, and to be able to resolve their delectation in the ways and works of God into a higher cause and reason than the mere general belief that he doth all things well; namely, their immediate, delightful view of the congruity and fitness of what he does. When they behold the apostasy and revolt of the sons of men expiated by one of themselves, but with whom the Divine Nature, in his own Son, was so intimately united, that the
The Living Temple

PART II.

Atonement made was both fit, as from them, and adequate, as to him: this they cannot but behold with complacential approbation and admiration; for, no doubt, he made creatures of such a capacity, with a design to gratify the understandings he gave them, by approving and recommending the exactness and accuracy of his methods thereto; otherwise, a far lower measure of intellectual ability, in these creatures, had answered the Creator's purpose as well. They certainly cannot but approve that way he hath taken, for itself; and do doubtless stoop down to look into it, not with less complacency, than wonder; it being, in the congruity of it, as suitable to their bright and clear intellects, being revealed, as for the strange contrivance thereof it had been altogether above them, if it had not been revealed. They cannot, when they behold a full, glorious vindication of the offence and wrong done to their common Lord, and the dignity of his government, by his revolted creatures, antecedent to the reception of any of them into grace and favour, but highly admire the lovely comeliness and congruity of his whole dispensation, and express their pleasant resentments, by bearing a part with the redeemed society in such strains of praise, such admirations and applauses, as these: "Holy and marvellous are thy works, Lord God Almighty; just and true are thy judgments, thou King of nations and of saints!"

Upon the whole, there appears sufficient reason to conclude, not only upon the account of justice more strictly taken, but also of congruity and fitness, or according to such a larger notion of justice as imports an inflexible propension to do what is fit and congruous to be done, it was indispensably necessary the holy God should, in order to his return to his temple among men, insist to have a recompense made for the wrong that was done him by the violation of it. Nor let this be understood to detract from, but add to, what hath been above discoursed of justice, taken in a most strict sense, and most appropriate to God, as it is, primarily and in the first place, conservative of his own most sacred rights; which must be, by consequence, vindictive of the violation of them: and this is the original justice, (as his are the original rights, and the fountain of all other,) and must have had place, though he had settled no express constitution of government. And also as, secondarily, it is conservative of the rights of the governed community, which, by the constitution once settled, accrue to it.
Whereupon also it may be understood, in what sense punishments, passively taken, are to be accounted debts. And it is fitter to distinguish, and thereupon to explain, how they are or are not so, than at random to deny they are so at all, when our Lord hath taught us to pray, “I forgive us our debts;” and when it is so plain in itself, that he who by delinquency hath forfeited his life, is most truly said to owe it to justice. Yea, and when, though the creditor pœnae—he who has a right to punish—is said not to be so easily assignable, yet no doubt at all is made concerning the debtor; for how absurdly should he be said to be a debtor, that owes no debt? Therefore punishments are not of the nature of those debts that, according to the rules of commutative justice, arise by contract between man and man; and which, as they arise by consent between the two covenanting parties, may as well cease by consent. But nothing hinders, but they may be such debts as are to be estimated by the distributive justice of rulers, whereof we must either say, that of some, justice doth oblige human and secular rulers to exact the punishment; or else, that magistratical justice would allow the remitting of all, and that no offences of any kind be ever at all punished. But if the justice of any secular rulers oblige them to punish some offenders, then most of all that of the supreme and most absolute Ruler and Lord of all, whose rights are natural, and depend not on our consent, or any contract with us, any more than our consent was previous to our coming into being, or our becoming his creatures; and whose justice must be more concerned to protect and vindicate his rights, than that of any earthly governor can be to preserve the rights of even the most considerable community: no community, nor all taken together, nor even the whole creation, being of any comparable value with the interest of the supreme and universal Ruler, of himself alone; in respect of whom all nations are as the “drop of the bucket, &c.” especially if we add, (though that be but of secondary consideration,) that the rights of the greatest, even the universal community of all mankind, are involved with his own, and that their common peace and order are to be preserved by punishments, even eternal ones, not as executed, but as threatened; which, as hath been said, made the execution necessary, where the terms and method of remission are not complied with.

And whereas it is reckoned difficult to assign the creditor pœnae, the reason of that is not difficult to be assigned, if we consider what the true notion of a creditor is. And it is not taken passively, for him who is intrusted with another’s
rights, at least is not so to be limited; inasmuch as a man may be more properly creditor of what is his own than of what is another's; but actively, for one who trusts another. But the debtor penœ— he who is liable to punishment, is not intrusted with any thing, but is only to be punished when he can be met with, and duly brought thereto; and therefore is not bound to offer himself to punishment, as another debtor is to pay what he owes: he is to be active in the solution; the delinquent, passive only: whence dare penœ is rightly interpreted to suffer punishment. And that this is all he is obliged to, is plain, if we consider that it is not the precept of the law that in this case obliges him, which only obliges to the doing of duty; but the annexed commination, which can only oblige to undergo punishment.

Creditor indeed is chosen as a fit word to express the correlative unto debtor penœ; but by it we are to understand no more than only the object of this solution: so in human governments, the governor is improperly, namely, as he is intrusted with the rights of the community. But in the divine government, God himself, originally and radically, as he is Maker and Lord of all; immediately and formally, as he is the supreme Ruler, and such a one therefore as governs principally, suo jure, and for himself, not for others. For he cannot but be his own supreme end; that he also doth undertake the care of the concernments and good of others, is of mere vouchsafement and condescension, not from any antecedent obligation so to do.

The sum of all therefore is, that whether we take divine justice in the larger sense, as it comprehends all the moral excellencies that relate to the government of God over man, especially his wisdom and his holiness, or whether we take it in the stricter sense, for a principle inclining him to maintain and vindicate the rights and dignity of his government, it did direct as well his making a constitution for the punishing of affronts and offences committed against it, as to proceed according to it, so as not to remit such injuries to the offender without most sufficient recompense.
CHAP. VIII.
The head marked thus (1.) being so far insisted on, namely, that a sufficient recompense was necessary; we proceed to shew, (2.) That no less was sufficient than that made by Immanuel. [1.] Dishonourable to have insisted on less. [2.] What the divine estimate in this matter was, his own word shews. [3.] His love to offenders would otherwise have been under restraint. [4.] It is proposed to consider two things: First, What was to be remitted; where is shewn, 1. The greatness of the offence—the sins of all times and ages. That the recompense is not applicable to fallen angels, or to the impenitent and unbelieving under the gospel, does not arise from any insufficiency. [5.] The way and manner in which remission is to be granted: namely, by a universal law. Secondly, What is to be vouchsafed; which follows in Chap. IX.

AND so much being clear, there is less need to insist copiously in shewing what was proposed, ch. vi. p. 360, and which comes next to be considered,

(2.) That no recompense could be sufficient for expiating the wrong done by the violation of God's temple among men, and the laying its foundations anew, besides that which hath been made by the Son of God, Immanuel, God with us. And this, by his becoming himself first an original Temple, a Man, inhabited with all the fulness of God, and then made also a Sacrifice to the offended majesty and justice of Heaven, for those great and high purposes, the expiating the indignity of violating God's former temple, and the raising, forming, and beautifying it anew, in conformity to its present pattern and original; and then possessing, inhabiting, and restoring the divine presence in it. For as it hath been shewn already, that this recompense could not but be full, and apt to answer these purposes; so it is in itself evident, that whatsoever should be tendered in the name of a recompense, ought to be full, and proportionable to the wrong done, and to the favours afterwards to be shewn to the transgressors. Here therefore let it be observed,

[1.] That it would have been dishonourable to have insisted on less: for it were manifestly more honourable and worthy of God not to have exacted any recompense at all, than
to have accepted, in the name of a sacrifice, such as were unproportionable, and beneath the value of what was to be re-
mittcd and conferred. What had been lower must have been
infinitely lower; let any thing be supposed less than God, and
it falls immensely short of him. Such is the distance between
created being and uncreated, that the former is as nothing to
the latter; and therefore, bring the honour and majesty of
the Deity to any thing less than an equal value, and you bring
it to nothing. And this had been quite to lose the design
of insisting upon a recompense; it had been to make the
majesty of heaven cheap, and depreciate the dignity of the
divine government, instead of rendering it august and great.
Therefore the whole constitution of Immanuel, his undertak-
ing, performances, and acquisitions, appear to have been not
only apt, suitable, and sufficient to the intended purposes,
(which was first proposed to be shewn,) but also requisite and
necessary thereto.

[2.] What the divine estimate in this matter was, his own
word shews: and for the evincing hereof, let us apply our minds
to meditate silently and intently a while on those words of our
Lord, (John 10. 17.) "Therefore doth my Father love me,
because I lay down my life:" and let us consider them with
that reverence which we cannot but conceive due to words we
esteem most sacred and divine; that is, that they could not be
 rashly or lightly spoken: whereupon, let us bethink ourselves,
Have those words a meaning? This, our awful regard to the
venerable greatness of Him that spoke them, cannot suffer us
to doubt. And if they mean any thing, it is impossible they
should not mean somewhat most profound and great; some-
what that implies a reference to a peculiar be\textit{num}t\textit{pers}, that is, a
divine decorum, which as an eternal law perpetually conducts
all the propensions and determinations of God's most perfect
will, that could by no means suffer any violation: what was
most becoming of God; namely, what might best "become
him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things;"
(Heb. 2. 10.) worthy of the great, all-comprehending, central,
original Being, from whence all things sprang, and wherein
all terminate. Here is some gradual refection (if we consider
what immediately follows, "In bringing many sons to glory,
\&c.") of the veiled\textit{ arcana} of the Divine Being: if we may,
on so fit occasion, allude to the inscription in the Egyptian
temple, elsewhere mentioned in this discourse—"I am all that
was, and is, and shall be, and who is he that shall draw aside
my veil?" Here is, in some part, a withdrawing of that sacred
veil, by Him to whom by prerogative it belonged, and of whom it is said, "No man hath seen God at any time, but the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father: he hath declared him," John 1. 18. Here is some disclosure of the mystery of God, of the Father, (Col. 2. 2.) in whom the divine nature was primarily, and as in that first fountain; and of Christ, the mystery of the Mediator, of whom Christ was the distinguishing name. The agreement, hitherto inconceivable and most mysterious, of the absolute purity and perfection of the divine nature, with the admirable mercifulness of the constitution of Immanuel, of God and man united in one, in order to the reconciliation of the holy, blessed God, with unholy, miserable man. How was it to be brought about, in a way becoming Him for whom and by whom all things were, so great, so august a Majesty! that He should admit that so despicable and rebellious a race should not only be saved, but be made sons! This could never be, though his immense and boundless love most strongly inclined him to it, but by their having one of highest dignity, his own Son, set as a Prince or Prefect over the whole affair of their salvation; nor by him, but upon his own intervening suffering! This was according to fixed rule indispensably necessary; that is, by the inviolable maxims of the divine government. But because, through the inconceivable riches of his own goodness, this was a thing he was most propense unto, and intent upon; yet because the death of his own Son in their stead could neither be meritorious nor just, without his own free consent, therefore, says our Lord, doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life—What conceivable reason can there be of this connexion, ("He therefore loves me, because I lay down my life," ) without the concurrence of these two things to be considered conjunctly? namely, A most intense, vehement love to a perishing world; and an inflexible regard to the eternal, immutable measures of right and wrong, fit and unfit, decent and indecent, that had their fixed, everlasting seat in the mind of God.

The first made the end necessary, the preventing the total, eternal ruin of a lost world; the second made the Son of God's death, and his own consent thereto, the necessary means to this end. The former, namely, the end, was not otherwise necessary than upon supposition; it was not so absolutely necessary, that by any means, right or wrong, fit or unfit, such a ruin (even most deserved) must be prevented. But it was so far necessary, as that if, by any rightful and decorous means,
this ruin could be prevented as to many, and a contrary blessed state of perpetual life be attained by them, this must be effected and brought about for them. Not, it is true, for all offenders, but as many as the like eternal, indispensable means and measures of equal and unequal, fit and unfit, capable and incapable, should not exclude.

All this we have in that most admirable text of Scripture, (John 3. 16.) "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." So loved! The matter is signified in such a way, as to leave all men amazed! and by their astonishment to supply their most defective conception of so stupendous a love. The world is an indefinite term, that contains the special and the afterwards specified object of this love; not a single person, but a whole race of intelligent creatures, a world inhabited by such, that were not to be left, and finally all swallowed up together in one common ruin; that upon this account he gave his only begotten Son to death, as the event and known design shewed. And how inconceivable must his love be to his only begotten Son! "The Brightness of his glory, the express Image of his person!" Always his Delight! Yet rather than all this world should be lost for ever, He is thns given up! "That whosoever believe on him, should not perish, &c." which expresses the certain, specified, declared object of this love: leaving them certainly excluded, who, after sufficient proposal, refuse their homage to the throne of Immanuel; choose rather their forlorn souls should be for ever forsaken of the divine presence, than unite with him, and surrender themselves to him, by whom alone they might be refitted, animated again, and inhabited as his living temples. Their exclusion is necessary, by such measures as those, by which such means were necessary to the salvation and blessedness of the others. But who can doubt hereupon, but that this course was indispensably necessary to this end? Especially if (reviewing that first-mentioned text) we consider, that our Lord represents his laying down his life as an unexpressible additional endearment of him to the Father: as if he should say, "O thou Son of my delights, thou hast now set my love to lost souls at liberty, that liath been ever pregnant with great and godlike designs towards them, and that must otherwise have been under perpetual restraint;" which is,

[3.] Most evidently implied. But it may be said, Could the love of God be under restraint? And I say No, it could
not; therefore to the all-comprehending Mind, where ends and means lie connected together under one permanent, eternal view, this course presented itself, as peculiarly accommodate to this end; and was therefore eternally determined by easy concert between the Father and the Son, not to remedy, but prevent any such restraint. Yet it may be further urged, Cannot the absoluteness and omnipotency of a God enable him to satisfy his own propensions, if it were to save ever so many thousand worlds of offending creatures, without taking such a circuit as this? It was once said to a human mortal king, that had about him but a thin shadow of sovereignty, Dost thou now govern Israel, and not make thy will any way take place? Much more might it here be said, Dost thou govern the world? Art thou not God? Yes! and freely say, I can the less, for that I am God, do what is not Godlike; that is, can therefore the less break through established, eternal measures, and counteract myself. I must do as becomes Him, for whom and by whom are all things. Others may assume to themselves an imagined, unhallowed liberty of pursuing, at the next, their own inclinations; but it is beneath divine greatness to do so. Yet in this case (it may be further said) why did not love to his Son preponderate? Which our Lord himself in great part obviates by what is subjoined—“because I lay down my life;” how? With a power and design to take it again, as v. 18. “I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again: this is a matter agreed. I am not to lie under a perpetual death; that could neither be grateful to my Father, nor is in itself possible. But as things are stated, I am prepared to endure the cross, and despise the shame, for the joy set before me: which joy will be everlastingly common to him and me, and to the whole redeemed community, according to their measure.” But was all this unnecessary trifling? What serious man’s reverence of Deity can let him endure to harbour so profane a thought! Therefore take we now the entire state of this matter, as it lies plainly in view before us, in these texts of Scripture: first, here is an unexpressible love of God to undone, lost sinners: secondly, here is a plain intimation that this love must have been under a suspension and restraint, if God’s own Son had not laid down his life for them: thirdly, it is as plainly signified, that the Son of God’s laying down his life for them, was, in divine estimate, a sufficient expedient to prevent this restraint upon his love to sinners:
fourthly, that this expedient was reckoned by the blessed God more eligible, than that his love to sinners should be under perpetual, everlasting restraint: fifthly, that it was only reckoned more eligible, as there was a conjunct consideration had of his laying it down, with a power and design of resuming and taking it again; sixthly, that therefore, as the eternal God had a most constant, unquestionable love to his only-begotten Son, his love to him hath a peculiar and most complacental exercise, on the account of his concurring with him upon this expedient; choosing rather to endure all the dolours of that “one hour, and power of darkness,” that was to come upon him, than that a whole world of reasonable creatures, his own offspring, and bearing his own image, should all perish together everlastingly. But who now sees not that this was the determinate judgment of the great God, namely, that his gracious designs towards guilty creatures were not otherwise to be effected, than in this way? And yet, for the further clearing of this matter, taking Heb. 10. 4. that the blood of the Lord Christ, and of bulls and goats, are put in direct opposition to each other; and hereupon, that it is said of the latter, “It is not possible it should take away sin:” what can that imply less, than that the former was necessary to the taking it away? Let us but appeal to ourselves, what else can it mean? Will we say, though sin could not be taken away by the blood of bulls and goats, it might by some nobler sacrifice of an intermediate value? But is not this manifestly precluded, and barred by the immediateness of the opposition? These two only are in competition, and it is said, not this, but that. Other sacrifices God would not; (Ps. 40. 6, 7.) then, saith our Lord, “Lo! I come.” These are rejected, this is chosen; he taketh away the first, that he may establish the second, Heb. 10. 9. When it is said, (Mic. 6. 6, 7.) not thousands of rams, or ten thousand rivers of oil; if one should say, Yea, but eleven thousand might serve; were not this trifling, not reasoning? Is it not plain all other were refusible, for the same reason?

I shall now somewhat enlarge (as was formerly designed) upon the two things already intimated under the foregoing head of Immanuel’s sufficiency, &c. as having acquired the two-fold power of forgiving sin, and giving the Spirit. And shall now show, further, the necessity of his engaging in this affair (the restoring of God’s temple) with reference to both these things, requisite thereto.
[4.] And to this purpose, let it be considered—What was to be remitted, and what was to be conferred, by his procurement.

First, What was to be remitted. It was not the single trespass of one or a few delinquent persons, but the revolt and rebellion of a vast community; a universal hostility and enmity, continued and propagated through many successive ages, that was now, once for all, to be atoned for. It is hereupon to be considered, How great the offence was that must be remitted, and the way and manner in which the grant was to be made of this remission.

1. How great was the offence to be remitted! A whole race and order of creatures had been in a conspiracy against their rightful Lord, to deface his temple, tear down his image, invade his rights, withhold and incapacitate themselves for his worship, substitute, instead of that, highest contempt, banish his presence, and as much as in them lay raze out his memorial, that he might be no more known, feared, or served upon earth! How horrid a prospect had the Lord from heaven, when, from the throne of his glory there, he beheld the state of things below! (Ps. 14. 2, 3.) "The Lord looked down from heaven upon the children of men, to see if any did understand, and seek after God; they are all gone back, none that does good, no not one." All were become such mischievous, wicked fools, as to say, with one consent, in their hearts,—No God! And though, it is true, this wickedness was not in event to be actually remitted to all, the case was to be so stated, that remission might be universally offered; and that it be left to lie upon men's own score if it were not accepted; and therefore, that a sacrifice must be offered up, of no less value than if every single transgressor was to have his actual, sealed pardon.

For let it be considered what sort of transgressors are excluded the benefit of remission, on the account of that great Sacrifice that once for all was offered up; and we find it not difficult to apprehend other most important reasons why they are excluded; but no colour of a reason that it should be for want of sufficient value in this Sacrifice.

As for the angels that fell, though their case comes not directly under our present consideration, yet occasionally, and as (a fortiori) we may argue from it, some thoughts may be usefully employed about it. The divine pleasure herein is indeed intimated, in the Son of God's not taking their nature, but ours;
and his known measure of shewing mercy, is that he will shew mercy, because he will shew mercy. Yet, whereas we find that the most sovereign act of grace, the predestinating of some to the adoption of children, is ascribed to the good pleasure, (Eph. 1. 5.) the same act is ascribed also to the counsel of his will, v. 11. And when we see the apostle in that holy transport, (Rom. 11. 33.) crying out, in contemplation of distinguishing mercy, αἰώνιος ἡμῶν—O the depth! he doth not say of the sovereign power, but of the wisdom and knowledge of God; and admires the unsearchableness, not of his arbitrary determinations, but of his judgments and ways, or judicial proceedings towards them that believed, or believed not: (Ps. 30. 31. 32.) implying that he had reasons to himself, though past our finding out, of his different proceedings towards some, and others. And as for the angels that fell, and whom he thought fit not to spare, (2 Pet. 2. 4, 5. Jude 6.) he threw them into chains of darkness, resolving to deal with them, not upon terms of absolute sovereignty, but of justice, therefore reserving them to the judgment of the great day; not in the mean time affording them a second trial, in order to their recovery, as he hath to us, even of mere mercy; for no justice could oblige him to offer us new terms. Yet their case and ours so differed, that there are reasons obvious to view, and which must lie open to all, in the public, final judgment, why he might judge it fitter to design the objects of mercy among men, than the apostate angels. As,

That we must suppose them (namely, the angels) created, each of them, in perfect maturity, unto which we (our first parents excepted) grow up gradually and by slow degrees. They had their intellectual ability fit for present exercise, when they first existed, and did all then at once coexist; (as we generally reckon, having nothing to induce us to think otherwise;) we come into being successively, and exist here but in a succession.

Whereas they therefore must be understood to have been originally under a sort of covenant of works, (as we were,) or were some way or other made to understand what, by the law of their creation, was their duty towards the Author of their being, and what their expectations might be from him; we have no reason therefore to apprehend that they were treated with, in one common head of their own order, in whom they should stand or fall, as we were; our case not admitting it to be otherwise, because we were not coexistent with him. But we must conceive them to have been, every individual of them,
personal covenanters, each one in his own person receiving the signification of their Maker’s will; and if there were reason or need of solemn restipulation, each one in his own person as it were plighting his faith, and vowing his allegiance to the celestial crown and throne. They therefore, from a self-contracted malignity, rebelled with open eyes; and though an obligation by a common head were binding; theirs, by their own act and deed must be more strongly binding; and their revolt more deeply and more heinously criminal.

The posterity of our apostate first parents have but a limited time, in this state of probation, wherein to understand the present altered state of things between them and their offended Lord: within which time, though he foresaw the malignity of very many would never be overcome by his goodness, in the ordinary methods wherein he reckoned it became him to discover and exercise it towards them, yet according to the course and law of nature he had now settled for this apostate sinful world, their course would soon be run out, and they would not have opportunity long to continue their rebellion, and obstruct his interest and designs on earth. And also, having all things ever present to his all-comprehending view, he foreknew and foredetermined that great numbers should become the captives of his grace, and that the love and blood of an Immanuel should not be lost and thrown away upon them: but that he should make them "willing in the day of his power" to fall in with gracious intendments, and their Redeemer should see his seed, and the travail of his soul, and be satisfied therein: whereas he beheld the apostate spirits of that higher order fixed in enmity, notvincible by any ordinary methods. Nor was it to be expected he should exert (in this case) his absolute power, and act *ad ultimum—to his very uttermost*, as a natural agent doth; (had he thought that fit, he could as well have prevented their revolt;) or that he should have appointed a Redeemer for their recovery, who were irrecoverable: their case at first being (probably) very parallel to their’s among men, who sin "that sin against the Holy Ghost." And as things lay in divine prospect, their malicious opposition to God’s designs in this world was not bounded within the narrow limits of a short human life, their natures not being subject to a law of mortality, as it is with every sinner among men; but they were beheld as continually filling this world with mischiefs, with wickednesses and miseries, and counterworking all God’s glorious and merciful designs in it; even every one of them, from his first apostasy, as long as the world shall last.
Man sinned at first, being seduced, tempted, and deceived by the devil. The devils, as being their own tempters, sin had in and from them its original and first rise in the creation of God. In all agency, whether of good or evil, much is wont to be attributed to this, Who was first in it? In point of good, the blessed God hath no competitor; he is the undoubted first Fountain of all good, and is therefore acknowledged the supreme Good. In point of evil, (namely, moral,) there is none prior to the devil, who is therefore eminently called the evil, or wicked one. And as the devils were first in sin, so they led us into it, by deceiving us; the malignity of it was therefore the greater on their parts, and proportionably the less on ours. The more knowing are the more deeply guilty, the deceiver than the deceived, and deserve the more stripes. It is true that none can deserve mercy, for then it were justice, and not mercy; but though none can deserve to have mercy shewn them, they may deserve not to have it. The more a ruler is above us, and the less he needs us, the less possible it is for us to oblige him, and the more possible to disoblige and offend him, and the more heinous will the offence be: therefore, though none can claim mercy, they may forfeit it; and will, by the deeper guilt, incur such a forfeiture, by how much the more and clearer the light and knowledge are against which they offend. And this we find to have been a measure with the blessed God, in the exercise of his mercy, even in some of the highest instances hereof that we meet with in holy Scripture; "I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly, in unbelief," 1 Tim. 1. 13. Not that this could specify a more deserving object of mercy; for where there can be no desert at all, there can be no more, or less. But it represents the occasion and season of shewing mercy more fitly, in the estimate of the divine wisdom, which conducts the acts of sovereignty; and judges of congruities, as justice doth of right and wrong. Where indeed, among the objects of mercy, there is an absolute parity, there (as to them) mere sovereignty determines; as it may be ordinarily, in God's electing among men the objects of his free favour. Where there is no objective reason of eligibility in one more than another, especially if there be such as would rather persuade the contrary way, wisdom hath no proper exercise. But occasions are of greater latitude, and comprehend all considerable circumstances and consequences; and many things lie open to the divine eye, that are hid to ours.

But now, whereas we cannot doubt, that besides such consider-
rations as occur to us, the blessed God saw superabundant ground of not making such provision for the recovery of fallen angels, as of lost men; we can have none, whereupon to imagine the former partake not of the benefit with the latter, for want of value in the sacrifice of Immanuel. For when the blood of his cross is intimated to extend to all things both in heaven and earth; (Col. 1. 20.) to diffuse an influence through the universe; to be the cement of the creation, in what part and for what time it shall continue, subordinately to the Creator's pleasure and purposes; and that by Him, who shed it even as such, all things are said to consist: and that besides his natural right, he hath acquired, by the superabundant value of this sacrifice, (the odours whereof are spread through all worlds,) a universal dominion; and particularly, to be Head of all principalities and powers; to establish the faithful and loyal, to judge and punish the disloyal, over whom he so gloriously triumphed on the cross; (Col. 2. 15.) to have every knee bow to him, &c.: (Phil. 2. 6—11.) it cannot be, doubtless, but the value of the same sacrifice had sufficed to obtain a power, as well as to govern and judge all, to establish and reward the good, to punish the bad; to have obtained that, upon terms, pardon and mercy might have reached down into the infernal regions, if they that inhabit them could upon other accounts have been thought a pardonable or tractable sort of delinquents. And if we cannot apprehend this great Sacrifice to want value even to make atonement for devils, we can as little think it should want value to save
The impenitent and unbelieving among men, under the gospel; and that it must therefore also be for some other reason, that such perish. As,

If there be any thing of reason in what hath been dis- coured concerning the state of the lapsed angels, the continuance of men in wilful impenitency and infidelity partly supposes, partly makes, the state of things with them the same.

Partly supposes it so. For it implies they have been ap- plied to and treated with personally, upon the terms of the second covenant; that is, the covenant of God in Christ, as the apostate angels were upon the first. And if the guilt of the former apostates were so horridly great upon this account, the guilt of the latter must be proportionably so on the same account.

Partly makes it the same. For hereby, as the angels were violators first and immediately in their own persons of the first covenant, so are men of the second. For, generally, they
that live under the gospel are professed covenanters; and if they were not, they could not but have become obliged to have been so, by the very proposal and tender thereof unto them; or, as soon as the mind of Him who made them, concerning this matter, was known. They were not obliged by their own consent, but they were obliged to it, and by an incomparably greater and deeper obligation; not by their own act and deed, but by His who gave them breath. What is their authority over themselves, compared with that of the Supreme Lawgiver? A mere borrowed subordinate thing, without and apart from him, without whom their being itself were mere nothing! An argument ad hominem, is convictive, in disputation, between one man and another; but how much more overpowering means of conviction will there be in the judgment of the great day! And the parity of cases between the angels that fell, and insolent sinners under the gospel, is intimated as monitory to the latter, in those texts of Scripture that speak of God's most just and terrible severity to the former; namely, the sin of both was apostasy, according to the different covenants or laws under which they stood. For as the one sort were apostates from God, so the others were from Christ, denying the Lord that bought them, 2 Pet. 2. 1. And again, "turning the grace of God into lasciviousness, and denying the only Lord God, and our Lord Jesus Christ," Jude 4. Whereupon, this example of God's vengeance upon the angels that fell is subjoined in both places. Besides what was common to them with the apostate angels, there were some things peculiar to these wilful refusers of the grace of the gospel, and violators of the gospel-covenant. As,

That the guilt of wilful sinners under the gospel admits of this aggravation above that of the rebelling angels, that they offend against the grace of the remedy, never offered to the other; treading under foot the Son of God, profaning the blood of the covenant, wherewith they were sanctified, as an unholy thing, and doing despite unto the Spirit of grace, Heb. 10. 29. And,

That the offer itself, made to them, carried in it a manifest signification of their (remote) claimable right to the benefits of the gospel-covenant, on supposition of their compliance with the terms of it, (unto which the fallen angels could have no pretence,) barred only by their non-acceptance or refusal, which appears in the general tenor of the gospel-covenant itself: "Ho, every one that thirsts"—"Whosoever will, let him come, and take of the waters of life freely"—"God so
loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, should not perish."—And it is here to be noted, that a secret intention gives not a claimable right, but some overt-act or deed; and it must be claimable, before it ought to be claimed or accepted. This is the case then with the wilfully impenitent and rebellious under the gospel, that it may be truly said to them, "You might have had pardon and eternal life, if you had not rejected the kindest offers." It is not therefore want of value in this sacrifice, but their rejection, whence it is unavailable to them. As for them that could never have the gospel, or infants incapable of receiving it, we must consider the holy Scriptures were written for those that could use them, not for those that could not; therefore to have inserted into them an account of God's methods of dispensation towards such, had only served to gratify the curious and unconcerned, not to instruct or benefit such as were concerned. And it well became hereupon the accurate wisdom of God, not herein to indulge the vanity and folly of man.

2. Now let it hereupon be considered, in what way was this to be done; not otherwise than by enacting and publishing a universal law, that whosoever should comply with such and such terms, expressed in that law, (as, for instance, repentance towards God, and faith in Jesus Christ,) should be actually and finally pardoned and saved. And this being now the plain state of the case, let any sober, unprejudiced mind make a judgment of it, what this matter would come to, if there had not been a compensation made, as a foundation to this law, and the publication of it. They that exalt one divine perfection, to the diminution of several others; that, for instance, so plead for the absoluteness and sovereignty of God's mercy, as not to adjust therewith the determinations of his wisdom, purity, righteousness, forget that they hereby make any satisfaction by a Redeemer unnecessary, (and by consequence make Christ, whom they cannot deny to have suffered and died, being innocent, to have died in vain,) nor do allow in their own thoughts its just weight to this state of the case,—that the method in which God was to exercise his pardoning mercy, was by publishing an edict for that purpose, that was to extend all the world over, and through all the successions of time. They know this is the course the wisdom of God hath pitched upon, and yet, taking the case as it is, would have this large, universal tenor of the gospel to proceed upon no foregoing compensation. The great God requires it should be proclaimed to all the world,
"Ho, every one that thirsts, come to the waters"—"Whosoever believes shall not perish, but have life everlasting"—"If the wicked turn from all the sins he hath committed, he shall not die: all his transgressions shall not be mentioned"—"Repent, so your iniquities shall not be your ruin"—"Come to me, all ye that are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest"—"Go, preach the gospel to every creature; whosoever believes shall be saved." This is the known tenor of the gospel, directed without limitation to all the ends of the earth: "Look to me, and be saved; all sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven to men." That gospel which determines that whosoever believes shall be saved, is directed to be preached to all nations. He did first, by his angels from heaven, indefinitely proclaim, "Peace on earth, and good-will towards men;" and pursuant hereto was the commission given by our ascending Lord to his apostles and ministers that should succeed to the end of the world. Now suppose that without reference to, or mention any where made of this compensation to the justice of God, there must be an offer made of such mercy, not to present delinquents only, but to all, in all future times and ages!

With what methods of government would such a course as this agree? I the rather insist upon this, both as apprehending it to have its own great weight, and that perhaps it hath escaped the consideration of the most, in treating of this important subject; yet, what is more obvious? It is one thing for a prince, by a private act of grace, to pardon a particular person that hath offended him without insisting upon any recompense; another thing to do it to a multitude, not only that had now transgressed, but that should do so in any future time. Lighter minds may perhaps at first sight reckon this would only so much the more magnify the mercy of God above that of man, "whose ways are not as our ways, nor his thoughts as our thoughts." And so indeed doth the way he hath taken for the pardoning of sin infinitely exceed all human thought, Isa. 55. 6—8. But we must take heed of being so inconsiderately officious, as to prescribe him ways of exalting one attribute, to the depressing of another; and so to set him above men in one respect, as to throw him in another below himself, yea and below men too: that, is not more to set him above them in point of mercy, than beneath them in point of governing wisdom and righteousness. And if any would be so insolent to prescribe to him, they might have thought the inconvenience of such a universal edict might have been avoided, by his sending an angel, or affording some particular revelation to
every man he would have turn to him, and repent. But were
it dutiful so to correct his way of dispensation? And consider
how this way he hath chosen would square with the ordinary
measures of government, without the foundation laid which we
are asserting. That prince would certainly never be so much
magnified for his clemency and mercy, as he would be despired
by all the world for most remarkable defects of government,
that should not only pardon whosoever of his subjects had of-
fended him, upon their being sorry for it, but go about to
provide a law that should obtain in his dominions, through all
after-time, that whosoever should offend against the govern-
ment, with whatsoever insolency, malignity, and frequency,
if they repented, they should never be punished, but be taken
forthwith into highest favour. Admit that it had been con-
grous to the wisdom and righteousness of God, as well as his
goodness, to have pardoned a particular sinner, upon repent-
ance, without satisfaction; yet nothing could have been more
apparently unbecoming him, than to settle a universal law,
for all future time, to that purpose; that let as many as would
in any age, to the world’s end, affront him ever so highly, in-
vade his rights, trample his authority, tear the constitution of
his government, they should, upon their repentance, be forgiven,
and not only not be punished, but be most highly advanced
and dignified.

And though he hath, upon the recompense made him by
his Son for all this injury, declared he will do all this; they
accepting their Redeemer and Saviour for their Ruler and
Lord, and returning to their state of subjection and duty to
himself, in him; yet it were enough to make the world trem-
ble and fall astonished at his foot-stool, to have peace and re-
conciliation offered them only upon such terms; and to
behold God’s own Son made a sacrifice to his justice, and a
public spectacle to angels and men, for the expiation of the
wrong done; and enough to make all men despair of ever
finding such another sacrifice, if they should reject the terms
upon which only the value and meritoriousness of this can be
available for them. They can never, after this, have pretence
to think it a light matter to offend God, or to think that he
looks with indifferency upon sin, or counts it a small matter.

And suppose it possible a single delinquent might have been
pardoned, without such atonement made for his offence; the
design of God’s unbounded mercy not being so narrow, but so
vastly comprehensive as to require the settling of a stated
course for the reducing and saving of lost souls, in all times

VOL. I.
and ages; since a Redeemer of so high dignity was to be constituted for this purpose: it had been an inexpressible injury to him, a detraction from the kindness of his undertaking and the authority of his office, that any thing of mercy should be shewn in this kind, but in him and by him alone.

But that it may be further understood how requisite it was such atonement should be made, such a sacrifice offered, for the sins of men, in order to God's settling his temple and presence with them; we were to consider, not only what was to be remitted, which we have done, but also what was to be communicated, namely, his blessed Spirit, in pursuance of the same gracious purpose; which remains to be done in what follows in chap. ix.

CHAP. IX.

We proceed to consider, Secondly, What is to be vouchsafed: namely, the gift or communication of the Spirit. 1. The gospel the means of it. 2. The inseparable connexion hereof with the former, the imparting of righteousness for removing the guilt of sin. 3. In what sense the Holy Spirit of God is said to be given or communicated. 4. What personal union signifies. 5. How personal presence, vital union, and communicated influences, concern the inquiry. 6. In what respect the necessity asserted of this communication. 7. Since there is such fulness of Spirit in Immanuel, purposely for communication, how comes it to pass that he thereby raises no more such temples? 8. The necessity of this communication for this purpose represented two ways; by shewing, (1.) That the holy Scripture teaches that God doth give his Spirit, though under distinct notions, only through Christ. (2.) That it was most reasonable, and therefore necessary it should be so.—The doctrine of Scripture herein proposed under six heads.

WHEREAS there could be no restoration of this temple of God with men (as hath been shewn) without the concurrence of these two things—the remission of sin, and the emission of the Holy Spirit: and that it was undertaken to shew, that these were so great things, as that the wisdom of God judged it not meet to vouchsafe them in another way, than by constituting the Immanuel invested with a full power, by his own acquisition, in an unexceptionable, legal way, to dispense, and effect both of them; whereupon, as we have seen, this constitution was abundantly sufficient, so it now also must appear necessary, for this purpose. Having endea-
voured to evince this necessity concerning the former of these, remission of sin, upon consideration of the vast amplitude and the peculiar way of this remission: we are now,

Secondly, to shew it concerning the latter; namely, the emission or communication of the Holy Spirit.

The rich sufficiency of Immanuel, so constituted, as to be furnished with this power of giving the Spirit, hath already been seen, and that in a two-fold respect; namely, both in respect of the end of its communication, that the indisposed, unwilling heart of man might be prepared and made willing again to receive the divine presence; and in respect of the way wherein it was to be communicated: namely, in a way suitable to man's intelligent nature, by representation of the glorious object by which his soul was to be impressed. Immanuel himself, represented as the original, exemplary Temple; and also represented as made a Sacrifice: as was discoursed ch. v. Whereby the two purposes are answered, mentioned ch. vi. sec. 1. For which it was requisite this constitution of Immanuel should be, and should be declared and made known to us: that the blessed God might, upon terms not injurious to himself, give his own consent: and might, in a way not unsuitable to us, gain ours. Both which he is graciously pleased to assume to himself, for his part, in his transactions with us about this matter; leaving it for our part, being so assisted, to consider what is represented to us: and thereupon, actually to give our own consent.

1. Whereupon we are not to look upon the gospel of the Son of God as a useless or unnecessary thing. It is the ministration of spirit and life, (2 Cor. 3. 6.) and the power of God to salvation to every one that believes; (Rom. 1. 16.) an apt instrument of such impressions upon the spirits of men as are necessary to their being formed into living temples; the sword of the Spirit. Not that any good work is wrought by the inanimate gospel: the letter kills; but it is the Spirit that gives life, 2 Cor. 3. An instrument comes under the general notion of means, which signify somewhat middle between the efficient and the effect. And suppose an agent able effectually to use them; a sword is a fit instrument for its proper use, supposing a hand able to wield it.

The communication therefore of the Spirit is what we are principally now to consider. And as the constitution of Immanuel was sufficient, in its own kind, and for its own proper purpose, in this restoration; so we are to shew the necessity of it, for this same purpose.
2. There ought to be a concurrence of these two, in the Cause, the Restorer, of this temple; namely, a fulness of righteousness, to be so imparted as that it may be a ground upon which sin may be forgiven; and a fulness of Spirit, from whence vital influence may be communicated and transfused.

Inasmuch, as it is most evident, there cannot but be a connexion of what is correspondent thereto in the effect, namely, the temple itself restored, it must be full of life, 1 Pet. 2. 4, 5. For can it be thought that the righteousness of the Son of God should ever be the clothing of a carcass? Without union to Christ, no man can have either: neither his righteousness nor his indwelling Spirit. Nor can they be separable, with reference to the designed end. It is an unsupposable thing, that one should be God's temple enlivened, and animated by his own Spirit, and yet be under remaining guilt, and liable every moment to his consuming wrath; or that he could be any whit the better, to have all his former guilt taken off, and be still "dead in trespasses and sins!" Wherefore this latter is of equal necessity. Hither therefore we have reserved the larger discourse we intended of the gift or communication of the Spirit, as the most proper place for it. And by way of preparation hereto, it is necessary to consider,

3. How or in what sense the Spirit is said to be given at all, or communicated; or to say somewhat of the true import of the phrase giving the Spirit. It is evident, that whereas giving imports some sort of communication, there is yet a sense wherein that blessed Spirit is, to any creature, simply incommunicable. There is a παραχώρησις, or mutual in-being, of the sacred persons in the Godhead, which is most peculiar to themselves, not communicable to creatures with them; and which is natural and necessary, not gratuitous, and wherefore therefore the notion of gift no way agrees. We cannot yet be ignorant, that because the Holy Spirit is sometimes called the Spirit of God, sometimes the Spirit of Christ, some bold, assuming enthusiasts, upon pretence of being possessed of this Spirit, have taken the liberty of uttering "great swelling words of vanity," and to talk of being godded with God, and christed with Christ. Yet, because the expressions of giving the Spirit, of receiving, of having the Spirit, of our being in the Spirit, and of his being and dwelling, or abiding in us, are phrases of known and frequent use in Scripture; whether in relation to extraordinary purposes and operations, peculiar to some, or to ordinary, common to all that are sincere in the
Christian church: such expressions are therefore by no means to be rejected or disused; but cautiously used, and understood in a sound and sober sense. We find no difficulty in apprehending how God is said to give any thing diverse or distinct from himself; as houses, lands, riches, &c.: when in the mean time we will confess it not so easy to conceive of his giving what is within the verge of Deity, or that is of and belonging to himself. Some have thought, that by the Spirit given, we are to understand the operations and effects of the Spirit, extraordinary, as of prophecy, working miracles, &c. and ordinary, (which concern our present purpose,) the graces, habits, acts, and influences of the Spirit. Others, finding it so expressly said of the Spirit himself, spoken of as a person, that he shall be given, he shall abide with, and shall or doth dwell with or in you; (John 14, 15, 16. Rom. 8, in divers verses of those chapters;) have thought it too diminishing, and benath the sense of those places, to understand them of anything less than the very person of the Spirit. And Some, reckoning the particle in to import union, have therefore incongruously spoken of a personal union between the Holy Spirit and believers. Others, more cautiously, of his indwelling, personal presence in them; as a greater thing, and more answerable to the letter of such texts, than their only having in them his graces or gracious influences. If any one may venture to give a censure and judgment upon all this, and to shew,

4. What personal union signifies, I conceive that if any will make use of metaphysical terms, they should take them in the sense wherein metaphysicians use them: which they do not, who speak of a personal union between Christ, or the Spirit of Christ and believers. For by personal union is never wont to be meant a union of one person with another, but a union of the singular nature with this peculiar manner of subsistence, whereby is constituted one person: that is, that by personal union is meant, not the subjects of union, as if it only signified that several persons remaining distinct were yet some way or other united with one another; which, so taken, were a very lax expression, and which, according to the various capacities persons may admit of, would be of vast extent, and may reach to domestical, political, and I know not how many more unions; which cannot but be much beneath what such men must be understood to intend: but that expression, personal union, means the result of union, whereby the mentioned two become one person. And therefore they that speak in this stricter and more proper sense of personal union of the Spirit
and believers, do most unwarily assert a nearer union between the Spirit and believers than that of the sacred persons in the
Godhead with each other. For they who acknowledge them
one in Godhead, do yet as commonly deny them to be one
person, and assert them to be ever three distinct persons: and
this must be as much above what such men will avow and
stand by. Therefore that expression can, in this case, admit
no tolerable sense at all, distinctly expressive of any thing
that can be truly meant by it. But,

5. How do personal presence, vital union, and communicated
influences, concern the subject? for,

(1.) That, of a personal indwelling presence, can by no
means be denied. The plain import of many texts of Scripture
is so full to this purpose, that to take them otherwise, exclu-
sively of this, is not to interpret Scripture, but deny it.

(2.) Yet this expression of a personal indwelling presence,
taken alone, doth not signify any peculiar distinguishing privi-
lege of believers from others: but what is common to all men and
creatures. For can we acknowledge God to be omnipresent, and
deny it of any person of the Godhead? Therefore, the Spirit’s
personal presence alone doth not distinguish believers from
others, even though we suppose that presence to be ever so
intimate: God is all, and in all, more inward or intimate to
us than we are to ourselves; an assertion carrying its own
evidence so fully in itself, as easily to be transferred from the
Pagan academy to the Christian church, so as generally to ob-
tain in it.

(3.) That therefore such as speak of the Spirit’s being pre-
sent, by his gracious influences, operations, and effects, sup-
pose his personal presence, from which they can no more be
severed, than the beams from the body of the sun. The way
of divine operation being also by an immediateness both vir-
tutis & suppositi, of both power and person, as it is commonly,
and fully enough, wont to be spoken.

If any therefore should speak of the Spirit’s personal pre-
sence, as excluding gracious effects wrought thereby; they
do not herein say a greater thing than the others, but much
less. For though there cannot be any gracious effects without
the present person of the Spirit, yet we all know he may be
personally present where he produces no such effects: it is
therefore his being so present, as to be the productive cause of
such blessed effects, that is any one’s peculiar advantage. It
is very possible to have the personal presence of some great
and munificent personage, and be nothing the better for it, if
his favour be shut up towards me. It is only his communicative presence that I can be the better for, which depends upon free good-will.

(4.) It is therefore only the free, gracious presence of the Spirit, that can be the matter of gift and of promise; not that which is necessary, or impossible not to be, which is peculiar and distinguishing. Mere personal presence, as the divine essence itself, is everywhere, by necessity of nature, not by vouchsafement of grace; and therefore no way comports with the notion of giving, or of promise.

(5.) Therefore giving the Spirit imports, in the full sense of it, two things:

[1.] Somewhat real, when he vouchsaferes to be in us, as the spring and fountain of gracious communications, influences, and effects, which are most distinct from himself. For the cause is uncreated: the effect is the new creature, with whatsoever was requisite to produce, sustain, improve, and perfect it; though so like its cause, in nature, as to bear its name. "That which is born of the Spirit, is spirit," John 3.

6. And because he is said to be in Christians, who are truly such, and they in him; which are words very expressive of union; that union is most properly vital, as wherever holy life is the immediate result: "I live, yet not I, but Christ" (that is, by his Spirit) "liveth in me." Nor, otherwise, could such be living temples, animated from Immanuel.

[2.] Somewhat relative, the collation of a right to such a presence, for such purposes; which hath no difficulty. We easily conceive how the meanest persons may, by vouchsafement, have relation to, and interest in, the greatest; so God gives Himself, his Son, his Spirit, to them that covenant with him, as we also take the Father, Son, and Spirit, to be our God; as the baptismal form signifies. And when we so covenant, then hath this giving its full and complete sense. And now, having thus far seen in what sense the blessed Spirit of God may be said to be given or communicated, we come next briefly to shew, as the other intended premise,

6. In what respect we are here, pursuantly to the drift and design of the present discourse, to affirm a necessity, in reference to this communication. It may admit a twofold reference: backward, to the constitution of Immanuel, on which it depends;—forward, to the restoration of God's temple, which depends on it. There was a consequent, moral necessity of this communication; upon what the Immanuel was, did, suffered, and acquired. There was an antecedent, natural
necessity of it, in order to what was to be effected, and done by it. In the former respect, it was necessary in point of right, as it stood related to its meriting cause. In the latter respect, it was necessary in fact, as it stood related to its proper designed effect, which could only be brought about by it. In short; the communication of the Spirit was necessary to the restoring of this temple. The constitution of Immanuel was necessary to the communication of the Spirit.

This former necessity hath, in great part, been evinced already, in representing the ruinous state of God's temple among men, when Immanuel undertook the reparation of it; and in treating of his abundant rich sufficiency for this undertaking. Yet, there will be farther occasion to say more of it in the progress of the following discourse; the other will more directly come under our consideration in what follows; wherein, however, we must have reference to both promiscuously, pursuant to what hath been said.

For as we have shewn, that the immense fulness of both righteousness and Spirit, treasured up in Immanuel, could not but be abundantly sufficient for the purpose of restoring God's temple; and have also shewn, that his fulness of righteousness was in order to the remission of sin, as well necessary, as sufficient, to the same purpose; so it remains further to be shewn, that his fulness of Spirit, as it was sufficient, so is the emission or immission of it also necessary, for that part it was to have in this restoration. And that the whole course of divine dispensation, in restoring of this temple, imports a steady comportment with this necessity in both the mentioned kinds of it. Therefore, the Immanuel being the procurer of this restoration, as this may fitly be styled the temple of Christ, or of God in him; so the Spirit, being the immediate actor herein, is it also styled the temple of the Holy Ghost, as we find in many texts of Scripture, Eph. 2. 20, 21. 1 Cor. 3. 16. and 6. 19. 2 Cor. 6. 16. 1 Peter 2. 4, 5. which the reader may consult at leisure. And they all shew, how important and necessary a part, the blessed Spirit hath in this merciful and glorious work. As withal, it being considered what relation the Spirit bears to Christ, as he is Immanuel and Mediator between God and man; it evidently shews the necessity of his being constituted and made such, in order to the Spirit's part herein.

God's own judgment is the surest measure to direct ours of what was necessary, in this case. And so far as the ground of his judgment is, by himself, made visible to us, we are neither
to put out our own eyes, nor turn them away from beholding it. We are to reckon it always safe and modest to follow him, by an obsequious, ductile judgment of things apparent, and which he offers to our view, or appeals to us about them. To go before him by a preventive judgment of the secret things that belong to him or pretend to give reasons, or an account of his matters, where he gives none himself, argues rashness, arrogance, and self-confidence, whereof we can give no account. But our judgment may be truly said to follow his, when he having in his word declared his choice of such a course, which he steadily pursues in his consequent dispensations; we thereupon conclude that course to be most fit, and that what he judged most fit, was to him (as formerly we have insisted) necessary. Therefore may we with just confidence undertake to shew,

That his declared, chosen, constant course of giving the Spirit, for restoring his temple with men, is to do it in and by Christ, or Immanuel, the constituted Mediator between God and man. And that it was apparently reasonable and becoming of himself so to do.

Whereby the necessity will appear, both of his giving the Spirit, for the restoring of his temple; and of his settling the constitution of Immanuel, or such a Mediator, in order to the giving his Spirit.

Only, before we proceed more distinctly to discourse these things, it seems requisite to consider and discuss a difficulty, which may give great amusement to the minds of many, namely,

7. That since, by the drift and tendency of this discourse, it would appear, that the Son of God, Immanuel, God with us, hath by his own dear purchase, a fulness of Spirit in him for this blessed work; and now hath it in his power to raise temples every where at his pleasure, That yet so great a part of the world is still desolate, full of idols' temples; yea, the visible temple of God full of idols, destitute of the divine Spirit, under the poisonous influence of the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that works in the hearts of the children of disobedience, Eph. 2. 2. and ἐνέργεια θεοῦ—by an efficacious energy, as the word there used emphatically signifies. For what hath that accursed spirit more power to destroy, than the Son of God, manifested to dissolve and destroy the works of the devil; and his blessed Spirit have to save?

Some considerations tending to disamuse men's minds about...
this matter, may make way for our clearer and less-interrupted progress in the following discourse. Therefore consider,

(1.) That the raising up of temples to God in the souls of men, with the dispossessing of that wicked one, must by no means be understood to be the work of mere power; as if no other excellency of the divine Being were concerned in it. Nor is it fit to say (as elsewhere is insisted) that God can do everything that almighty power can do. Almighty power gives us not an adequate notion of God. He is every other excellency as well as power; and can do nothing but what agrees with every other perfection of his nature, wisdom, justice, holiness, truth, &c. as well as his power.

(2.) The Son of God, Immanuel, having obtained an infinite fulness of power to reside in himself, cannot be expected to exert it to the utmost, as natural, unintelligent agents do. But so far as is suitable to the proper ends of his undertaking, and the office which he bears.

(3.) It ought to be deeply considered, as a truth both of clearest evidence and great importance, (though perhaps it may have escaped the thoughts of many,) that the principal end of our Lord's undertaking and office, was not the salvation of men, but the glory of God. This is that whereupon his design did ultimately terminate. The other he could only intend secondarily, and as a means to this; otherwise, he would make the creature his chief end, and place upon it a most appropriate divine prerogative, to be the last, as he is the first, to all things: which is said of the great God, in reference to this very case, the saving of some, and rejecting of others. In contemplation whereof, the apostle, crying out, O the depth! asserts God's absolute liberty, as debtor to no man, (Rom. 11. 33—35.) and subjoins the true reason hereof, That of him, and by him, and to him, are all things, that to him might be glory, &c. This is the avowed design of our Lord Christ's office, in both his lowest humiliation, and highest exaltation. The desire of being saved from the (approaching) hour and power of darkness vanishes, and gives place to this,—Father, glorify thy name, John 12. 27, 28. When, for his obedience to death, that of the cross, he is highly exalted—all are to confess him Lord, to the praise and glory of God. Phil. 2. 8, 11. He, who is the most competent and most rightful Judge, determines when it will be more for the glory of God, to dispossess the strong man armed, being himself the stronger, and erect that house into a temple: and when it
CHAP. IX.  THE LIVING TEMPLE.

will most serve this his great end, to leave the strong man armed still in his possession, and finally to doom the possessor and the possessed to take their lot together. In the former case, there are vessels unto honour, framed by his own hand, to the praise of the glory of grace, Eph. 1. 6. In the latter, vessels unto dishonour, to glorify his power, by making known his wrath and just resentments. For that honourable purpose, none are of themselves fit; but he makes them meet (Col. 1. 12.) for that glorious state, before he makes them partakers of it: but none serve the dishonourable use, but who are, of themselves, vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, Rom. 9. 22. Our Lord was faithful as a Son; and was therefore content to die upon a cross, that he might, in a way against which the strictest justice should not reclaim, obtain to himself a power of giving an apostate world a time of trial; and as men should acquit themselves, by complying or not complying with his methods, glorify the Father, whose glory he sought, as being sent by him, and vindicate the rights of the divine government, both in them that are “saved, and in them that perish.”

(4.) But it may gain us further advantage, to consider the great God doth not pursue ends, as we are wont to do, who commonly apprehend ourselves to stand in need of the things we pursue as our ends. But he acts agreeably to his self-sufficient fulness, who dwells not in temples made with hands, nor in any human temple, “as if he needed any thing, seeing he gives to all life and breath, and all things;” (Acts 17. 25.) and expects hereupon, that men should seek after him:—as nothing is more fit, than that indigency and necessity should crave and supplicate unto rich and abounding fulness. Princes glory in their acquisitions, and the increased multitude of their subjects, from whom they have an increase of power, and the ampler revenues. They glory in receiving; He in giving, in making his diffusive goodness flow among his creatures. Nor hath he any cause to be anxious about the event, or how his communications are received; beholding always, with infinitely higher complacency, the perfect rectitude of his own dispensations, than their felicity, though he take a secondary pleasure in that too, when it is the result of the former. He glories, as he requires us to do, (Jer. 9. 24.) that he exerciseth loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness in the earth, because in those he delighteth.

(5.) Though the goodness and loving-kindness of God be immense, and without limit; yet, the exercise of it is within
certain limits, which annexed judgment or the most exquisite wisdom prescribes to it. He waits to be gracious—and because he is the God of judgment, they are blessed that wait for him, Isa. 20. 18. There is a critical season and nick of time, which men are concerned to wait for; and because to every purpose there is time and judgment, therefore is the misery of men great, Eccl. 8. 6. For man also knows not his time, ch. 9. 12. The most perfect wisdom hath drawn out a certain verge, within which the most special goodness confines, ordinarily, its communications: otherwise, what means that,—if thou continue in his goodness? Rom. 11. 22. with that of Jude 21. Keep yourselves in the love of God, looking for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto eternal life. While we converse with the ever Blessed One, within the region of his own love and goodness, imbibing, and taking in his free and gracious communications, and still craving and expecting more, we keep within the sacred vital circle and inclosure; without which, is darkness and the shadow of death. We breathe in the element of life, by grateful aspirations, and respirations, that cannot be unpleasant to ourselves, but must be infinitely more pleasant to him; who reckons it a more blessed thing to give than to receive. We are always to remember, that our state is that of expectants: that we keep ourselves in the love of God, looking, waiting, always onward, until we attain eternal life. Our waiting hath the annexed promise of blessedness, as above, Isa. 30. 18. and Prov. 8. 34. And is most becomingly required, as a just homage unto sovereign goodness.

(6.) That admirable goodness of God, which shews itself in raising up temples in this vile world by the Spirit of Immanuel, claims our subordinate co-operation as under-builders in this structure: We are to work, because he works, of his good pleasure, Phil. 2. 12, 13. Which signifies both his liberty and delight in working. It is said, I Cor. 3. 9. Ye are God's building: yet, it is also said, v. 14. If any man's work abide, which he hath built, &c.

One of great note in the ancient Christian church, discoursing of this passage, says, ἵνα διαδραμήσῃ τῇ τεχνίτῃ, ἀλλά τῇ διαστορε. —The building is not the artist's, or workman's, but the Lord's, that owns it; and who is to be, as a little after he speaks, καὶ ἐστιν ὁ ἐνα, and the inhabitant, (Chrysost. in I ad Cor.) the inhabitant of it. And inasmuch as we are to be living, intelligent temples, we are also to be ourselves labourers and workmen (as well as they who are to be so by special office) in this building. But
if our work be pulling down, stifling convictions, suppressing desires, fear, &c. Do we provoke the Lord to jealousy, by keeping up the service of the idols' temple, and profaning his own, 1 Cor. 10. 22? or have we forgot who hath said, Vengeance is mine, even for treading under foot his Son Immanuel, and despising his Spirit of grace, Heb. 10. 29, 30? The high pleasure the blessed God takes in his own gracious communications, gratefully received; and his just resentment and displeasure for the contemptuous refusal of them, may be understood some way to measure one another. Both may be conjectured from this text of Scripture, after such sort, as the great things of God can be conceived of, by such mean mortals. The Spirit of grace! of all kindness! love! goodness! benignity! sweetness! O the ineffable delight that blessed Spirit must take in its own effusions, tending to the recovery, the healing and saving of a lost soul, when there is an agreeable comportment therewith! But the despising of such a Spirit! Who can conceive or apprehend, deeply enough, the horror of this crime! the thwarting the design of so compassionate goodness! or of severity, or soreness of punishment, it shall be thought worthy of!

The whole work of faith, that is, that entire work, necessary to be wrought upon the soul of a man, in order to his future felicity, and that by God's own power is called the fulfilling or satisfying, the good pleasure of his goodness, 2 Thess. 1. 11. O the plenitude of satisfaction which our blessed Lord takes in the fulfilling the good pleasure of his goodness, when the methods are complied with, according whereunto he puts forth his power for effecting such a work! But if we can apprehend what it is to cross a man of power in his pleasures: what is it to withstand the great God in his pleasures! even the pleasures of his goodness! His most connatural, delightful pleasures! Some estimate we can make, by supposing a wealthy, potent, wise, and good man, intent upon reclaiming a poor, wretched, undone, perverse neighbour; if his supplies and counsels be gratefully received, how pleasant is it to his benefactor! if often repeated, they are scornfully rejected, how vexing is the disappointment!

(7.) We must know, there are vincible operations of that Spirit, leading on to those that are victorious, being complied with; otherwise, to the most terrible vengeance. When it was charged upon the Jews, Acts 7. 51. that they did always resist the Holy Ghost, as their fathers did: it is implied, he was always striving, though more rarely, to victory. But
when it is said, Prov. 1. 23. Turn at my reproof, could any essay to turn, without some influence of the Spirit? But that complied with, tends to pouring forth a copious effusion, not to be withstood. The less sensible adminicula, the gentler aids and insinuations of grace, lead to what shall overcome.

(8.) Without such an overpowering effusion, man’s impotency will be acknowledged, by those that understand either the Scriptures or themselves. But how perverse is the inference, that therefore they are to sit still! No: therefore to pray, cry, strive, wait, more than they that wait for the morning, until he be gracious, and shew mercy.

(9.) Therefore, for men to be destitute of the Spirit is criminal: and as much so, not to be filled with the Spirit, as to be drunk with wine: the same authority that forbids the one, enjoins the other, Eph. 5. 18.

(10.) But though it be God’s ordinary method, to proceed gradually in raising temples to himself in this world, he never so binds his own hands, as not to do extraordinary acts of grace and favour, when he thinks fit; and without any danger of forcing men’s wills, or offering violence to human nature: than which imagination nothing is more absurd; both because,

[1.] The forcing of a man’s will, implies a contradiction in the terms: for we have no other notion of force, than the making one do a thing against his will. But it is impossible a man should will or be willing against his will. He that hath made a man’s soul and all its powers, well enough knows how to govern him without violence, and by (though ever so sudden) an immission of his light and grace, effectually to change a man’s will without forcing it. And also because,

[2.] No man that hath the present use of his own faculties, will think they can be injured by divine light and grace; or that they hurt the nature of man, which they manifestly tend to restore, improve, and perfect. Yet no man is to expect, that because the blessed God vouchsafes to make some rarer instances of dealing by way of sudden surprise with the spirits of men, that this should be his ordinary method; but, more usually, to awaken them into some consideration of that forlorn state, while they are destitute of the divine presence, and their souls the haunts and residence of devils, instead of temples of the Holy Ghost. And to make them know, that he counts the gift of his Son, and Spirit, too great things to be
despised, or not earnestly sought; after he hath given hope of their being attained; or that the neglect thereof should not have a very terrible vindication: letting men feel that the despising the riches of his goodness, which gently leads to repentance, is nothing else but “treasuring up wrath against the day of wrath,” and the revelation of his righteous Judgment. Inasmuch as he owes it to himself, to let them know that the high and lofty One that inhabits eternity, needs not seek to them for a house, Isa. 66. 1, 2. And as to what in ordinary course, he judges necessary (lest men should in all this be thought justly querulous) he appeals to themselves, Isa. 5. 4. What could I have done more? Are not my ways equal? Ezek. 18.

8. Whereupon we now proceed to shew the two things, before intimated.

That the Holy Spirit is not otherwise given, than in or by Immanuel, or for Christ’s sake; and, How necessary, or (which comes fully to the same) how highly reasonable it was in itself, and may appear to us, that so mighty a gift, and of this peculiar nature and kind, should not be vouchsafed unto men, upon other terms, or in any other way, than this.*

(1.) For the former of these; That the Spirit of God is actually given, upon this account only, his own word sufficiently assures us. And who can so truly inform us, upon what considerations he doth this, or that, as he himself? Let us then, with equal, unbiassed minds, consider the tenor and import of what we find spoken in the holy Scripture about this matter, which I conceive may be truly summed up thus, namely,

[1.] That the Holy Spirit is given to this purpose of restoring the temple of God with men, with the worship and fruitions thereof, under a twofold notion,—of a Builder, and an Inhabitant.

[2.] That He is given under both notions, or for both these purposes, for Christ’s sake, and in consideration of his death and sufferings; though they have not influence to the obtaining of this gift, for both these purposes, in the same way, but with some difference, to be afterwards explained in what follows.

[3.] That it was not the immediate effect of his suffering, that this blessed Spirit should be forthwith given to this or that particular person; but that all the fairness of his grace be given into Christ’s power, and the right of dispensing it, annexed

* This is considered in chap. xi. page 151.
to his office, as he is the Redeemer of sinners, and Mediator between God and them, for the accomplishing the end of his office, the ceasing of controversies, enmities, and disaffections on our part, Godward.

[4.] That hereupon, its actual communication for both the mentioned purposes, is immediately from Christ or by and through him.

[5.] That it is given by Christ, under the former notion, or for the former purpose of rebuilding God's temple, as a sovereign, or an absolute plenipotentiary in the affairs of lost souls, in a more arbitrary way, so as not to be claimable, upon any foregoing right.

[6.] That he gives it, under the latter notion, and in order to a continued abode and inhabitation, as an oeconomus, or the steward of the household of God proceeding herein, by fixed rule; published in the gospel, according whereto the subjects of this following communication, being qualified for it, by the former, may, with certainty, expect it upon the prescribed terms, and claim it as a right; he having, by the merit of his blood, obtained that they might do so.

[CHAP. X.]

I. The first of the six heads mentioned in the preceding chapter, page 415, insisted on—That the Spirit is given both as a Builder, and as an Inhabitant of this temple. 1. Scripture testimony concerning the former of those, and the latter. 2. The Spirit given for the sake of Christ's death and sufferings. 3. Anciently, the blessing of Abraham, and his seed from age to age, upon this account. 4. More copiously and to other nations, when the fulness of time was come. 5. Christ's death hath influence for these two purposes with much difference, to be afterwards explained. II. Colossians 1. 10—21. largely opened. III. A digression relating thereto. The principal import of that text, to shew the dependence Christ's whole work of reconciliation, both of God to us, and of us to God, had upon his sacrifice on the cross. The latter whereof (our reconciliation to God) is effected by his Spirit, obtained by that sacrifice. Other texts to the same purpose. IV. The subject is resumed, and it is further noted, 6. That the Spirit is expressly said to be given by Christ, or in his name, &c. 7. Given for building or preparing a temple, by a less certain, known rule.

I. NOW let us see, as to each of these, whether this be not the plain doctrine of the Scriptures in this matter.
First, For the first of these, it hath been sufficiently shewn already, and the common experience of all the world shews, that until this blessed Spirit be given, the temple of God is every where all in ruin: that therefore he cannot dwell until he build, and that he builds that he may dwell, (the case and his known design being considered,) are things, here-upon, plain in themselves, and are plainly enough spoken in Scripture. Let us therefore,

1. Consider the Scripture testimony concerning both these. When the apostle had told the Christians of Corinth, (1 Cor. 3. 9.) "Ye are God's building," he shortly after adds, (in the same chapter, v. 16.) "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" This temple, being a living thing, (as 1 Pet. 2. 5. represents it,) the very building and formation of it is, in the more peculiar sense, generating; and because it is to be again raised up out of a former ruinous state, wherein it lay dead, and buried in its own ruins, this new production is regeneration. And do we need to be put in mind whose work that is? that "it is the Spirit that quickeneth?" (John 6. 63.) or of what is so industriously inculcated by our Lord, (ch. 3. v. 2, 5, 6, &c.) and testified under the seal of his fourfold amen, that this new birth must be by the Spirit? And we have both notions again conjoined, Eph. 2. For having been told, (v. 18.) that both Jews and Gentiles have by one Spirit access to the Father, so as to be no longer strangers and at a distance, but made nigh to God; (v. 19. compared with v. 13.) it is said, (v. 20.) We "are built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief Corner-stone;" and again added, (v. 21.) "In whom all the building, fitly framed together, growth (as a living thing) unto an holy temple in the Lord." After all which, the end and use of this building (implied in the name of a temple) are more expressly subjoined, (v. 22.) "In whom also ye are builded together an habitation of God, through the Spirit." It is therefore sufficiently evident, that the Spirit is given under these distinct notions, and for these several purposes, the one subordinated to the other, namely, both as a builder and a dweller.

2. That the Spirit is given for Christ's sake, whether for the one purpose or the other, is as expressly signified as any thing in the whole gospel. For what means it, that he is said to be given in his name? John 14. 26. and 15. 26. and that the work he does, being given, is said to be done in his name?
1 Cor. 6. 11. "Ye are sanctified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and by the Spirit of our God."

Yea, and that it is given in consideration of his sufferings and death, is not less plainly spoken: for not only are the immediate and most peculiar operations of this Spirit, ascribed to his death, (1 Pet. 2. 21.) "He himself bare our sins in his own body on the tree, that we, being dead to sin, should live unto righteousness;" but the imparting of the Spirit itself, is represented as the design and end of those sufferings, Gal. 3. 13, 14. "He was made a curse for us; for cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree, that the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles, that we might receive the promise of the Spirit," &c.

3. It was the same way, and on the same terms, upon the largeness and certainty of the divine prospect, and foresight touching Christ's future sufferings, that this was the blessing of Abraham and his posterity, long before he suffered: that God gave them, of old, his Spirit to instruct them; (Neh. 9. 20.) which is not obscurely implied, when looking back upon the days of old, they are said to have "rebelled, and vexed his Spirit;" (Isa. 63. 9, 10.) and when Stephen tells them, (Acts 7. 51.) "Ye do always resist the Holy Ghost; as your fathers did, so do ye," it is implied that even from age to age that blessed Spirit was striving with them; (children and fathers;) for there could be no resistance, where there was no striving: and that, in those former ages, that Holy Spirit was active among them upon Christ's account, and by the procurement of his future sacrifice, (presignified by their many sacrifices,) is also sufficiently intimated, in that, when it is said, That under Moses, they did eat and drink spiritual meat and drink; they are said to have drank of the rock that followed them; and it is added, that rock was Christ. And by what provocations could they be supposed more to resist and vex the Holy Spirit, than by those wherewith, in the day of provocation and temptation, they are said to have lusted in the wilderness, and tempted God in the desert, (Ps. 106. 14. Ps. 78. Ps. 95. Heb. 3.) by which they are expressly said to have tempted Christ, 1 Cor. 10. 9. And certainly the privilege was incalculably great, (though they too generally little esteemed it, and made little advantage of it,) that when the most of the world besides was nothing else but waste, neglected wilderness, they should be an inclosed vineyard, under the long continued droppings and dews of heavenly influence. For it was not but upon high
and long provocation, that at last God commands his clouds to rain no more rain upon it, Isa. 5. 6. How singular a favour was it to be the appropriate plantation, vineyard, and garden of God, taken in from so vast and wild a desert! and that the God of Abraham would so long continue the relation, and be their God; to bless them with the choice of his blessings, those whereof his own Spirit was the peculiar source and spring!

4. But when the fulness of time, and the season for the actual immolation of that Sacrifice, (once for all, to be offered up,) was now come, that the immense fulness of its value and virtue might be duly demonstrated and glorified; down goes the inclosure, which the amplitude and extensiveness of God’s kind design could no longer endure: and as some time the great prophetic oracle given to Abraham, must take effect, In thy seed (and it is said, not of seeds, as of many, but of seed, as of one, namely, Christ, Gal. 3. 16.) shall all the nations of the earth be blessed; this is the time. Now must the blessing of Abraham come upon the Gentiles. Nor could any time have been more fitly chosen, that the copiousness and vast diffusion of the effect, might demonstrate and magnify the power and fulness of the cause, and even lead the eyes of all unto it. The drawing, so generally of all men, was that which must dignify the cross, and incite all eyes to behold and adore the Son of man lifted up, John 12. 32. and in the midst of death, even with his dying breath, sending forth so copious, and far-spreading a diffusion of spirit and life! And now had it only been said loosely and at large, that this was brought about by his dying, that might admit a great latitude of sense, and give some room for sinister interpretation. The intention of the expression might be thought sufficiently answered, if, in any way, his dying did occasion good impressions upon the minds of men. But when the effect is expressely ascribed to his dying so, as the cause, that is, to his being lifted up, to his being made a curse in dying, by hanging on a tree, and a curse for us to redeem us thereby from the legal curse which lay upon us before; the curse of the law, the doom which the violated law laid upon us, of having (as is apparently meant) the Spirit withheld from us, that thereupon the great and rich blessing might come upon us, of having that holy Spirit freely, and without further restraint, communicated to us; this puts the matter out of all dispute, that it was in consideration of his dying, that God now gives his Spirit, and leaves no place for contending against it unto any,
who have not more mind to object, than they can have pre-
tence for it.

It is then, the plain doctrine of the Scriptures, that the
Spirit is given for the restoring of God's temple with men, for
the sake of Christ's death and suffering, who was Immanuel,
and, in his own person, the original temple, out of which,
each single temple was to arise and spring up, as well as he
was the exemplary temple, unto which they were all to be
conformed.

5. But whereas his sufferings and death have their influence
differently, to the Spirit's building of any such particular sec-
ondary temple, and to his replenishing and inhabiting it: that
difference we shall find is not inexplicable or very difficult to
be represented according to the tenor of the Scriptures also.
In order where to it will be of use to add,—That, as the im-
mediate effect of his sufferings and death, the Spirit in all the
fulness thereof, is first given into his power, and the right of
communicating it annexed to his office, as he is the Immanuel,
the Redeemer of sinners, and Mediator between God and them;
that it might implant what was necessary, and root out what
should be finally repugnant, either to their duty towards him
or their felicity in him.

That this was the end of his office, the very notion of a
mediator between God and men, doth plainly intimate;
(1 Peter 3. 18.) "For Jesus Christ himself suffered once, the
just for the unjust, to bring us to God." Which must signify
not only that he was to render God accessible, expiating by
his blood our guilt; but also, to make us willing to come to
him, vanquishing by his Spirit, our enmity procured also by
his suffering, the just for the unjust, without both we could
not be brought to God, which was, we see, the end of his suf-
fering.

II. Here we are to open Col. 1. 19, 20. That all fulness
did, upon his suffering, reside in him, for this purpose is as
plainly signified by that remarkable connexion, "For it pleased
the Father that in him should all fulness dwell—and, having
made peace by the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all
things to himself." The Father is not in the original text,
(the verb being left impersonal,) but is fitly and necessarily
understood; for whose pleasure can this be supposed to be,
but the Father's? And so the current of discourse doth thus
run smooth. "The Father was pleased that all fulness should
dwell in him, having made peace by the blood of his cross, by
him to reconcile all things to himself; even by him: for that
is inculcated a second time. It was judged necessary to this
reconciling design, that all fulness should dwell in him. But
who did thus judge? The Father was pleased it should be so;
but upon what consideration? "having made peace by the
blood of his cross." The same *He,* that was pleased all ful-
ness should dwell in him, was so pleased, as having made
peace by the blood of his cross; for the syntax cannot admit
that εἰγνώσωτα should be spoken of the Son; but the Father
(as agent, agreeably to that 2 Cor. 5. 18. "All things are of
God, who hath reconciled us to himself, by Jesus Christ")
having made peace; or pitched upon this method, and laid
this foundation of making peace (for it is usual to speak of a
thing as done, when it is put into a sure way of being so) by
the blood of his Son's cross, was now content that all fulness
should dwell in him, to be diffused by him, through the
world, in order to his having temples prepared, inhabited,
replenished with divine glory every where; not in heaven
only, which was already full of them, or where it was easy to
suppose he might find such temples ready prepared in all
quarters; but even on earth also, where all was waste and de-
solate, nothing to be seen but forlorn ruins.

III. And, by the way, (that we may make some, not un-
useful, digression,) it is very ordinary in Scripture, to join
things in the same period, as if they were of equal concern-
ment, when, though they are mentioned together, their con-
cernment is very different, and the main stress is intended to
be laid but on the one of them; the other being placed there,
either as an opposite, the more to illustrate and set off that
with which it is joined; or as an introduction, a thing sup-
posed, and which had place already, unto which the other is
more principally necessary to be added; and then is the form
of speech, manifestly, elliptical, but so, as that to considering
readers it is easy to apprehend what is to be supplied. As when
the apostle speaks thus, (Rom. 6. 17.) "God be thanked, that
ye were the servants of sin, but ye have obeyed from the heart
that form of doctrine which was delivered you;" doth the
apostle intend to thank God for their having been the ser-
vants of sin? No man can think so. But that, whereas, or
notwithstanding, they had been so, (which was the thing to be
supplied,) they did now obey, &c. So that (John 3. 5.) "Ex-
cept a man be born of water, and the Spirit, he cannot enter
into the kingdom of God." It was certainly none of our Sa-
vior's design to assert the absolute, universal, necessity of
washing with water, equally, with being born of the Spirit; but whereas it was the known manner among the Jews to admit proselytes to their religion, by baptism (which was then reckoned as a new birth) his design was, without rejecting that as useless, (which he intended to continue in the Christian church,) to represent the greater, and most indispensable necessity, of being born of the Spirit, added to the other, and that without this, the other alone would avail nothing. When again it is said, (James 1. 9. 19.) "Let the brother of low degree rejoice in that he is exalted; but the rich, in that he is made low;" it cannot be thought, that both these were equally intended to be enjoined; but the former is supposed, as a thing that would be naturally, and of course: Let him, as if he had said, admit he do, or he may, or it is taken for granted that he will rejoice, who, being of low degree, is exalted. But the principal design is to shew, what it is less obvious to apprehend or imagine, that the rich hath a truer cause and greater reason to rejoice when he is made low; because he was, otherwise, apt to please himself, or be mocked with a shadow. Many more such instances might be given of two things thus joined together in the same assertion, or sometimes, in the same precept, where the intentment is to make use of the one, either by way of opposition, or comparison, the more to magnify, or to lay the greater weight on the other.

The matter may well be so understood in the place under our present consideration; "by him to reconcile all things to himself," (things being put for persons, as elsewhere in holy Scripture, Luke 19. 10. 1 John 5. 4. and commonly in other writers,) "whether things on earth, or things in heaven;" that is, even as well men on earth, where the difficulty was greater, and where enmity against God did rage, where he was set at greatest distance and highest defiance; as those in heaven, where all was pacate already, and therefore a word was chosen more suitable to the state of their case, who were principally intended, namely, of reconciling; meaning that, by reconciliation, he would make the state of things on earth, now so filled with enmity against God, suitable to their state above, among whom there was none: and yet a word not wholly incongruous to the heavenly state also; for ἄποκαλλάττων, doth not always suppose a foregoing enmity, as ἀνοπλῶς (used 2 Cor. 5. 19, 20.) doth not always; nor doth the decompound here more limit the sense; but doth sometimes signify to conciliate, or draw into society, and may, in reference to that
state above, have reference to the continuation of amity and accord there; that no more any such rupture, as once there was, should have place in those bright regions for ever. And it seems designed for the Redeemer’s more consummate glory, that the perpetual stability of the heavenly state, should be owing to him, and to the most inestimable value of his obligation on the cross; that it should be put upon his account, and be ascribed to the high merit of his pacificatory sacrifice, that they continue in obedience, and favour for ever! For why, else, is the mention of the “blood of his cross” so carefully inserted, and that, rather than be omitted, it is even thrust into a parenthesis: “It pleased the Father that in him should all fulness dwell, and (having made peace by the blood of his cross) to reconcile all things to himself—on earth—in heaven!” This is the more remarkably designed; though yet, the principal import of the word reconciled, (as any word that is to be applied to divers matters, is differently to be understood, according to the diversity of the matter,) is accommodated to their case, who were principally intended, namely, those on earth, who were in enmity with God. And the following words shew these to have been here principally intended: “And you, who were sometime alienated, and enemies in your minds by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled,” &c. (v. 21.) as if he had said, He hath not only conciliated to himself, or made sure of the everlasting amity of those, who were always dutiful in heaven; but he hath also recovered the good-will and loyal affection of such on earth, as were at enmity, in an apostasy, alienated, and enemies in their minds; and all, by the same means, the virtue and fragrancy of a sacrifice, sufficient to fill heaven and earth with its grateful odour, and whose efficacy can never decrease to all eternity. Nor therefore, is it consequent, that the direct intention of this his sacrifice, should bear reference to the concerns of angels, whose nature he took not, but from the redundancy of its merit, this inestimable advantage, namely, the permanent stability of their state, may well be supposed to accrue to them; and, for the greater honour of the Redeemer, they made debtors to him for it.

And why should it seem incongruous, that those most constantly pure and holy creatures above, who are, in this same context, (v. 16.) made to owe whatever excellencies they have, within the sphere of nature, to the Son of God, should owe to him also, whatsoever they have within the sphere of grace? Yea, how aptly do things correspond, that, whereas it had
been said above, (v. 16.) "By him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are on earth," &c. it should also be after said, "by him are all things reconciled," either recovered into, or continued in, everlasting amity with him, that is, That whosoever partake of special divine favour, whether they be of the things on the earth, or the things in heaven, shall for the future be debtors to him for it. And whereas it is expressly said in Scripture, that "when God raised him from the dead, he set him far above all principality and power," &c. Eph. 1. 20, 21. (which words ἵσταται ἐνάντια, set him above, not only signify constitution, a thing diverse from natural priority, but also, being conjunct with his raising him from the dead, import a reference to his dying, and conquest over death, as the reason of it,) and that "being gone into heaven—angels, and authorities, and powers, are made subject to him;" (1 Peter 3. 22.) and that he being said to be "the head of all principalities and powers," he might, by themselves, be understood not to be an useless or unbeneﬁcial Head to them. Though it also is not to be forgotten, that at the time when the apostle wrote these words, a considerable part of that holy blessed society, then in heaven, were sometime on earth, in a state of enmity against God, and so who needed reconciliation in the strict and proper sense; as they did who were still on earth, and to whom he now more particularly directs his speech, (v. 21.) "And you also, who were sometimes alienated—yet now hath reconciled," &c.

But, though I could not think it an impertinency, to use some endeavour for clearing the whole of this (somewhat obscure) context, it coming, as it did, in my way, yet the principal thing, with reference to my present scope and purpose, which I consider in it, is that it was upon the account of the blood our Redeemer shed on the cross, that the Father was pleased all fulness should dwell in him, as an original Temple, to serve the purposes of that great reconciling work, undertaken by him. the raising up of multitudes of temples, all sprung from this one, in this world of ours. That God might dwell with men on earth! that amazing thing! 2 Chr. 6. 18. And that ascending (in order whereo he was ﬁrst, dying, to descend) that he might ﬁll all things, give gifts, that of his Spirit especially; and that to such as were enemies in their minds, by wicked works, even the rebellious also, that the Lord God might have his temple, and dwell with them, Ps. 68. 18. And whereas that work must comprehend the working out of enmity from the hearts of men against God (and not
only the propitiating of God to them, which the word εἰςνηπίσται seems more principally to intend) and that a great communication of influence from the Divine Spirit, was necessary for the overcoming that enmity; that therefore this fulness must include (among other things, being ὁ λείψεως, all fulness) an immense treasure and abundance of Spirit, (which is elsewhere said to be given him, not by measure, John 3. 34.) and that therefore his sufferings did obtain this plenitude of Spirit to be first seated in him, as the receptacle and fountain, whence it must be derived, and that the power and right of dispensing it should belong to his office, as he was the great Reconciler and Mediator between God and man. Which also many other texts of Scripture do evidently imply, as when he is represented as a universal Plenipotentiary, able to quicken whom he will, John 5. 21. And "all power is said to be given him, both in heaven and earth;" (Mat. 28. 18.) and that "the Father had given all things into his hands," (John 13. 3.) which must comprehend the power of giving the Spirit, and which the end of giving him that plenitude of power plainly requires. "Thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he might give eternal life to as many as thou hast given him;" (John 17. 2.) the Spirit given being the root of that life, (Gal. 6. 8.) they that sow to the Spirit, shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting. And that he is exalted to be a Prince and a Saviour, to give repentance, (which equally implies the gift of the Spirit) as well as remission of sins, Acts 5. 31. Nor is the consideration of his sufferings and death less plainly signified to be the ground, upon which this fulness of power is given him; when it is said, "Christ both died, and revived, and rose again, that he might be Lord of the living and the dead," Rom. 14. 9. And when, after mention of his being obedient to death, &c. it is said, "Wherefore God hath highly exalted him, &c." that all "should confess Christ is Lord, &c." Phil. 2. 5—11. Having made this digression, we now

IV. Resume the subject, and further note,

6. That hereupon, the Spirit (whether it be for the one or the other, of the mentioned purposes) is actually and immediately given by Christ, or by the authority of that office which he bears; than which nothing can be plainer, in that he is called the Spirit of Christ, Rom. 8. 9. And when our Lord himself uses the expressions about this matter, with such indifference and as equivalent; either "I will send him," (John 16. 7.) or, "I will send him from my Father," (John 15. 26.) or, "My Father will send him

Vol. I.  § 1
in my name," John 14. 26. Which what can it signify less, than that, as the Father was the first Fountain of this communication, so the established way and method of it, was in and by Christ, from which there was to be no departure? as is also signified in that of the apostle, Eph. I. 3.

"Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places (or things) in Christ."

And when we consider, how exact care is taken in well-ordered secular governments, not only that things be done which the affairs of the government required; but that they be done regularly, and in the way which is prescribed and set; so as that every one knows, and attends the business of his own place and station; and that no one may expect that from the treasurer, which is to be done by the chancellor, or that from him, which belongs to the secretary of state. If there be any beauty and comeliness in order, where should we more expect to find it, than in the divine government, and in the conduct and management of the affairs of the supreme and celestial kingdom; wherein only the remoteness of those things from our sense makes every thing seem little and inconsiderable? But did we allow ourselves to retire more frequently out of this world of shadows, and ascend into those glorious regions above; there to contemplate the bright orders of holy, loyal spirits, all employed in the services of the celestial throne, and to behold Jesus the Head of all principalities and powers, the Restorer of what was sunk and decayed, and the Upholder of the whole sliding universe, even of the noblest parts of it, that were liable to the same lapse and decay; by whom all things consist; we should not think it strange that such deference and honour should belong to his office; that it should be rendered every way so august and great, that he should be so gloriously enthroned at the right hand of the Majesty on high; and that, when his administrations are manageable, with so much ease and pleasure, to one of so immense wisdom, power and goodness; all acts of grace and favour, should more especially pass through his hands. And if we understand any thing of the distinction of persons in the ever blessed Deity (whereof if we understand nothing, how do we adventure to affirm any thing?) it is not more difficult to apprehend distinct employments, wherein yet, all can never fail to have their most complacential consent. And when that kind of office, was so freely undertaken by the Son;
the susception and management whereof, hath, no doubt, filled the supreme court, at first, and from age to age, with his highest celebrations and praises, and for the execution whereof, when he made his first descent into this world of ours, and was to appear an incarnate God on earth, a proclamation was published in heaven, "Now let all the angels of God worship him;" and in his execution whereof, they had, from time to time afterwards, spontaneously stooped down to behold, with pleased wonder, his surprisingly strange and prosperous methods and performances; who can think it unsuitable to the dignity and authority of so great, and so highly magnified an office, unto which all the power of heaven and earth was annexed, that it should by consent belong to it, to employ the whole agency of the Holy Ghost, in pursuance of its high and great ends?

But now, he having by his blood obtained, that this immense plenitude of Spirit should reside in him, not for himself, personally considered, (for so he had it by natural, eternal necessity, without capitulation or procurement) but as he was invested with such an office, and in order to its being, by the power of that office, communicated to others; it is easy to be conceived, and may be collected from the tenor of holy Scripture, in what different methods it was to be communicated, for the (already mentioned) different ends of that communication, namely, the rebuilding of God's temple on earth, and the constant inhabiting and replenishing it afterwards. Therefore,

7. For the former of these purposes, it is given more arbitrarily, and of more absolute sovereignty, not limited by any certain, published, or known rule; or other than what lay concealed in secret purpose. Here the first principle is given of that life which springs out, and exerts itself, in the generating, and forming of a living temple; which grows up into everlasting life, and makes it an eternally living thing. Now whereas he hath so vast a power given him by the Father over all flesh, (which giving, we again note, must signify this not to be the power he had by natural inherence, but by later constitution,) we do know to whom, or to what sort of persons, this eternal life, in the consummiate state of it, is to be given, for that is sufficiently declared in Scripture; but we are not told to whom it shall be given in the very initial state, or in the first and seminal principle of it; that is reserved among the Arcana Imperii, the secret resolves, or placita of the divine government. And so, tak-
ing the whole of it together, (as here we must,) we are only
told, He will give it to as many as the Father hath given
him, John 17. 2. We do find a connexion, (Rom. 8. 30.)
of predestination, calling, justification, and glorification;
but not of a sinner, as such, with any of these. So ob-
servable was that of a noted ancient, (S. Jerom,) "He that
hath promised pardon to a penitent, hath not (except with very
great latitude) promised repentance to a sinner." To speak
here more distinctly,

Ever since the apostasy, even upon the first declared con-
stitution of a Redeemer, and in the shining forth of that first
cheering ray of gospel light and grace, "the seed of the wo-
man shall break the serpent's head;" a promise was implied
of the communication of the Spirit; that curse, which made
the nature of man, as the accursed ground, improdutive of
any thing but briers and thorns; and whereby all holy, vital,
influences were shut up from men, as in an inclosed, sealed
fountain, being now so far reversed, for the Redeemer's sake,
as that all communication of the Spirit should no longer re-
main impossible. And hereupon, some communication of it,
in such a degree, as might infer some previous dispositions
and tendencies to holy life, seems to have been general (and
is therefore fitly enough wont to be called common grace) but
then, in that lower degree, it is not only resistible, but too
generally resisted with mortal efficacy; so as that it builds no
living temples; but retiring, leaves men under the most un-
comfortable and hopeless (but chosen) shades of death.

When it was said concerning the old world before the flood,
"My Spirit shall not always strive with man," it is implied, it
had been constantly and generally striving, until then; but
that it was now time, by the holy, wise, and righteous judg-
ment of heaven, to surcease, and give them over to the de-
struction which ensued. Which text, it is true, some interpret
otherwise; but if we will allow that of the 1 Pet. 3. 18—20.
to mean that, while Noah, that preacher of righteousness, did
it externally, Christ was, by his Spirit, inwardly preaching to
that generation, who were, now since, in the infernal prison;
not while they were so, (which the text says not,) but in their
former days of disobedience on earth; this place will then much
agree with the sense, wherein we (with the generality of our
interpreters) take the other. Nor are we therefore to think
there is no stated rule at all, in reference to this case of God's
more general (but less efficacious) striving with men, by his
Spirit. For we here see, that before God took any people to
be peculiar to him, from the rest of men, the reason which he
gives, why his Spirit should not always strive with man, in
common (after an intimation of his contemptible meanness,
and his own indulgence towards him notwithstanding, and in-
stance given of his abounding wickedness in those days) was,
because all "the imaginations of the thoughts of his heart
were only evil continually;" (Gen. 6. 3—5.) that is, that in
opposition to the dictates of the blessed Spirit, he gave
himself up to the power, and government of sensual in-
clination, his mind, or thinking, considering power and
faculty, falling in with the imaginations of sense, and
taking part therewith, against the Spirit of God; which im-
ported nothing less than a continual rebelling against that
Holy Spirit. Now if we consider this, as the declared reason,
why God's Spirit should not always strive, and compare there-
with other passages of Scripture; we may collect, and per-
ceive there is some rule of God's proceeding, in this matter,
not only settled in heaven, but sufficiently notified on earth
also: that is, concerning the extent, not concerning the limi-
tation of this gift; how far God would certainly go, in afford-
ing it, not how far he would not go. As far as it is sought,
complied with, and improved; not how far he would not, in
some instances, proceed, beyond that. He hath bound us to
pray, strive, endeavour, but not tied his own hands from doing
surprising acts of favour, above and beyond his promise.

It is plain, man had by his apostasy cut off all intercourse
between God and him; not only was become regardless of it,
but disentituled. It was his inclination not to converse with
God; it was his doom that he should not. We have but
short and dark hints of God's first transactions with men, but
what was written and done afterwards, much enlightens and
explains them. There was, no doubt, a much more compre-
hensive and substantial law, or rule of duty given to Adam,
than that positive statute: "Of the tree of knowledge of good
and evil, thou shalt not eat;" that was fundamental to it, and
transgressed in the violation of it, and therefore some way
implied in it; and if all that more were only given by internal,
mental impression, or was only to be collected from the
thorough consideration of God's nature and his own, and of
the state of things between God and him; that must have been
as intelligible to his yet undepraved mind, as written tables
or volumes. There must also, accordingly, be much more im-
plied in the subjoined enforcing sanction, or rule of punishment:
"In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt die the death;"
than the vulgar apprehension of dying comes to; for these were the words of the commination or curse upon man, if he should transgress. And are we not plainly told, (Gal. 3. 13, 14.) "Christ hath redeemed us from that curse—that this blessing might come upon us, that we might receive—the Spirit?" Therefore, this curse did shut up the Spirit from us; and this death must signify a suspension of all vital, holy influence, a continual languishment under the stupefying power of a carnal mind, which (Rom. 8. 6.) we are expressly told is death. And when that first evangelical promise was collaterally, and implicitly given, wrapped up in the threatening to the serpent, That the woman's seed should break his head; it could mean no less, than that he, that should afterwards, in the fulness of time, become her seed, and be born of a woman, should redeem us from under that curse, and turn it, in all the consequent horrors of it, upon himself. It was therefore further plain also, that no breath of holy divine influence was ever more to touch the spirit of man, had it not been for the Redeemer's interposition, and undertaking.

But he having interposed, undertaken, and performed, as he hath; what is the effect of it? What! Is it that the Spirit should now go forth with irresistible almighty power to convert all the world? That, the event too plainly shews was not the design; or that it should immediately supply men with sufficient grace and power to convert themselves? That, no scripture speaks, and it were strange, if such sufficient grace were actually given to all, it should prove effectual with so very few. But the manifest effect is, that the Spirit may now go forth (the justice, and malediction of the law not reclaiming against it) and make gentle trials upon the spirits of men, inject some beams of light, and some good thoughts, with which if they comply, they have no cause to despair of more; and so, that which is wont to be called common grace, may gradually lead, and tend to that of a higher kind, which is special, and finally saving. That light, and those motions, which have only this tendency, must be ascribed to the Spirit of God, co-operating with men's natural faculties; and not to their own unassisted, natural power alone. For we are not sufficient of ourselves, to think one right thought. And now if they rebel against such light and motions, violently opposing their sensual imaginations and desires, to their light, and the secret promptings of God's Holy Spirit; they hereby vex his Spirit, provoke him to leave them, and do forfeit even those assistances they have had, and might further have expected,
upon the Redeemer's account. All which seems to be summed up, as a stated rule, in that of our Saviour,—"To him that hath, shall be given; but from him that hath not" (where having manifestly includes use and improvement) "shall be taken away that which he had." Which latter words must be taken not for a prediction, expressive of the certain event, or what shall be; but a commination, expressing what is deserved, or most justly may be. The true meaning or design of a commination, being, that it may never be executed. And to the same sense is that of Prov. 1. 23, 24, &c. "Turn at my reproof—I will pour out my Spirit unto you, I will make known my words unto you: but I called, and they refused; I stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; therefore they shall eat the fruit of their own way," &c. vi. 31.

So far then we are not without a stated rule, as to those previous and superable operations of the Spirit of God; according whereto we may expect them to be continued and increased, or fear they shall be withheld. But now, because all do more or less resist, and thereby deserve they should cease, or commit a forfeiture of them; and sometimes this forfeiture is taken, sometimes it is not; but the grieved Spirit returns, and re-enforces his holy motions, even unto victory, where, or when he shall do so, we have no certain published rule, whereby to conclude this way, or that. The Son of God (by consent with the Father) here acts as a Plenipotentiary, and Sovereign, quickening whom he will. The Spirit (by consent with him) breathes, in order to the vital production of temples, as the wind—where it listeth; or for regeneration, which is the thing there discourse of in all that context, and even in the next following words, which apply that similitude; "so is every one that is born of the Spirit," John 3. 8. And we are therefore, elsewhere, warned to "work out our salvation with fear and trembling," (Phil. 2. 12, 13,) because God worketh in us, to will, and do, of his own good pleasure; being under no tie, not quite to desist, and forsake us, at the next opposition he meets with. At least, they that are not within the compass of his covenant (once sincerely entered) can lay no claim, in such a case, to his continuance, or return.
CHAP. XI.

I. The sixth head proposed before, chap. ix. p. 416, now insisted on; which includes what was also mentioned in the first, namely, that the Holy Spirit is given, not only as the Builder, but also, Secondly, As an Inhabitant of this temple; for which latter purpose he is given by Immanuel as a Trustee; the Oeconomus, or chief Steward, of God's household, by a certain, known rule, giving them who partake therein, the ground of a rightful claim unto this great and most comprehensive gift. Whereupon we are to consider—The dueness and the amplitude or comprehensiveness of this gift. 1. The dueness of it. 1. By promise. 2. By this promise, its having the form of a covenant restipulated on their part. 3. From their state of sonship, as regenerate: as adopted. 4. From their being to receive it by faith.

e. Its ample extent, (1.) Measured by the covenant, considered partly in actu signato—in agreement, partly in actu exercito—in execution. This infers, [1.] Reconciliation. [2.] Relationship. (2.) The summary of the covenant refers to it. (3.) It is considered what there is promised in the gospel covenant, besides what may be comprehended in the gift of the Spirit. II. The subject resumed from chap. ix. p. 416: and having shewn, as even as there proposed, that the Spirit is not otherwise given than by Immanuel; it is considered, as was also promised, How highly reasonable it was that the Spirit should not be vouchsafed upon any other terms. III. The subject briefly considered in reference to the external state of the whole Christian church. IV. Conclusion.

I. THE sixth head proposed before, chap. ix. p. 416, now insisted on, which includes also what was mentioned in the first head, namely, that the Holy Spirit is given not only as the Builder, but also,

Secondly, As an Inhabitant of this temple. For which purpose, when by regeneration it is thus built and prepared, the Redeemer gives the Spirit upon other terms, namely, according to the tenor of a certain rule declared and published to the world: and whereby a right thereto accrues unto these regenerate ones. The unregenerate world; especially such as by frequent resistances had often forfeited all gracious communications of that blessed Spirit, have nothing to assure them he will ever regenerate them. But, being now regenerate, and thereby formed into living temples, they may, upon known and certain terms, expect him to inhabit them as such; and
to be statelyly their Emmanuel, and that as God, even their own God, (Ps. 67.) he will bless them, and abide with them, and in them, for that gracious purpose. Why else hath he conquered all their reluctancy, and made them his temples? It was against their (former) will, but according to his own. He at first herein, by rough hewings might displease them, but he pleased himself, and fulfilled, hereby, "the good pleasure of his own goodness," 2 Thess. 1. 11. Nor will now leave his people, because it pleased him to make them his people, 1 Sam. 12. 22. Neither is he now the less pleased that he is under bonds, for he put himself under them, most freely, and his "gifts and callings are without repentance," Rom. 11. 29. But being under bonds, he now puts on a distinct capacity, and treats these his regenerate ones under a different notion, from that under which he acted towards other men, or themselves before: not as an absolute, unobliged Sovereign; that might do, or not do for them as he would: but as a trustee, managing a trust committed to him by the Eternal Father; as the Oeconomus, the great Steward of his family; the prime Minister, and Curator of all the affairs of his house and temple, which they are, (1 Cor. 3. 17.)* all and every one: for as vast as this temple is, where it is made up of all; and as manifold as it is, when every one is to him a single temple; neither is above the comprehension, nor beneath the condensation of his large and humble mind. Neither larger diffusion, nor more particular distribution, signifying him to be greater or less, in all, in every one.

He so takes care of all, as of every one, and of every one, as if he were the only one under his care. He is the first-born among many brethren; and as that imports dignity, so it doth employment; it being his part as such to provide for the good state of the family; which is all named from him, both that part in heaven, and that on earth, Eph. 3. 15. Yea, and he may in a true sense be styled the Paterfamilias, the Father of the family: though to the first in Godhead, he is the Son; to us he is styled the everlasting Father,

* Hujus enim Templum simul omnes; & singuli, Tempia sumus—For we altogether form this temple, and each is also a temple. Omnia Concordiam, & singulas inhabitantes dignatur, non in omnibus, quam in singulis major. Quamiam nec mole distendimus, nec partitione minimitur, Aug. de Civ. Dei Lib. 10, Cap. 4.—He designs to inhabit the whole society, and every one of those who compose it; nor is He greater in the body than in the members, since he is not enlarged in the mass nor diminished by the division.
Is. 9. 6. Therefore he is under obligation hereto, by his Father's appointment, and his own undertaking.

And that which he hath obliged himself to, is to give the Holy Spirit, or take continual care that it be communicated from time to time, as particular exigencies and occasions shall require. It was a thing full of wonder, that ever he should be so far concerned in our affairs! But being concerned so deeply as we know he hath been; to be incarnate for us; to be made a sacrifice to God for us, that he might have it in his power to give the Spirit, having become a curse for us, that he might be capable of conferring upon us this blessing; it is now no wonder he should oblige himself to a continual constant care that his own great and kind design should now not be lost or miscarry. After he had engaged himself so deeply in this design for his redeemed, could he decline further obligation?

And his obligation creates their right, entitles them to this mighty gift of his own Spirit! Concerning which we shall consider—the duceness and the greatness, or amplitude of this Gift: or shew, that, as their case is now stated, upon their regeneration, they have a pleasurable right to this high privilege, the continued communication of the Spirit. And next shew, of how large extent this privilege is, and how great things are contained in it. I scruple not to call it a Gift, and yet at the same time to assert their right to it, to whom it is given; not doubting but every one will see, that a right accruing by free-promise (as we shall shew this doth) detracts nothing from the freeness of the gift. When the promise only, with what we shall see is directly consequent, produces or creates this right, it is unconceivable that this creature, by resulting naturally, should injure its own parent or productive cause.

We shall therefore say somewhat briefly.

1. Of the duceness of this continued indwelling presence of the blessed Spirit to the regenerate: (intending to speak more largely of the amplitude and extensiveness of it, on the account afterwards to be given.) And

(1.) It is due (as hath been intimated) by promise. It is expressly said to be the promise of the Spirit, Gal. 3. 14. But to whom? To the regenerate, to them who are born after the Spirit, as may be seen at large, ch. 4. These (as it after follows) are the children and heirs of the promise, which must principally mean this promise, as it is eminently called, Acts 2. 38. "Repent," (which connotes regeneration,) "and ye shall receive the Holy Ghost; for the promise is to you, &c. and to as many as the Lord shall call:" which calling, when
effectual, includes regeneration. When (Eph. 1. 13.) this blessed Spirit is called the Spirit of promise, what can that mean but the promised Spirit.

(2.) Their right is the more evident; and what is promised the more apparently due, in that the promise hath received the form of a covenant, whereby the covenancers have a more strongly pleadable right and claim; to which the rest of men have no such pretence.

It is true that we must distinguish of the covenant,—as proposed, and entered.

The proposal of it is in very general terms, "Ho, every one that thirsts"—Isa. 55. 1. "Incline your ear—and I will make an everlasting covenant with you—" v. 3. And so it gives a remote, future right to such as shall enter into it. But only they have a present actual right to what it contains, that have entered into it: and their plea is strong, having this to say; "I have not only an indefinite, or less determinate promise to rely upon; but a promise upon terms expressed, which I have agreed to; and there is now a mutual stipulation between God and me: He offered himself, and demanded me; I have accepted him, and given myself. And hereupon I humbly expect and claim all further needful communications of his Spirit, as the principal promised blessing of this covenant." Such a one may therefore say, as the psalmist hath taught him, Remember thy word to thy servant, in which thou hast caused me to hop", Ps. 119. 49. I had never looked for such quickening influences, if thou hadst not caused me, and been the Author to me of such an expectation. Now thou hast quickened me by thy word, v. 50. so quickening me according to thy word. "I will put my Spirit within you," is a principal article of this covenant, Ezek. 36. 27. And this expression of putting the Spirit within, must signify not a light touch upon the soul of a man, but to settle it as in the innermost centre of the soul, in order to a fixed abode.

And how sacred is the bond of this covenant! it is founded in the blood of the Mediator of it. This is, as he himself speaks, the new testament (or covenant) in my blood, Luke 22. 20. Therefore is this, in a varied phrase, said to be the "blood of the covenant:" and therefore is this covenant said to be everlasting, Heb. 13. 20. referring to a known maxim among the Hebrews, Pacts, confirmed by blood, (sanguine sancta,) can never be abolished. "The God of peace—by the blood of the everlasting covenant, make you perfect in every good work:" which must imply a continual communication of the Spirit;
for it is also added, to do always what is well-pleasing in his
sight; which, who can do without such continual aids? "Com-
ing to Jesus the mediator of the new covenant, we come to the
blood of sprinkling," Heb. 12. 24. He could not mediate
for us upon other terms; and upon those, obtains for us the
better promises, "spiritual blessings in heavenly things,"
Eph. 1. 3.

And further, this covenant is ratified by his oath who form-
ed and made it. "My covenant will I not break—Once have I
sworn," Ps. 89. 34, 35. By these two immutable things, (even
to our apprehension,) it is impossible for God to lie, Heb. 6. 17,
18. Regeneration is the building of this temple; covenanting
on our part contains the dedication of it; and what then can
follow but constant possession and use.

(3.) The regenerate, as such, are sons, both by receiving a
new nature, even a divine, 2 Pet. 1. 4. in their regeneration;
and a new title, in (what is always conjunct) their adoption.
Now, hereupon the continual supplies of the Spirit in this
house (or temple) of his are the children's bread, Luke 11. 12.
Because they are sons, therefore God sends the Spirit of his
Son into their hearts, Gal. 4. 6. and he is styled the Spirit of
adoption, Rom. 8. 14, 15. Therefore they have a right to the
provisions of their Father's house.

(4.) The Spirit is unto these children of God given upon
their faith; which must certainly suppose their previous title
for the ground of it. They receive "the promise of the Spirit
by faith," (Gal. 3. 14.) as by faith they are God's children,
26. Receiving the Son, who was eminently so, and to
whom the sonship did primarily or originally belong; and be-
lieving in his name, they thereupon have &s;—power or
right to become the sons of God, John 1. 12. being herein,
also regenerate, born not of flesh and blood.—but of God.
And thus, by faith receiving him; by faith they retain him,
or have him abiding in them, as he abides in them: for the
union is intimate and mutual, John 15. 5. They first receive
him upon the gospel offer, which, as was said, gave them a re-
mote right, and now retain him, as having an actual right.
He dwells in the heart by faith, Eph. 3. 17. But what he
doeth, in this respect, his Spirit doeth: so he explains himself:
for when, in those valedictory chapters of St. John's gospel, 14,
15, 16. he promises his disconsolate disciples, he would come
to them, he would see them, he would manifest himself to them,
he would abide with them, within a little while they should see
him, &c. he intimates to them, that he principally meant all
this of a presence to be vouchsafed them by his Spirit, ch. 14. 
16–19. And he concerns the Father also with himself in 
the same sort of commerce; (v. 20.) "At that day ye shall 
know that I am in my Father, and you in me, and I in you;" 
as also v. 21, and 23. Thus in another place, we find the Spirit 
promiscuously spoken of as the Spirit of God, and the Spirit 
of Christ; and the inbeing, or indwelling of Christ, and of the 
Spirit, used as expressions signifying the same thing; when 
also the operation of God is spoken of by the same indwelling 
Spirit, Rom. 8. 9–11. Which an eminent father observing, 
takes occasion to speak of the joint presence of the several 
persons of the trinity, with such, with whom any one is present, 
because each bears itself inseparably towards the other, and is 
united most intimately therewith, * wheresoever one hypostasis 
(or person, as by the Latins we are taught to speak) is present 
there, the whole trinity is present—Amazing thing! that the 
glorious Subsistents in the eternal Godhead, should so con- 
centre in kind design, influence and operation towards a de-
spicable impure worm!

But this conjunction infers no confusion; breaks not the 
order, wherein each severally acts towards one end. But that, 
notwithstanding, we may conceive from whom, through whom, 
and by whom, what was lately a ruinous heap is become an an-
imated temple, inhabited by the divine presence, wherein we 
ought not to forget, how eminent and conspicuous the part is 
of our Lord Christ, and upon how costly terms he obtained, 
that the blessed Spirit should so stately, and upon a right 
claimable by faith, employ his mighty agency in this most 
gracious and wonderful undertaking! being (as hath been ob-
served) made a curse for us, that we might receive the promise 
of the Spirit by faith, Gal. 3. 12, 14. Whence also it is said that 
after our believing we are sealed with the Spirit of promise; 
(Eph. 1. 13.) that is, by that seal, by which God knows, or 
owns, or acknowledges, them that are his, (2 Tim. 2. 19.) 
though they may not always know it themselves. Hereupon 
also our Lord hath assured us: from them that believe in him, 
shall flow (as out of the belly of a conduit) rivers of living 
waters, which it is said he spoke of the Spirit, which they that 
believed should receive, John 7. 38, 39.

Much more might be alleged from many texts of the old and 
new testament to evince the right which believers, or they who

* ὅπως καὶ μιὰς τῶν τριῶν ἑγέρθη παρὰ πάσηι η ὑπόστασις. Chrys. 
in Epist. ad Roman.
are God's more peculiar people, have to the abiding indwell-
ing presence of his Spirit, as the inhabitant of that temple which they are now become. But that matter being plain, we shall proceed to what was next proposed; to shew:

2. The ample extent and comprehensiveness of this privi-
lege, which I shall the rather enlarge upon, that from thence we may have the clearer ground upon which afterwards to ar-
gue;—how highly reasonable and congruous it was, that so
great a thing, and of so manifest importance to God's having a temple and residence among men should not be otherwise communicated than in and by Immanuel; the Founder and
Restorer of this temple.

(1.) And we cannot have a truer, or surer measure, of the amplitude and extensiveness of this gift, than the extent and comprehensiveness of the covenant itself, to which it belongs. To which purpose, let it be considered that this covenant of God in Christ, of which we are now speaking, may be looked upon two ways; that is,

We may view it abstractly, taking the frame and model of it, as is were in actu signato—in agreement, to be collected and gathered out of the holy Scriptures. Or we way look upon it as in actu exercito, namely, as it is now transacted and entered into by the blessed God, and this or that awakened, considering, predisposed soul. Now here,

Take it the former way, and you find this article, con-
cerning the gift or communication of the Holy Ghost; stand-
ing there as one great grant contained in the gospel covenant. And it is obvious to observe, as it is placed there, what aspect it hath upon both the parts of the covenant, I will be your God—you shall be my People. Which will be seen, if

You consider this covenant as actually entered into, or as the covenanting parties are treating; the one, to draw the other to enter this covenant. And so we shall see that our con-
sent, both that God shall be our God, and that we will be of his people, with all previous inclinations thereto, and what immediately results from our covenanting, do all depend upon this communication of the Spirit; and otherwise, neither can he do the part of a God to us, nor we, the part that belongs to his people towards him. By all which we shall see the vast extent of the gift. It is the Mediator's part to bring the cov-
enanting parties together. He is therefore said to be the Mediator of the new covenant, Heb. 12. 24. He rendered it possible, by the merit of his blood, that the offended Majesty of heaven might, without injury to himself, consent; and that
the Spirit might be given to procure our consent, which, as Mediator or Immanuel, he gives: and when he gives it in so copious an effusion, as to be victorious, to conquer our aversion, and make us cease to be rebellious, then he enters to dwell, Ps. 68. 18. Till then, there is no actual covenanted; no plenary consent on our part to what is proposed in the covenant, in either respect: we neither agree that God shall be our God, nor that we will be of his people. This speaks this gift a great thing and of vast extent, looking for the present upon the two parts of the covenant summarily: and afterwards considering what each part more particularly contains in it. But if in practice, it be so far done as is requisite to a judicious and preponderating determination of will, (which may yet afterwards admit of higher degrees,) how great a thing is now done! Their state is distinguished from theirs who are strangers to the covenant, who are without Christ, and without God in the world. From hence results,

[1.] An express reconciliation between God and thee: for this is a league of friendship, enmity ceasing.

[2.] A fixed special relation: (Ezek. 16. 8.) "I entered into covenant with thee, saith the Lord God, and thou becamest mine." How great and high a privilege! Relations are said to be of minute entity, but great elicacy: and it is observable what the philosopher (as he was wont to be called) says of them, (Ar. το ζητε στ. ) that their whole being, namely, of the things related, is related to another. Admireable! all the divine Being related to me a worm! And that all this may be the plainer, let us,

(2.) But consider more distinctly: what the great summary of God's part of this covenant contains: what is the most principal promise of it; the dependance of our part thereon; upon what terms that which is distinct is promised; how far what is distinctly promised, is coincident with this gift of the indwelling Spirit, both in respect of this present and the future eternal state.

[1.] The known and usual summary of this covenant, on God's part, is, "I will be their God;" as it is set down in many places of both testaments. Now, what can be meant, more principally, by his being their God, than giving them his indwelling Spirit? Wherein without it can he do the part of a God to them? By it he both governs and satisfies them: is both their supreme and sovereign Lord, in the one regard, and their supreme and sovereign good, in the other. Both being their God intend no more than an empty title? or, what
would be their so great advantage, in having only a nominal God? Yea, and he is pleased himself to expound it of his continued gracious presence, (2 Cor. 6. 16.) "I will dwell in them, and walk in them, and I will be their God;" alluding to his continuing his tabernacle among them, as is promised, Lev. 26. 11, 12. "I will set my tabernacle among you, and my soul shall not abhor you; and I will walk among you, and I will be your God," &c. And what did that tabernacle signify but this living temple, whereof we speak, as a certain type and shadow of it? Agreeably whereof his covenant is expressed, with evident reference to the days of the gospel, and the time of the Messiah's kingdom, (plainly meant by David's being their king and prince for ever,) Ezek. 37. 24—27. "David, my servant, shall be king over them," (spoken many an age after he was dead and gone,)—"and their prince for ever. Moreover, I will make a covenant of peace with them, it shall be an everlasting covenant with them, and will set my sanctuary in the midst of them for evermore. My tabernacle also shall be with them; yea, I will be their God." That Yea, the exegetical note, is observable, "my sanctuary and tabernacle shall be with them," (that is, "I will dwell in them," as it is expounded before, 2 Cor. 6. 16. And could it be meant of an uninhabited, desolate sanctuary or tabernacle, that should be with them for evermore?) And why is this his constant inhabiting presence to be with them? The emphatical yea, with what follows, informs us, Yea, I will be their God: as if he should say, I have undertaken to be their God, which I cannot make good unto them, if I afford them not my indwelling presence. To be to them a distant God, a God afar off, can neither answer my covenant, nor the exigency of their case. They will but have a God, and no God, if they have not with them, and in them, a divine, vital, inspiring, inactuating presence, to govern, quicken, support, and satisfy them, and fill them with an all-sufficient fulness. They would soon, otherwise, be an habitation for Zimm and Oehim, or be the temple but of idol gods.

It is therefore evident that this summary of God's part of his covenant, I will be their God, very principally intends his dwelling in them by his Spirit.

And the restituation, on their part, to be his people, (which is generally added in all the places, wherein the other part is expressed,) signifies their faith, by which they take hold of his covenant, accept him to be their God, dedicate themselves to be his people, his peculiar, his mansion, his
temple, wherein he may dwell. Now this their self-resigning faith, taken in its just latitude, carries with it a twofold reference to Him, as their Sovereign Lord, as their Sovereign Good; whom, above all other, they are to obey and enjoy. But can they obey him, if he do not put his Spirit into them, to write his law in their hearts, and "cause them to walk in his statutes?" Ezek. 36. 27. Jer. 31. 33. Or can they enjoy him, if they love him not as their best good? which love is the known fruit of his Spirit. Whereupon, after such self-resignation and dedication, what remains, but that "the house of the Lord be filled with the glory of the Lord?" as 2 Chr. 7. 2.

[2.] Let us consider what is the express, more peculiar kind of the promises of this covenant, in the Christian contradistinct to the Mosaical administration of it. It is evident, in the general, that the promises of the gospel covenant are in their nature and kind, compared with those that belonged to the Mosaical dispensation, more spiritual; therefore called better promises, Heb. 8. 6. They are not promises of secular felicity, of external prosperity, peace, and plenty, as those other most expressly were. It is true indeed that the covenant with Israel, with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and their seed, was not exclusive of spiritual good things. For the communication of the Spirit was (as hath been noted) the blessing of Abraham, (Gal. 3. 14.) and that, as he was the father of that people, the head of a community, now to be much more extended, and take in the Gentiles, the time being come, when all nations were to be blessed in him, which is said to be the gospel that was preached to Abraham, Gal. 3. 8. But in the mean time, the Spirit was given less generally, and in a much lower measure; wherefore, in that purposed comparison, 2 Cor. 3. between the legal and the evangelical dispensation; though a certain glory did attend the former, yet that glory is said to be no glory, in respect of the so much excelling glory of this latter, v. 10. And the thing wherein it so highly excelled, was the much more copious effusion of the Spirit. That whereas, under the former dispensation, Moses was read for many ages, with little efficacy, a vail being upon the people's hearts, signified by the (mystical) vail wherewith, when he conversed with them, he was wont to cover his face; that comparative inefficacy proceeding from hence, that little of the light, life, and power of the Spirit accompanied that dispensation: now, under the gospel dispensation, the glory of the Lord was to be beheld as in a glass, with unvailed face, so as that, beholding
it, we might be changed (so great an efficacy and power went with it) into the same likeness, from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord; which is the scope of the latter part of that chapter, from v. 10 to 18.* How great were the splendour and magnificence of Solomon's temple, yet how much more glorious is that which is built of living stones! And as the whole frame of that former economy was always less spiritual, a lower measure of the Spirit always accompanying it; so when it stood in competition, as corrival to the Christian dispensation, being hereupon quite deserted by the Spirit, it is spoken of as weak, worldly, carnal, and beggarly, Gal. 4. 9. Col. 2. 20. Heb. 9. 2, 10. Therefore the apostle expostulates with the Galatian Christians, verging towards Judaism; "Received ye the Spirit by the works of the law, or by the hearing of faith? Are ye so foolish, having begun in the Spirit, are you now made perfect by the flesh?" Gal. 3. 2, 3, and ch. 4. from v. 22 to 31. Speaking of the two covenants, under allegorical representation, he makes the former, given upon Mount Sinai, to be signified by Agar the bond-woman, and by the terrestrial Jerusalem, which was then in bondage, with her children, as productive but of a servile race, born after the flesh only, as Ishmael was, destitute of the Divine Spirit; (which where it is, there is liberty, 2 Cor. 3. 17.) the other by Sarah, a free-woman, and by the celestial Jerusalem, which is free, with her children, all born from above, of the Divine Spirit; (John 3. 3, 5. as εἰς τὸν θεόν there signifies;) which spiritual seed, signified by Isaac, are said at once to be born after the Spirit, and by promise, v. 23, 28, 29. And this can import no less than, that the ancient promise, (given long before the law, upon Mount Sinai, namely, four hundred and thirty years, Gal. 3. 17. and expressly called the covenant of God, in Christ; most eminently to be made good in the days of the gospel, after the cessation of the Mosaical institution, as it was made before it,) must principally mean the promise of the Spirit. Which is most plain from that of the apostle Peter to his convinced, heart-wounded hearers, Acts 2. 38, 39: "Repent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost; for the promise is unto you, and

* Domus Dei ædificatur per Testamentum Novum lapidibus vivis longe gloriosior quam Templum illud quod à Rege Solomone constructum est, &c.—The house of God is built by the New Testament with living stones, and is far more glorious than the temple which was erected by king Solomon. Aug. de Civ. Dei. L. 18. C. 45.
your children, and to all that are afar off,” (this promise not being to be confined to them and their children, but to reach the Gentiles also, as Gal. 3. 14.) “even as many as the Lord our God shall call.” And surely that which is, by way of excellency, called the promise, must be the more principal promise of this covenant; which it is also signified to be, in that account given of it by the prophets, Isa. 44. 3. and 59. 20, 21. Jer. 31. 33. quoted Heb. 8. 10. (where though the Spirit be not expressly named, yet those effects of it are, which manifestly suppose it,) and Ezek. 36. 25, 27. Joel 2. 28. This new covenant is distinguished from the former, by the more certain, more general, and more efficacious communication of the Spirit promised in it, as is plainly implied, Jer. 31. and (which refers thereto) Heb. 8. 9—11.

[3.] It will further tend to evidence, that the Spirit is given as a settled Inhabitant, upon the known terms of this covenant; if we consider upon what terms it is promised, what is distinct but however most conjunctly promised therewith, namely, all the relative graces of justification, pardon of sin, and adoption. These are promised, as is apparent, in the same covenant, and upon faith, which is our taking hold of and entering into the covenant, our accepting God in Christ to be our God, and giving up ourselves to be his people; and is (according to that latitude, wherein faith is commonly taken) inclusive of repentance. For a sinner, one before in a state of apostasy from God, cannot take him to be his God, but in so doing he must exercise repentance towards God. His very act of taking him, in Christ, is turning to him through Christ, from the sin by which he had departed and apostatized from him before. Therefore must the indwelling Spirit be given, upon the same certain and known terms as is also expressed in (the before-mentioned) Gal. 3. 14. Eph. 1. 13, &c. Acts 2. 38, 39.

[4.] Now faith and repentance being first given in forming God’s temple, consider, how coincident the gift of the Spirit, as an Inhabitant, is with remission of sin, or with whatsoever relative grace as such, is distinct from that which is inherent, subjected in the soul itself, and really transmutative of its subject. But we are to consider withal, how manifestly the latter of these is involved in the former. Giving the Spirit (the root and original of subjective grace) implies two things: first, conferring a right to it; and secondly, actual communication. The former belongs to relative grace, the latter to real; (as they commonly distinguish;) but the former is in order to the latter, and the latter most certainly follows upon
THE LIVING TEMPLE. PART II.

the former. Both are signified by one name of giving; and do both, in a sort, make one entire legal act, (though there are distinct physical ones,) which the former (usually) begins, and the latter consummates. Divers things are not herein given, but only a title to, and the possession of the same thing: nor by divers donations; but by the concurrence of such things as are requisite to make up one and the same. And let it now be considered,

(3.) What there is promised in the gospel-covenant, besides what may be comprehended in the gift of the Spirit. We will first set aside what is manifestly not promised in it besides; and then, more closely inquire about what may seem distinctly promised, and see in how great part that residue will be reducible hither.

[1.] As to what is manifestly not promised besides; it is plain, there is not promised in it a part and portion in a particular land or country on earth, as there was in the old covenant (contra-distinguished to this new one) to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and their seed, which land was, we know, called the "land of promise;" and unto which the body of that people had so certain a title, upon the condition of their continued obedience, that they were sure never to be removed out of it; or if they had made a general defection, and were thereupon forsaken of God, and given up to invading enemies, that should dispossess them, they were as sure, upon their general repentance, to be restored, and settled there again, as may be seen in Solomon's prayer, at the dedication of the temple, and God's most gracious and particular answer thereto, and in divers places of the Old Testament besides.

If particular persons brake this covenant, by grosser transgressions, they were to be cut off from this good land, and, by Moses's law, at the mouth of two or three witnesses, to die without mercy; and so, by such execution of justice, the body of the people was kept safe from divine displeasure; the land was not defiled, so as to spew out its inhabitants.

But if the people did generally revolt, so as that the ordinary methods of punitive justice could have no place, God took the matter into his own hands, and did justice upon them himself, by casting them out. This is the covenant which, it is said, they brake, Jer. 31. 32. and Heb. 8. The new gospel covenant is apparently of no such import, or hath no such addition to the spiritual blessings of it.

Nor again doth it promise more indefinitely, temporal blessings of any kind, with certainty, upon any condition whatso-
ever, even of the highest faith, the most fervent love to God, or the most accurate obedience, and irreprehensible sanctity, attainable on earth; as if the best and holiest men should therefore be any whit the more assured of constant health, ease, opulence, or peace in this world. We know the ordinary course of providence (which cannot justly be understood to be a misinterpreter of God's covenant) runs much otherwise; and that such things as concern the good estate of our spirits, and inward man, are the only things we can, upon any terms, be sure of, by this covenant; the tenor of it not warranting us to look upon external good things, as otherwise promised, than so far as they may be subservient to these, and to our better serving the interest and honour of God and the Redeemer; of which things he reserves the judgment to himself; And unto Him, by this covenant, we absolutely devote ourselves to serve and glorify him in his own way, and in whatsoever external circumstances his wisdom and good pleasure shall order for us; being ourselves only assured of this in the general, That all things shall work together for good to us, if we love him, &c. but still esteeming if our highest good (as we cannot but do, if we love him as we ought) to be most serviceable to his glory, and conformable, in our habitual temper, to his will. Spiritual good things then, are by the tenor of this covenant our only certainties. Other things indeed cannot be the matter of absolute universal promise. Their nature refuses it and makes them uncapable. They are but of a mutable goodness; may be sometimes, in reference to our great end, good for us: and sometimes, or in some circumstances, evil and prejudicial. And being in a possibility to become evil in that relative sense, (as what hinders a greater good, is then an evil,) if they ever be actually so; they are then no longer matter of a promise. The promise would in that case cease to be a promise; for can there be a promise of an evil? It would then necessarily degenerate, and turn into a threatening.

But it may be said of those good things that are of a higher kind and nature, that respect our souls and our states godward, there seem to be some vastly different from this of giving the Spirit. Therefore,

[2.] We are next to inquire what they are, and how far they may be found to fall into this.

Remission of sin is most obvious, and comes first in view, upon this account. And let us bethink ourselves what it is. We will take it for granted, that it is not a mere concealed will or purpose to pardon, on the one hand, (for no one in com-
mon speech takes it so; a purpose to do a thing signifies it not yet to be done;) nor mere not punishing, on the other. If one should be never so long only forborne, and not punished, he may yet be still punishable, and will be always so, if he be yet guilty. It is therefore such an act as doth, in law, take away guilt, namely, the reatum pœnae, or dissolve the obligation to suffer punishment.

It is therefore to be considered, what punishment a sinner was, by the violated law of works and nature, liable to in this world, or in the world to come; and then what of this, is, by virtue of the Redeemer's sacrifice and covenant, remitted. He was liable to whatsoever miseries in this life God should please to inflict; to temporal death, and to a state of misery hereafter, all comprehended in this threatening, "Thou shalt die the death;" if we will take following scriptures and providences for a commentary upon it.

Now the miseries to which the sinner was liable in this world, were either external, or internal. Those of the former sort, the best men still remain liable to. Those of the inner man were certainly the greater, both in themselves, and in their tendency and consequence; especially such as stand in the ill dispositions of men's minds and spirits godward, unapprehensiveness of him, alienation from him, willingness to be as without him in the world. For that the spirits of men should be thus disaffected, and in this averse posture towards God, in whom only it could be possible for them to be happy, how could it but be most pernicious to them, and virtually comprehensive of the worst miseries? And whence came these evils to fall into the reasonable, intelligent mind and spirit of man? Was it by God's infusion? Abhorr'd be that black thought! Nor could it be, if they were not forsaken of God, and the holy light and influence of his Spirit were not withheld. But is more evil inflicted upon men than either the threatening or the sentence of the law contained? That were to say, he is punished above legal desert, and beyond what it duly belonged to him to suffer. Experience shews this to be the common case of men. And did that threatening and sentence concern Adam only, and not his posterity? How then come they to be mortal, and otherwise externally miserable in this world, as well as he? But how plainly is the matter put out of doubt, that the suspension of the Spirit is part (and it cannot but be the most eminent part) of the curse of the law, by that of the apostle, "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us, that this blessing—might come upon
us," (even the Gentiles, as well as Abraham's seed,) "that we might receive the promise of the Spirit," Gal. 3. 13, 14.

But now what is there of all the misery duly incumbent upon man in this world, by the constitution of that law of works and nature, remitted and taken off by virtue of the covenant or law of grace or faith, from them that have taken hold of it, or entered into it? Who dare say, God doth not keep covenant with them? And we find they die as well as other men; and are as much subject to the many inconveniences and grievances of human life. And it is not worth the while to talk of the mere notion, under which they suffer them. It is evident that God doth them no wrong, in letting these be their lot; and therefore that as they were, by the law of nature deserved; so God hath not obliged himself, by the covenant or law of grace, to take or keep them off; for then surely he had kept his word. That he hath obliged himself to do that which is more, and a greater thing, to bless and sanctify them to their advantage and gain, in higher respects, is plain and out of question. Which serves our present purpose and crosses it not.

For upon the whole, that which remains the actual matter of remission, in this world, is whatsoever of those spiritual evils would be necessarily consequent upon the total restraint, and withholding of the Spirit.

And that this is the remission of sin in this life, which the Scripture intends, is plain from divers express places, Acts 2. 37, 38. When the apostle Peter's heart-pierced hearers cry out, in their distress, "What shall we do?" he directs them thus: "Repent, and be baptized, every one of you, for the remission of sins, and ye shall (he adds) receive the Holy Ghost; for the promise is to you, and your children;" as though he had said, "The great promise of the gospel-covenant, is that of the gift of the Holy Ghost. It doth not promise you worldly wealth or ease or riches or honours: but it promises you that God will be no longer a stranger to you, refuse your converse, withhold his Spirit from you; your souls shall lie no longer waste and desolate. But as he hath mercifully approached your spirits, to make them habitable, and fit to receive so great and so holy an intimate, and to your reception whereof, nothing but unremitted sin could be any obstruction; as, upon your closing with the terms of the gospel-covenant, by a sincere believing intuition towards him whom you have pierced, and resolving to become Christians, whereof your being baptized, and therein taking on Christ's badge
and cognizance, will be the fit and enjoined sign and token, and by which federal rite, remission of sin shall be openly confirmed, and solemnly sealed unto you; so by that remission of sin the bar is removed, and nothing can hinder the Holy Ghost from entering to take possession of your souls as his own temple and dwelling-place."

We are by the way to take notice, that this fulfilling of the terms of the gospel-covenant is aptly enough, in great part, here expressed by the word repentance; most commonly it is by that of faith. It might as fitly be signified by the former in this place, if you consider the tenor of the foregoing discourse, namely, that it remonstrated to them their great wickedness in crucifying Christ as a malefactor and impostor, whom they ought to have believed in as a Saviour; now to repent of this, was to believe, which yet is more fully expressed by that which follows, and be baptized in (or rather into) the name of the Lord Jesus Christ.

It is in the whole plain, that their reception of the Holy Ghost, as a Dweller, stands in close connexion, as an immediate consequent, with their having their sins actually remitted, and that, with their repenting their former refusing of Christ, as the Messiah, their now becoming Christians, or taking on Christ's name, whereof their being baptized was to be only the sign, and the solemnization of their entrance into the Christian state, and by consequence, a visible confirmation of remission of sin to them. They are therefore directed to be baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, ἐν τῷ ὄνομα τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, or unto a covenant-surrender of themselves to Christ, whereof their baptism was, it is true, to be the signifying token for the remission of sins, which remission, therefore, must be understood, connected, not with the sign but with the thing which it signified. And it was only a more explicit repentance of their former infidelity, and a more explicit faith, which the apostle now exhorts them to, the inchoation whereof he might already perceive, by their concerned question, "What shall we do?" intimating their willingness to do any thing that they ought; that their hearts were already overcome and won; and that the Holy Ghost had consequently begun to enter upon them: the manifestation of whose entrance is elsewhere, as to persons adult, found to be an antecedent requisite to baptism, and made the argument why it should not be withheld, as Acts 10. 47. "Can any man forbid that these should not be baptized, who have received the Holy Ghost, as well as we?"
Remission of sin therefore, as it signifies giving a right to future impunity, signifies giving a right to the participation of the Spirit; the withholding whereof was the principal punishment to be taken off. And as it signifies the actual taking off of that punishment, it must connote the actual communication of the Spirit. Therefore, upon that faith which is our entrance into the gospel-covenant, the curse which withheld the Spirit is removed, and so we receive the promise of the Spirit (or the promised Spirit) by faith, as is plain in that before mentioned, Gal. 3. 13, 14.

The same reference of giving (or continuing) the Spirit unto forgiveness of sin, we may observe in that of the Psalmist: "Hide thy face from my sins, and blot out all mine iniquities. Create in me a clean heart, and renew a right Spirit within me. Cast me not away from thy presence, and take not thy Holy Spirit from me;" (Psa. 51. 9—11.) which it is plain was dreaded and deprecated as the worst of evils; but which would be kept off, if iniquity were blotted out. And as to this, there was no more difference in the case, than between one whose state was to be renewed, and one with whom God was first to begin. And that summary of spiritual blessings promised in the new covenant, Jer. 31. 31, 32, &c. and Heb. S. which all suppose the promised gift of the Spirit itself, as the root of them all—"I will put my law in their inward parts, and will write it in their hearts," &c. is all grounded upon this: "For I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more." When therefore the punishment of sin is remitted, quoad jus, or a right is granted to impunity, the Spirit is, d. iuris, given; or a right is conferred unto this sacred gift. When actually (upon that right granted) the punishment is taken off; the Spirit is actually given; the withholding whereof was the principal punishment we were liable to, in this present state.

And as to justification, the case cannot differ, which itself so little differs from pardon, that the same act is pardon, being done by God as a sovereign Ruler acting above law, namely, the law of works; and justification, being done by him as sustaining the person of a judge according to law, namely, the law of grace.

Adoption also imports the privilege conferred of being the sons of God. And what is that privilege? (for it is more than a name) that such are led by the Spirit of God; (Rom. 8. 14.) which Spirit is therefore, as the peculiar cognizance of their vol. 1. SM
State, called the Spirit of adoption, (v. 15.) and forms their's suitably thereto: for it was not fit the sons of God should have the spirits of slaves. It is not the spirit of bondage that is given them, as there it is expressed, but a free generous spirit; not of fear, as there, and 2 Tim. 1. 7. but of love and power, and of a sound mind. Most express is that parallel text, Gal. 4. 6. Because they are sons, he hath sent the Spirit of his Son into their hearts, that enables them (as also Rom. 8. 16. speaks) to say, Abba, Father, makes them understand their state, whose sons they are, and who is their Father, and really implants in them all filial dispositions and affections.

Wherefore it is most evident that the relative grace of the covenant only gives a right to the real grace of it; and that the real grace communicated in this life, is all comprehended in the gift of the Spirit, even that which flows in the external dispensations of Providence, not excepted. For as outward good things, or immunity from outward afflictions, are not promised in this new covenant, further than as they shall be truly and spiritually good for us; but we are, by the tenor of it, left to the suffering of very sharp afflictions, and the loss or want of all worldly comforts, with assurance, that will turn to our greater spiritual advantage; so the grace and sanctifying influence, that shall make them do so, is all from the same Fountain, the issue of the same blessed Spirit. We only add, that eternal life in the close of all depends upon it, not only as the many things already mentioned, do so, that are necessary to it, but as it is signified to be itself the immediate perpetual spring thereof. They that sow to the Spirit, shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting, Gal. 6. 8. And how plainly hath our blessed Lord signified the vast extent of this gift, when by good things in general, Mat. 7. 11. he lets us know he means the Holy Spirit, Luke 11. 13.

We therefore see, that this great gift of the Holy Ghost is vouchsafed entirely upon the Redeemer's account, and by the authority of his office, for the building and inhabiting the desolated temple of God with men. For the rebuilding of it; by that plenipotency, or absolute fulness of power, which, by the sacrifice of himself, he hath obtained should be in him. For the re-inhabiting of it, by virtue; and according to the tenor of that covenant, now solemnly entered; and which was established and ratified in the blood of that same Sacrifice. Herein appears the dueness of it to the regenerate; or that they have a real right to it, who are born of the Spirit; and
we have also seen the large amplitude and vast comprehensiveness of this gift.

II. We therefore proceed to what was, in the next place, promised, chap. ix. p. 415, (and wherein, after what hath been said, there will need little enlargement,) to shew,

(2.) How highly reasonable it was the Holy Spirit of God should not be vouchsafed for these purposes, upon other terms. And this we shall see,

[1.] By mentioning briefly, what we have been shewing all this while,—The vast extent and amplitude of this gift. Let it be remembered that the most considerable part of the penalty and curse incurred by the apostasy, was the withholding of the Spirit; from which curse in the whole of it Christ was to redeem us, by being made a curse for us. By the same curse also, our title to many other benefits ceased and was lost, and many other miseries were inferred upon it. But this one of being deprived of the Spirit did so far mount all the rest, that nothing else was thought worth the naming with it, when the curse of the law, and Christ's redemption of us from it, are so designedly spoken of together. If only lesser penalties were to have been remitted, or favours conferred of an inferior kind, a recompense to the violated law and justice of God, and the affronted majesty of his government, had been less necessarily insisted on. But that the greatest thing imaginable should be vouchsafed upon so easy terms; and without a testified resentment of the injury done by ruining his former temple, was never to be expected. Nothing was more becoming or worthy of God, than when man's revolt from him so manifestly implied an insolent conceit of his self-sufficiency, and that he could subsist and be happy alone, he should presently withhold his Spirit, and leave him to sink into that carnality which involved the fullness of death and misery in it. ("To be carnally minded is death.") It belonged to the majesty and grandeur of the Deity, it was a part of godlike state and greatness, to retire and become reserved, to reclude himself, and shut up his holy cheering influences and communications from a haughty miscreant; that it might try and feel what a sort of God it could be to itself: but to return; the state of the case being unaltered and every way the same as when he withdrew, no reparation being made, no atonement offered, had been, instead of judging his offending creature, to have judged himself, to rescind his own sentence as if it had been unjust; to tear his act and deed as if it had been the product of a rash
and hasty passion, not of mature and wise counsel and judgment; the indecency and unbecomingness whereof had been the greater and the more conspicuous, by how much the greater and more peculiar favour it was to restore his gracious presence, or (which is all one) the influences of his Holy Spirit. Further consider,

[2.] That since nothing was more necessary for the restitution of God's temple, it had been strange if, in the constitution of Immanuel for this purpose, this had been omitted: for it is plain that without it things could never have come to any better state and posture between God and man; God must have let him be at the same distance, without giving him his Spirit. Neither could He honourably converse with man; nor man possibly converse with Him. Man would ever have borne towards God an implacable heart. And whereas it is acknowledged, on all hands, his repentance at least was necessary both on God's account and his own, that God might be reconciled to him, who without intolerable diminution to himself, could never otherwise have shewn him favour. He had always carried about him the καρδιὰν ἀμεματηκὸν, the heart that could not repent. The "carnal mind," which is "enmity against God, is neither subject to him nor can be," had remained in full power; there had never been any stooping or yielding on man's part. And there had remained, besides, all manner of impurities: fleshly lusts had retained the throne; the soul of man had continued a cage of every noisome and hateful thing, the most unfit in all the world, to have been the temple of the holy blessed God. It had neither stood with his majesty to have favoured an impenitent, nor with his holiness to have favoured so impure a creature. Therefore, without the giving of his Spirit to mollify and purify the spirits of men, his honour in such a reconciliation had never been salved.

And take the case as it must stand on man's part, his happiness had remained impossible. He could never have conversed with God, or taken complacency in him, to whom he had continued everlastingly unsuitable and disaffected. No valuable end could have been attained, that it was either fit God should have designed for himself, or was necessary to have been effected for man. In short, there could have been no temple: God could never have dwelt with man; man would never have received him to dwell.

[3.] But it is evident this was not omitted in the constitution of Immanuel. It being provided and procured by his
dear expense, that he should have in him a fulness of Spirit: not merely as God; for so in reference to offending creatures it had been inclosed: but as Immanuel, as a Mediator, a dying Redeemer; for only by such a one, or by him as such, it could be communicated; so was there a sufficiency for this purpose of restoring God’s temple. And why was he in this way to become sufficient, if afterwards he might have been waved, neglected, and the same work have been done another way?

[4.] It could only be done this way, in and by Immanuel. As such, he had both the natural and moral power in conjunction, which were necessary to effect it.

The natural power of Deity which was in him, was only competent for this purpose. Herein had he the advantage infinitely of all human power and greatness. If an offended secular prince had never so great a mind to save and restore a condemned favourite, who besides that he is of so haughty a pride, and so hardened in his enmity, that he had rather die than supplicate, hath contracted all other vicious inclinations, is become infamously immoral, debauched, unjust, dishonest, false, and we will suppose stupid, and bereft of the sprightly wit that graced his former conversation; his merciful prince would fail preserve and enjoy him as before; but he cannot change his qualities, and cannot but be ashamed to converse familiarly with him, while they remain unchanged. Now the blessed Immanuel, as he is God, can, by giving his Spirit, do all his pleasure in such a case. And he hath as such too,

The moral power of doing it most righteously and becomingly of God, that is, upon consideration of that great and noble sacrifice, which as such he offered up. He is now enabled to give the Spirit: he might otherwise do any thing for man, rather than this: for it imports the greatest intimacy imaginable. All external overtures and expressions of kindness, were nothing in comparison of it. And no previous disposition towards it, nothing of compliance on the sinner’s part, no self-purifying, no self-loathing for former impurities, no smiting on the thigh, or saying, “What have I done,” could be supposed antecedent to this communication of the Spirit! The universe can afford no like case, between an offending wretch, and an affronted ruler. If the greatest prince on earth had been never so contumeliously abused by the most abject peasant; the distances are infinitely less, than between the injured glorious Majesty of heaven, and the guilty sinner; the injury done this majesty incomprehensibly greater.
And besides all other differences in the two cases, there is this most important one, as may be collected from what hath been so largely discoursed, that the principal thing in the sentence and curse upon apostate man, was, That God's Spirit should retire and be withheld, so that he should converse with him, by it, no more. The condemning sentence upon a criminal, doth in secular governments extend to life and estate; such a one might be pardoned as to both, and held ever at a distance. If before he were a favourite, he may still remain discounted. Familiar converse with his prince, was ever a thing to which he could lay no legal claim, but was always a thing of free and arbitrary favour. But suppose, in this case of delinquency, the law and his sentence did forbid it for ever; and suppose we that vile insolent peasant, before under obligation to his prince, for his daily livelihood and subsistence, now under condemnation for most opprobrious affronts and malicious attempts against him; he relents not, scorns mercy, defies justice; his compassionate prince rushes, notwithstanding, into his embraces, takes him into his cabinet, shuts himself up with him in secret: but all this while, though by what he does he debases himself, beyond all expectation or decency; the principal thing is still wanting, he cannot alter his disposition. If he could give him a truly right mind, it were better than all the riches of the Indies. This greatest instance of condescension, he cannot reach, if he never so gladly would. It is not in his power, even when he joins bosoms, to mingle spirits with him; and so must leave him as uncapable of his most valuable end, as he found him.

In the present case; what was in itself so necessary to the intended end, was only possible to Immanuel; who herein becomes most intimate to us, and in the fullest sense admits to be so called; and was therefore, necessary to be done by him: unless his so rich sufficiency, and his end itself, should be lost together.

Thus far we have been considering the temple of God individually taken as each man, once become sincerely good and pious, renewed, united with Immanuel, that is, with God in Christ, and animated by his Spirit, may be himself a single temple to the most high God.

III. I might now pass on to treat of the external state of the Christian church, and of the whole community of Christians, who collectively taken, and built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief
Corner-stone, in whom fitly framed and builded together, they grow unto an holy temple in the Lord; and are in this compacted state, a habitation of God through the Spirit. Eph. 2. 20. But this larger subject, the outer-court of this temple, is, I find, beset and overspread with scratching briers and thorns. And for the sacred structure itself, though other foundation none can lay, than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ, 1 Cor. 3. 11; &c. yet some are for superstructing one thing, some another; some gold, silver, precious stones; others wood, hay, stubble. I am, for my part, content, that every man's work be made manifest, when the day shall declare it.

Great differences there have long been, and still are; about setting up (the περιπλυτά) the pinnacles, and adjoining certain appendicles, which some have thought may innocently and becomingly belong to it. And very different sentiments there have been about modifying the services of it. Some too are for garnishing and adorning it one way, some another. And too many agitate these little differences, with so contentious heats and angers, as to evaporate the inward spirit and life, and hazard the consumption of the holy fabric itself. Ill-willers look on with pleasure, and do hope the violent convulsions which they behold, will tear the whole frame in pieces, and say in their hearts, "Down with it even to the ground." But it is built on a rock, against which the gates of hell can never prevail!

It ought not to be doubted, but that there will yet be a time, of so copious an effusion of the Holy Spirit, as will invigorate it afresh, and make it spring up out of its macilent, withered state, into its primitive liveliness and beauty; when it shall, according to the intended spiritual meaning, resemble the external splendor of its ancient figure; Sion, the perfection of beauty; and arise and shine, the glory of the Lord being risen upon it. But if before that time there be a day that shall burn as an oven, and make the hemisphere as one fiery vault; a day wherein the jealous God shall plead against the Christian church for its lukewarmness and scandalous coldness in the matter of serious substantial religion; and no less scandalous heats and fervours about trivial formalities, with just indignation, and flames of consuming fire, then will the straw and stubble be burnt up; and such as were sincere, though too intent upon such little trifles, be saved yet so as through fire.

A twofold effusion we may expect, of the wrath, and of the Spirit of God. The former to vindicate himself; the other to reform us. Then will this temple no more be termed for-
saken; it will be actually and in fact, what in right it is always, "Bethel, The house of God, and the gate of heaven." Until then, little prosperity is to be hoped for in the Christian church; spiritual, without a large communication of the Spirit, it cannot have; external (without it) it cannot bear. It was a noted Pagan's observation and experiment, *Infirma est animi, non posse puti divitiis—how incapable a weak mind is of a prosperous state.* Sen. In heaven there will be no need of afflictions: on earth, the distempers of men's minds do both need and cause them. The pride, avarice, envyings, self-conceitedness, abounding each in their own sense, minding every one their own things, without regard to those of another, a haughty confidence of being always in the right, with contempt and hard censures of them that differ, spurning at the royal law of doing as one would be done to; of bearing with others, as one would be borne with, evil surmisings; the imperiousness of some, and peevishness of others, to be found among them that bear the Christian name, will not let the church, the house of God, be in peace, and deserve that it should not; but that he should let them alone to punish themselves and one another.

But the nearer we approach, on earth, to the heavenly state, which only a more copious and general pouring forth of the blessed Spirit will infer, the more capable we shall be of inward and outward prosperity both together. Then will our differences vanish of course. The external pompousness of the church will be less studied, the life and spirit of it much more; and if I may express my own sense, as to this matter, it should be in the words of that worthy ancient,* namely, That supposing an option or choice were left me, I would choose to have lived in a time when the temples were less adorned with all sorts of marbles, the church not being destitute of spiritual graces. In the mean time, until those happier days come, wherein Christians shall be of one heart and one way, happy are they that can attain so far to bear one another's yet remaining differences. And who, since it is impossible for all to worship together within the walls of the same material temple, choose ordinarily to do it, where they observe the nearest approach to God's own rule and pattern; and where, upon experience, they find most of spiritual advantage and edification, not despising, much less paganizing those that are built with them upon the same foundation, because of circumstantial dis-

agreements; nor making mere circumstances, not prescribed by Christ himself, the measures and boundaries of Christian communion, or any thing else that Christ hath not made so: who abhor to say (exclusively) Christ is here, or there, so as to deny him to be any where else; or to confine his presence to this or that party; or to a temple so or so modified, by no direction from himself. And if any through mistake, or the prejudices of education and converse, be of narrower minds, and will refuse our communion, unless we will embrace their's upon such terms as to abandon the communion of all other Christians, that are upon the same bottom with ourselves and them; even as to them we retain a charitable hope, that our blessed Lord will not therefore exclude them; because, through their too intense zeal for the little things, whereof they have made their partition-wall, they exclude us. If again, we be not too positive, or too prone to dispute about those minute matters that have been controverted by the most judicious and sincere servants of our Lord, on the one hand, and the other, in former days, and with little effect; as if we understood more than any of them; had engrossed all knowledge; and wisdom were to die with us! and that with our bolt too suddenly shot, we could out-shoot all others that ever had gone before us: if our minds be well furnished with humility, meekness, modesty, sincerity, love to God, and his Christ, and our brethren, no otherwise distinguished, than by their visible avowed relation to him: this will constitute us such temples, as whereunto the blessed God will never refuse his presence. And do more to keep the Christian church in a tolerable good state, until the \( \pi \alpha \mu \delta \gamma \nu \epsilon \omega \alpha \) the times of restitution come, than the most fervent disputations ever can.

IV. And so I shall take leave of this subject, in hope that through the blessing of God, it may be of use to some that shall allow themselves to read and consider it. Only I request such as are weary of living as without God in the world, that they defer not to invite, and admit the divine presence; until they see all agreed about every little thing that belongs to his temple, or that may be thought to belong to it, but resolve upon what is plain and great, and which all that are serious, that have any regard to God, or their own everlasting well-being, cannot but agree in, that is, forthwith to "lift up the everlasting doors, that the King of glory may come in." Do it without delay, or disputatation. Let others dispute little punctilios with one another as they please; but do not you dispute this grand point with him. Look to Immanuel; con-

CHAP. XI. THE LIVING TEMPLE. 437
sider Him in the several capacities, and in all the accomplishments, performances, acquisitions, by which He is so admirably fitted to bring it about, that God may have his temple in your breast. Will you defeat so kind, and so glorious a design? Behold, or listen, doth he not stand at the door, and knock? Rev. 3. 20.

Consider as exemplary, the temper of the royal psalmist, how he sware—how he vowed—I will not come into the tabernacle of my house, nor go up into my bed; I will not give sleep to my eyes, nor slumber to my eye-lids, until I have found out a place for the Lord, a habitation for the mighty God! Ps. 132. Yours is a business of less inquisition, less expense! His temple is to be within you. Lament, O bitterly lament, the common case, that he may look through a whole world of intelligent creatures, and find every breast, until he open, shut up against him! All agreeing to exclude their most gracious rightful Lord, choosing rather to live desolate without him!

The preparation, or prepared mansion, is a penitent, purged, willing heart! Fall down and adore this most admirable and condescending grace; that the high and lofty One, who inhabits eternity, who having made a world, and surveying the work of his own hands, inquires, "Where shall be my house, and the place of my rest?" and thus resolves it himself: "The humble, broken, contrite heart! there, there, I will dwell!"

If you have such a temple for him, dedicate it. Make haste to do so: doubt not its suitableness. It is his own choice, his own workmanship; the regenerate new creature. He himself; as Immanuel, hath procured and prepared it, knowing what would be most grateful, most agreeable to him: to the most exalted Majesty; the most profound, humble, self-abasement. Upon this consummative act, the dedicating of this temple, I might here fitly enlarge; but having published a discourse already some years ago, under this title of Self-dedication; (which you may either find annexed to this, or have apart by itself, at your own choice;) thither I refer you. And because this must be a living temple; there is also another extent, upon these words: Yield yourselves to God, as those that are alive from the dead. That also, such as are inclined may, through God's gracious assisting influence, with eyes lift up to heaven, peruse unto some advantage.